IA: LEO could not conduct parole search

Law enforcement officer’s search could not be justified by defendant’s parolee status. The court takes a foray into parole searches and doesn’t like Samson [only SCOTUS does]. State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 2010):

G. Academic Commentary on the Samson Approach. Academic commentary has generally been hostile to Samson and the departure of particularized suspicion. A raft of student notes takes the position that Samson spun the wheels off of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Robert Cacace, Recent Development, Samson v. California: Tearing Down a Pillar of Fourth Amendment Protections, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 223, 229-33 (2007) (stating that Samson confuses the reasonableness test with the special needs test, thereby undermining Fourth Amendment rights); John Lassetter, Article, Samson v. California: “Evil” Suspicionless Searches Become a Part of Everyday Life for Parolees, 25 Law & Ineq. 539, 554-55 (2007) (rejecting balancing test utilized by Samson and asserting that suspicionless searches of parolees are not reasonable); Rachael A. Lynch, Note, Two Wrongs Don’t Make a Fourth Amendment Right: Samson Court Errs in Choosing Proper Analytical Framework, Errs in Result, Parolees Lose Fourth Amendment Protection, 41 Akron L. Rev. 651, 681-88 (2008) (stating Samson ignores important Fourth Amendment interests of parolees and overstates state interests); David M. Stout, Note, Home Sweet Home?! Maybe Not for Parolees and Probationers When it Comes to Fourth Amendment Protection, 95 Ky. L.J. 811, 838 (2007) (arguing warrantless, suspicionless searches have negative impact on offender reintegration with little gain).

Leading academic commentators agree. For example, Professor LaFave finds Samson unpersuasive, characterizing the move away from “special needs” analysis into a general reasonableness analysis as “especially troublesome.” 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 10.10, at 44 (4th ed. Supp. 2010-2011).

. . .

The scope of the asserted power is stunningly broad. A person on parole for an alcohol-related crime, for instance, could be subject to warrantless searches of books, records, diaries, invoices, and intimate surroundings. The proposed invasion is not minimal and highly-defined as in Terry; nor is it closely-linked to an identified special need as in National Treasury Employees Union or Skinner. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 489 U.S. at 669-71, 109 S. Ct. at 1392-93, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 704-05 (urine testing of employees to avoid corruption in the revenue service); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623-24, 109 S. Ct. at 1416-17, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 663-64 (blood, urine, and breath testing for persons in safety sensitive jobs); Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S. Ct. at 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 910-11 (investigatory stops). The scope of the search in Samson thus is flatly contrary to the common-sense notion that “the scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S. Ct. at 1878, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 904 (quoting Hayden, 387 U.S. at 310, 87 S. Ct. at 1652, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 794 (Fortas, J., concurring)). The scope of search authority in Samson reminds one of the search of Coke’s premises and the seizure of his children’s poem and his will; there are no limits to the scope of the search. See White, 31 U. Pitt L. Rev. at 194 (comparing broad searches of parolees’ dwelling places to general searches condemned by Otis).