In a case involving use of a drug dog on a Greyhound bus in Utah, a drug dog alerted on a bag in the luggage compartment. In the passenger compartment, the defendant disclaimed ownership of a bag in the overhead rack that another passenger said he pushed away. That was an abandonment. They didn’t first search the bag in the luggage compartment before they boarded the bus to talk to passengers, and that wasn’t constitutionally required. United States v. Tubens, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16906 (10th Cir. September 2, 2014):
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One man was stripping insulation from copper wire in front of a house. The door to the house was partially open. The police thought that a burglary was in progress. They made no effort to determine whether the person in the house lived there before they entered. He did, and the entry was unlawful. People v. Lujano, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 771 (4th Dist. August 26, 2014):
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Testing DNA left behind on a chair in a police station did not require a search warrant. Raynor v. State, 2014 Md. LEXIS 538 (August 27, 2014).

Officers came for a knock-and-talk and developed a suspicion, likely less than reasonable, that there might be a gun inside, and it was taking too long to get an answer about consent, one way or the other. When the first occupant came back, they pushed through the door with guns drawn. Assuming that this entry was unlawful, the court finds consent attenuated by two factors. First, they talked at length with the defendant about consent before it was granted (would they “tear up” the place? etc.) while defendant smoked a cigarette. Second, the consent form provided that he had a right to refuse the search and they talked about it. United States v. Whisenton, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16900 (8th Cir. September 2, 2014).

Defendant’s 15 year old daughter properly consented to putting a wireless transmitter on her to record defendant sexually assaulting her. It was a proper one-party consent to a recording. Minors about this age can consent to a search so why not this (particularly when she’s the victim)? State v. Turner, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 681 (August 26, 2014).

A motorist reaching for his waistband as he gets from a car with five officers already drawn down on him can’t be presumed by the officers to be going for a weapon. Here, the unarmed Cruz was shot 20 times when he made such a reach, likely because he was tangled in the seatbelt he was still caught in when dead. Important to the court was the fact that the testimony might be considered by a jury simply self-serving and that one of the officers similarly shot an unarmed man two years earlier. Cruz v. City of Anaheim, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16705 (9th Cir. August 28, 2014):
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There is a diminished expectation of privacy in courthouse for security and decorum purposes. What is legal on the street may not be in a courthouse. Defendant was observed using his cell phone in a courtroom with strong suspicion he was taking pictures of witnesses in violation of a direct order to leave phones off. This 2012 warrantless search of the cell phone was unlawful either as a forced consent and lack of a warrant. Seizure of the cell phone is not suppressed, but the search of the phone is. People v. Weissman, 2014 NY Slip Op 24235, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3831 (Kings Co. August 26, 2014).

Defendant was stopped by U.S. Park Police for suspected DWI, and the federal regulation (36 C.F.R. § 4.23) on implied consent is not unconstitutional under McNeely. United States v. Muir, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119921 (D. Md. August 28, 2014), superseded 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61074 (D.Md. May 6, 2015).

This forfeiture is remanded on a 2-1 vote because the stop was continued too long, but the two votes are slightly different. “On appeal, all panel members agree that the initial stop was justified at its inception. But Judge Phillips and Judge Ebel both vote to reverse the district court’s order denying suppression. Judge Phillips reasons that reasonable suspicion of any registration offenses (expired, fake, or stolen license plates or registration tabs) dissipated when the trooper learned or should have learned that the State of Missouri had issued the plate and its registration tab within two weeks of the traffic stop; and that any reasonable suspicion that Wiley’s truck was stolen dissipated when Wiley handed the trooper his ‘original motor vehicle title receipt.’ Although Judge Phillips agrees with Chief Judge Briscoe that the trooper had reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity by the end of the stop, Judge Phillips reasons that the government cannot rely on the key facts suggesting illegal drug activity because the trooper learned those facts after Wiley was entitled to be released. Judge Ebel reasons that reasonable suspicion continued up to the point that the trooper returned Wiley’s driving documents and told Wiley he was free to leave. But Judge Ebel reasons that the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity before continuing to detain Wiley in order to deploy the drug dog. Chief Judge Briscoe dissents, reasoning that the trooper had reasonable suspicion of a registration-related offense up until he returned Wiley’s driving documents and further that by then he had a separate reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity. Accordingly, because two judges vote to suppress the evidence seized from the truck, we REVERSE the district court’s order denying suppression and REMAND for further proceedings.” United States v. $85,688.00 in United States Currency, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16639 (10th Cir. August 28, 2014).

A wiretap order [inadvertently] failed to include “electronic communications” in his search clause but the officers and the judge talked about it. This is Sheppard good faith. “The Court finds that the issuing judge and executing officers both understood the intended scope of the wiretap authorization, and that the authorization included interception of text messages. The Court also finds that the officers’ reliance on this understanding was ‘objectively reasonable.’ See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989-90 (1984) (‘[W]e refuse to rule that an officer is required to disbelieve a judge who has just advised him, by word and by action, that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search he has requested.’). As a result, the KBI’s interception of text messages falls within the good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, and the Court refuses to suppress them on the basis that the orders authorized interception of wire communications only.” United States v. Banks, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120779 (D. Kan. August 29, 2014).

“In his motion to suppress, Anderson argued ‘1) The consent to search was not knowing or voluntary. 2) If the consent was knowing and voluntary, the search exceeded the scope of the consent.’ Anderson now complains the search was unreasonably expanded beyond the purpose of the stop. This is a different claim, and one not raised before the district court. Therefore, it was not preserved for appeal, and we will not consider the issue.” State v. Anderson, 2014 Iowa App. LEXIS 872 (August 27, 2014).

Merely corroborating an anonymous tip that defendant would show up at a particular place isn’t corroboration enough to make the tip reliable. State v. One 2004 Lincoln Navigator, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 9557 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg August 28, 2014).

Binding precedent in California at the time of defendant’s cell phone search said that a warrant wasn’t needed, so Riley v. California is mooted here by Davis good faith exception. United States v. Peel, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118264 (E.D. Cal. August 22, 2014).

A[n apparently] pre-Riley cell phone search in Nevada was governed by Riley. There was no binding Ninth Circuit authority that said search incident was good enough before Riley was decided. Therefore, no good faith exception. United States v. Eisenhour, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119101 (D. Nev. August 25, 2014).

There was a fair probability that defendant seen with a handgun on his porch, not a public place under state law, violated state law, but that doesn’t give any justification to surround his house and order him out at gunpoint which violated Payton. It was at worst a misdemeanor. United States v. Nora, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16677 (9th Cir. August 28, 2014):
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