CA4: Entry without reason to believe defendant home was invalid

Police lacked reason to believe the defendant was in his house for entry without a warrant, surveying all the cases, and finding that even the lowest standard from other circuits was not met. United States v. Hill, 649 F.3d 258 (4th Cir. 2011):

This case is about the “centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the home.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999). Defendant, Torrance G. Hill, filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained in his residence without a warrant. The district court denied the motion, and determined that the police acted legally when they entered Hill’s home. Hill subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea while reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. We now hold that the district court erred in finding that the police’s initial entry into the house was valid, but that it properly found Ms. Alvarez’s consent for the second search was valid. We remand to the district court for a determination as to whether the taint from the initial illegal entry into the house was dissipated by Ms. Alvarez’s consent.

. . .

The police did not have sufficient reasons upon which to base their belief that Hill was present in the home to execute their arrest warrant. In Payton v. New York, the Supreme Court concluded that police may enter into a home without a search warrant in order to execute an arrest warrant only if “there is reason to believe [that the subject of the warrant] is within.” 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980). Generally, circuits have broken the analysis of whether the entry was lawful into two conjunctive parts: (1) whether there is reason to believe that the location is the defendant’s residence, and (2) whether or not there was a “reasonable belief” that he would be home. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 553 F.3d 6, 13 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 189 (1995).

Circuits have employed a variety of approaches in defining reasonable belief and its relationship to probable cause. Some circuits have found that reasonable belief is the same as probable cause. See United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 416 (6th Cir. 2008) (probable cause is the correct standard to use in determining an officer’s reasonable belief that the subject of a warrant is present in the home); United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); see also United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 469 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting an inclination to believe “that ‘reasonable belief’ is synonymous with probable cause.”).

Other circuits have simply found that the distinction between reasonable belief and probable cause is indefinite or negligible. See United States v. Barrera, 464 F.3d 496, 501 n.5 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that the distinction between probable cause and reasonable belief is “more about semantics than substance”), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 937 (2007); Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1535 (noting that it is “difficult to define the Payton ‘reason to believe’ standard, or to compare the quantum of proof the standard requires with the proof that probable cause requires.”).

While still other circuits have found that the requirements of reasonable belief are something less than probable cause. See United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“reasonable belief” requires less than probable cause), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1055 (2006); Valdez v. Machetes, 172 F.3d 1220, 1227 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. Later, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1995) (same). A final set of circuits has taken no position as to the relationship between “reasonable belief” and probable cause. United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Rise, 83 F.3d 212, 216 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Edmonds, 52 F.3d 1236, 1248 (3d Cir. 1995), vacated in part on other grounds, 52 F.3d 1251.

In light of the diverse views taken by our sister circuits, we decline to reach a conclusion as to whether ‘reason to believe’ is as stringent as ‘probable cause’ because we conclude below that the police entry was not justified even under the less stringent interpretation of the standard.