PC remained after illegal re-entry search was purged from affidavit for SW

Even if information illegally obtained from an illegal search was removed from the affidavit for the search warrant, there still would be probable cause for the warrant. United States v. Lawrence, 205 Fed. Appx. 786 (11th Cir. 2006)* (unpublished). The same result occured in Ohio on November 9th. State v. Newell, 2006 Ohio 5980, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 5903 (2d Dist. November 9, 2006) (emergency entry in response to a shooting in progress; police re-entered after situation was resolved, and that was purged from the affidavit still leaving PC).

On November 4th there is a post about Microsoft creating software that permits tracing back webcasts of child porn that was used in Ontario to rescue a child from a live production. Related to that, and just before that article was published, there was an opinion from the District of Idaho involving a live transmission of child porn from Edmonton to Idaho which the police became aware of, and they obtained a search warrant in Idaho. United States v. Banks, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82368 (D. Idaho October 27, 2006). The issue here was particularity: When the affidavit for the search warrant states the crime under investigation, the fact parts of the material sought do not specify a crime within them does not matter because it relates back to the overall possible crime mentioned in the affidavit:

By contrast, in this case, it is quite clear from the face of the warrant that the search related to criminal possession, production and/or transportation of child pornography and the visual depiction of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. As defendant himself observes, the ten sections to which he does not object contain explicit and repeated mention of this specific criminal conduct. (Reply at 5.) Defendant’s hyper-technical reading of the cases above runs afoul of Supreme Court authroity, which has stated clearly that courts are to read a “warrant in a common sense fashion.” Cardwell, 680 F.2d at 77 (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965)); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-482 (1976) (rejecting a particularity challenge because the relationship between the items to be seized and the alleged criminal conduct was “clear from the context”). In this instance, there is a clear, commonsense, logical nexus between the items described in those six categories and the crimes listed elsewhere throughout in the warrant. Indeed, many of the disputed categories authorize seizure of items which are directly necessary for adequately processing and searching items listed in the undisputed categories. Therefore, the May 21, 2005, warrant has given a more than adequate “indication of the alleged crime to which the seized [items] pertained.” Kow, 58 F.3d at 427.

Voluntariness of Miranda warning and consent to search was supported by the record. People v Knudsen, 2006 NY Slip Op 8149, 2006 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13361 (2d Dept. November 8, 2006).*

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