Consulting with an attorney after unlawful entry purged consent of taint of the illegal entry

North Dakota holds that a defendant’s consulting with an attorney after the police entered without consent purged the taint of the primary illegality. State v. Graf, 2006 ND 196, 721 N.W.2d 381 (September 13, 2006):

The district court said there was a short temporal proximity between law enforcement’s unlawful entry into the apartment and the time when officers began asking Parisien for consent to search the apartment. Although noting some courts have found a short temporal proximity resulted in a tainted consent to search, the district court nevertheless said that intervening circumstances may be sufficient to break the causal connection between unlawful conduct and consent. The crux of the court’s rationale for deciding Parisien’s consent purged law enforcement’s prior unlawful entry into the apartment is the court’s conclusion that Parisien’s consultation with an attorney before signing the consent to search was an intervening circumstance sufficient to purge the taint of the prior illegality.

. . .

Here, law enforcement permitted Parisien to consult with his mother and an attorney before he consented to the search of the apartment. According to one officer, the attorney spoke with the officer before speaking with Parisien, and the attorney spoke with Parisien for about ten to fifteen minutes in the hallway. According to Parisien, the attorney “took [Parisien] down the hall to the front steps to talk with [Parisien],” and Parisien “told [the attorney] what was going on [and the attorney] told [Parisien] to sign the consent to search because [the attorney] felt they were going to get the warrant anyway.” The attorney also served as a witness when Parisien signed the written consent to search the apartment. The nature of Parisien’s private consultation with an attorney is the crucial factor in this case. Under these circumstances, we conclude Parisien’s consent to search the apartment was voluntary and his consultation with an attorney was a sufficient intervening circumstance to purge the taint of the prior unlawful entry into the apartment. Moreover, on this record, we cannot say that the unlawful police activity was so flagrant as to require suppression of the seized evidence. We therefore conclude the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the evidence found in the apartment.

Defendant consented to further search of premises after parole officers entered with arrest warrant, and entry into bedroom was proper. State v. Young, 943 So. 2d 1118 (La. App. 1st Cir. September 15, 2006)* (This case has plenty of evidence of other potential felons on the premises and a protective sweep being required, but this is never discussed by the court.).

N.D. Ohio denies MSJ for officers in two shooting cases on the same day because of questions of fact over the justification for the shooting. Tomazic v. City of Cleveland, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65685 (N.D. Ohio September 14, 2006); Neace v. Perry Twp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65678 (N.D. Ohio September 14, 2006).*

E.D. Tenn. grants MSJ for officers on the use of a dog that attacked plaintiff, finding that plaintiff was warned before the dog was released. Baker v. Snyder, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65872 (E.D. Tenn. September 14, 2006).*

E.D. La. holds that police had PC to arrest based on citizens identifying plaintiff from enhanced surveillance video of a store robbery run on New Orleans television. Gaines v. Asaro, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65784 (E.D. La. September 1, 2006).*

S.D. Ind. finds PC for plaintiff’s arrest, and grants officer’s MSJ. Hubble v. Rice, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65900 (S.D. Ind. August 29, 2006).*

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