Field sobriety test based on reasonable suspicion is not a Fourth Amendment violation

A field sobriety test, after a stop based on reasonable suspicion, is not an unlawful seizure. Arthur v. State, 216 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. App. — Ft. Worth 2007):

The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325-26, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). The scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Id. The scope of the detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purposes of the stop. Id. Furthermore, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicions within a short period of time. Id.

Here, Officer Berry observed Appellant’s car weaving out of its lane of travel and speeding. These articulable facts, combined with Appellant’s admission that she had been drinking, were sufficient to give Officer Berry a reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant further to administer field sobriety tests. See id. The administration of the field sobriety tests was the least intrusive means by which Officer Berry could verify or dispel his suspicion that Appellant had been driving while intoxicated. See id. This minimal intrusion into Appellant’s personal freedom was reasonable under the circumstances. See id. Accordingly, we hold that Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights and her rights under article one, section nine, of the Texas Constitution were not violated by Officer Berry’s temporary detention of Appellant and his request that she perform field sobriety tests.

Taking defendant to a police car to put him in did not elicit an incriminating response. Russell v. State, 215 S.W.3d 531 (Tex. App. — Waco 2007).*

Where the officer overextended the scope of consent, the search was unlawful. The defendant disclaimed ownership of a suitcase in the vehicle, but only after the stop had become unreasonable, so the motion to suppress was properly granted. State v. Veltri, 136 Wn. App. 818, 150 P.3d 1178 (January 25, 2007).

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