CA4: No RS to detain ptf to require him to ID himself; no QI

The officer here lacked reasonable suspicion to refuse to release plaintiff without plaintiff identifying himself under Hiibel and Brown. Moreover, there was enough case law on the subject to put him on notice to deny qualified immunity. Wingate v. Fulford, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 3130 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2021):

Read together, Brown and Hiibel illustrate that a valid investigatory stop, supported by Terry-level suspicion, is a constitutional prerequisite to enforcing stop and identify statutes. Necessarily so. The prevailing seizure jurisprudence flows from the idea that, short of an investigatory stop, a person is “free to disregard the police and go about his business.” Cf. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991); Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254-55 (2007); I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216-17 (1984). To be sure, officers may always request someone’s identification during a voluntary encounter. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35; Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216-17. But they may not compel it by threat of criminal sanction. Allowing a county to criminalize a person’s silence outside the confines of a valid seizure would press our conception of voluntary encounters beyond its logical limits. We therefore decline to do so here.

As discussed, Deputy Fulford’s initial stop was not justified at its inception. The Officers do not argue, nor does the record suggest, that they acquired constitutionally adequate suspicion of criminal activity between the deputy’s initial stop and the Officers’ eventual arrest. Accordingly the Officers enforced Stafford County’s stop and identify statute outside the context of a valid Terry stop, and arrested Mr. Wingate on that basis. The arrest was therefore unconstitutional. The district court erred in holding otherwise.

. . .

Deputy Fulford’s suspicion of criminal activity in this case is on par with that which we found insufficient in Slocumb, and pales in comparison to that which we found lacking in Massenburg. Because these cases placed Deputy Fulford on notice that suspicion of criminal activity must arise from conduct that is more suggestive of criminal involvement than Mr. Wingate’s was, he is not entitled to qualified immunity for his unlawful investigatory stop.