LA2 recognizes a sliding scale of exigency for DWI cases

Defendant’s stop by an off-duty law enforcement officer driving home who was outside her jurisdiction was valid under Virginia v. Moore. She called for assistance in handling a DWI, and a state trooper told her to stop the car. There is a sliding scale of exigency in DWI cases. State v. Stapa, 46 So. 3d 264 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2010):

In Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10 (2009) Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Scalia joined, dissented from the denial of certiorari. Justice Roberts observed:

There is no question that drunk driving is a serious and potentially deadly crime, as our cases have repeatedly emphasized. See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (“No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States’ interest in eradicating it. Media reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation on the Nation’s roads are legion”). The imminence of the danger posed by drunk drivers exceeds that at issue in other types of cases. In a case like (Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266) the police can often observe the subject of a tip and step in before actual harm occurs; with drunk driving, such a wait-and-see approach may prove fatal. Drunk driving is always dangerous, as it is occurring. This Court has in fact recognized that the dangers posed by drunk drivers are unique, frequently upholding anti-drunk-driving policies that might be constitutionally problematic in other, less exigent circumstances.

Considering the especially grave and imminent dangers posed by drunk driving; the enhanced reliability and training of the Greenwood officer; that she was in a marked police vehicle; that she was driving behind defendant and observed his driving; that she contacted a state trooper with jurisdiction and was told to stop defendant; that there were exigent circumstances; that the trooper was at the stop within seconds; that traffic stops are typically less invasive than searches or seizures of individuals on foot; and the diminished expectation of privacy enjoyed by individuals driving their cars on public roads, we find that the stop by the Greenwood officer did not violate the constitutional protections against unreasonable seizures.

[Well, then, what about murder and rape? Really big drug cases? Meth labs? Firearms?]

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