Officers employed a knock and talk strategy which failed, so they decided that they had exigent circumstances and entered. The District Court found exigent circumstances, but the Fifth Circuit disagreed. United States v. Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 2007):
The district court found exigent circumstances and rejected Gomez-Moreno’s argument that the officers created them. Specifically, the district court concluded that exigent circumstances arose when the man exited the back door of the front house, saw the officers, and ran back inside. According to the district court, it was this situation, when coupled with the anonymous tip, the activities detected during surveillance, and the people that the officers saw through the window in the back house, that created probable cause and exigent circumstances. The district court concluded that these exigent circumstances permitted the officers to secure the house to protect their safety and the safety of those inside.
Not so fast. Reviewing the district court’s holding for clear error, we are “left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been committed.” See In re Missionary Baptist Found., 712 F.2d at 209 (quoting United States Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395). Here, the officers’ “knock and talk” strategy failed. In the first place, the officers improperly executed the “knock and talk” strategy, and secondly, the “knock and talk” did not result in someone voluntarily coming to the door. The purpose of a “knock and talk” is not to create a show of force, nor to make demands on occupants, nor to raid a residence. Instead, the purpose of a “knock and talk” approach is to make investigatory inquiry or, if officers reasonably suspect criminal activity, to gain the occupants’ consent to search. Jones, 239 F.3d at 720. Here, the officers did not engage in a proper “knock and talk” but instead created a show of force when ten to twelve armed officers met at the park, drove to the residence, and formed two groups–one for each of the two houses–with a helicopter hovering overhead and several officers remaining in the general area surrounding the two houses. When no one responded to the officers’ knocking, the officers impermissibly checked the knob on the door to the front house to determine if it would open, and simultaneously, at the back house, announced their presence while demanding that the occupants open the door. When officers demand entry into a home without a warrant, they have gone beyond the reasonable “knock and talk” strategy of investigation. To have conducted a valid, reasonable “knock and talk,” the officers could have knocked on the front door to the front house and awaited a response; they might have then knocked on the back door or the door to the back house. When no one answered, the officers should have ended the “knock and talk” and changed their strategy by retreating cautiously, seeking a search warrant, or conducting further surveillance. Here, however, the officers made a show of force, demanded entrance, and raided the residence, all in the name of a “knock and talk.” The officers’ “knock and talk” strategy was unreasonable, and accordingly, the officers created the exigent circumstances.
The district court erred in finding that exigent circumstances justified entry into the front house when the man exited the back door to the front house, saw the officers, and ran back into the house. According to the officers, they followed the man into the house because they needed to surprise the occupants and any potential armed smugglers to divert a possible shoot-out. This argument fails because the officers had already lost any element of surprise when they announced their presence, knocked on the doors, and demanded entry.
Defendant was stopped with reasonable suspicion, and officer told him to drop his duffle bag. When it hit the floor, it made a thud, so the officer was entitled to look for a gun. United States v. LePage, 477 F.3d 485(7th Cir. 2007).
Officer responding to a call about a gun pointing incident had specific information as to the car. They found the car, and that gave them cause to stop the car. When they stopped the car, there were furtive movements inside, and the officer believed he heard the sound of a gun hitting metal. That justified a patdown which validly produced cocaine. United States v. Bradley, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10050 (E.D. Ark. February 13, 2007).*
Court credits the testimony of officers that consent was validly given. As to the reason for the stop of defendant’s vehicle, the officer conceded that he was looking for an excuse, and defendant’s rolling through a stop sign was cause. United States v. Kimbrough, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9985 (E.D. Mich. February 13, 2007).*
Franks allegation in a § 1983 case failed because the officer at worst was somewhat negligent in ascertaining possibility of changes of conditions regarding issuance of an insurance policy that was a motive for insurance fraud. Porter v. Gray, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10143 (W.D. Pa. February 13, 2007).*
