CA10: Eight 911 calls about shots from a car essentially corroborated each other

“Taken together, eight corroborating emergency calls, all from the same general geographic area, all reporting gunshots, combined with the time of night and an exact match to the make, model, and color of the vehicle described in the call shows more than mere ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion.’ Chavez, 660 F.3d at 1221; accord Juvenile T.K., 134 F.3d at 904 (holding officers had reasonable suspicion when told a man had ‘broken out a window to a vehicle and that he had gotten into a gray vehicle and that he had a gun’); United States v. Burgess, 759 F.3d 708, 709 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding officers had reasonable suspicion when told ‘shots were fired from a black car traveling south’ on a particular street); United States v. Bold, 19 F.3d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding officers had reasonable suspicion when told about a ‘four-door gray Cadillac with three black males, one of whom was armed with a gun’). Here Officer DeGeorge had enough facts to warrant reasonable suspicion. Thus the district court did not clearly err when it denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on the initial stop.” United States v. Sherwood, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5471 (10th Cir. Mar. 10, 2025).*

Not a Franks violation: “the fact that Officer Allen knew Mr. Griffey had a medical marijuana card isn’t material to the probable-cause finding, because having a medical marijuana card doesn’t make it lawful to drive under the influence of alcohol or marijuana.” United States v. Griffey, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42908 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2025).*

“[E]ven if the vehicle stop were unconstitutional, the stop appears no more than an ‘error[] in judgment,’ like in Strieff, rather than flagrant police misconduct.” United States v. Frye, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42295 (D. Alaska Mar. 10, 2025).*