Choice between blood test or urine test did not make consent involuntary

The defendant having a choice between blood test or urine test did not make consent involuntary. Harrison v. State, 205 S.W.3d 549 (Tex. Crim. App. November 1, 2006), rev’g Harrison v. State, 144 S.W.3d 82 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2004):

The Court of Appeals found that “[t]he fact that Harrison’s consent was given to avoid painful physical pressures–more needle sticks, probably in her feet–weighs against voluntariness.” But the court failed to take into account the fact that Harrison did not withdraw her consent to provide a blood specimen before she consented to provide a urine specimen, a less-invasive alternative. So unlike cases where the person’s consent is the result of physical or psychological pressure from law enforcement officials, Harrison willingly chose to give her consent to a painless alternative.

Furtive movements of a traffic detainee who had a prior record for pointing guns gave the officer reason for a vehicle frisk under Long. United States v. Bynum, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79289 (D. Minn. August 16, 2006):

This behavior, coupled with Officer Burns’s knowledge that Bynum was driving with a suspended license and had been a suspect in at least two gun pointing incidents, gave Officer Burns sufficient reason to return to the Bronco to perform an inventory search in the event he was going to impound the vehicle and to perform a protective sweep of the Bronco for officer safety.

Comment: The court reached the right result, but phrased everything wrong.

Stop was based on first time confidential informant’s accurate predictive information. The officer walked up to the car and saw meth in plain view on the passenger seat. Cole v. State, 282 Ga. App. 211, 638 S.E.2d 363 (November 1, 2006).*

In another case yesterday, the same court held that a stop based on an informant’s information was valid. The defendant was asked about consent, but he neither agreed nor objected. Another officer asked if he was on parole, and he admitted that he was. His PO was called, and the car was searched on his parole condition and the search was valid. Police were not “stalking horses” for PO, and Knights’ rejection of that rationale is recognized. State v. Cauley, 282 Ga. App. 191, 638 S.E.2d 351 (November 1, 2006).*

911 call that child had OD’ed on methadone justified warrantless entry. Plain view and search warrant followed. State v. Chatterson, 942 So. 2d 646 (La. App. 2d Cir. November 1, 2006).*

Robbery victims’ detailed description of car gave PC to stop it and conduct a search incident when it drove by a police car in the place it was expected to be found. State v. Talley, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 802 (October 16, 2006).*

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