CA10: Pulling off I-70 at ruse checkpoint signs at off-ramp is not reasonable suspicion; more required

Relying on Edmond, United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2002), and United States v. Prokupek, 632 F.3d 460 (8th Cir. 2011), the Tenth Circuit holds that stopping cars that pulled off at an exit by ruse checkpoint was not based on reasonable suspicion. Pulling off was a factor in RS, but more is required. United States v. Neff, 10-3336 (10th Cir. June 5, 2012):

We agree with the Eighth Circuit that a driver’s decision to use a rural highway exit after seeing drug checkpoint signs may serve as a valid, and indeed persuasive, factor in an officer’s reasonable suspicion analysis. See, e.g., Carpenter, 462 F.3d at 987; United States v. Klinginsmith, 25 F.3d 1507, 1510 n.1 (10th Cir. 1994) (listing as one valid factor that “the defendants took an exit which was the first exit after a narcotics check lane sign, and an exit that was seldom used”). But standing alone, it is insufficient to justify even a brief investigatory detention of a vehicle. Here, of course, the government points to a number of other factors that the trooper relied on in forming reasonable suspicion, including: (1) Neff’s car had a Shawnee County license plate but was driving in Wabaunsee County; (2) the exit was in a rural area without highway services such as restaurants or gas stations; (3) Neff pulled into a private driveway where he did not seem to have any reason to be; (4) Neff had a startled look on his face when he saw the trooper.

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These facts, when taken together, do not fairly suggest that Neff was attempting to evade police. To be sure, an officer is “entitled to make an assessment of the situation in light of his specialized training and familiarity with the customs of the area’s inhabitants.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 276. But even considering the totality of the circumstances, Neff’s conduct conformed to the patterns of everyday travel. …