CA2: In getting arrest warrant, defenses don’t have to be considered

In a false arrest claim, the officer procuring the warrant doesn’t have to negate plaintiff’s defenses beforehand. Glover v. Onondaga Cty., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 8436 (2d Cir. Apr. 10, 2025)*:

A. False Arrest/Imprisonment and Fourth Amendment Claims

Claims of false arrest and false imprisonment are often viewed as synonymous and analyzed together. See Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995). The elements of a false arrest claim, whether brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or under New York common law, are that “(1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Id. (alterations adopted); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 366 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The elements of a claim of false arrest under § 1983 are substantially the same as the elements of a false arrest claim under New York law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Under New York law, a warrantless arrest raises a rebuttable presumption that the arrest is unlawful. See Curry v. City of Syracuse, 316 F.3d 324, 335 (2d Cir. 2003). However, “[t]he existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest.” Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Further, despite Glover’s arguments to the contrary, the existence of probable cause is not negated simply because Deputy Albanese did not have evidence of her state of mind and refused to accept her “innocent” explanation that the counterfeit bills must have come from the ATM. We have held that a police officer has probable cause to arrest even if he lacks evidence of the elements of knowledge or intent necessary to secure a conviction at trial, see Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 370-71 (2d Cir. 1989), and the law recognizes that “probable cause does not require officers to rule out a suspect’s innocent explanation for suspicious facts,” Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 61 (2018). For these reasons, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Glover’s claims of false arrest/imprisonment and Fourth Amendment violations.

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