Inventory policy does not have to be written to be standardized. Here, it was reasonable to impound the vehicle where the arrest was at a Taco Bell drive thru and then conduct this inventory. The police would be negligent not to. United States v. Beckford, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36338 (N.D. Ga. February 2, 2010)*:

The government’s evidence with respect to the impound policy was thin but sufficient. Under the circumstances, any policy that did not allow for law enforcement to take custody of the Avalanche would have been illogical and dangerous. It would have been unreasonable, if not negligent, for the agents to leave the Avalanche unattended in the drive-thru lane or the private parking lot of the Taco Bell restaurant, particularly since there was reason to believe it might contain weapons and/or currency. …

That the search of the Avalanche began while it was still at the Taco Bell (for the purpose of ensuring officer safety) does not provide a basis for suppression of evidence. While the government characterizes the search at the Taco Bell as a “protective sweep,” I find that the initial search at the Taco Bell is more properly characterized as part of the inventory search, in that one of the justifications of an inventory search is to protect officers from potential danger. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372 (finding that after lawfully taking custody of a vehicle, law enforcement officers may conduct an inventory search of that vehicle in order to: (1) protect the owner’s property while it is in police custody; (2) protect the police from claims of lost or stolen property; and (3) “to guard the police from danger”) (emphasis provided). Whether characterized as a protective sweep or inventory search, it was reasonable for the agents to search the bed of the vehicle before they drove it away from the Taco Bell in order to ensure that no one was hiding in it who could pose a danger to them.

Yahoo, Feds Battle Over E-Mail Privacy by David Kravets on Wired.com:

Yahoo and federal prosecutors in Colorado are embroiled in a privacy battle that’s testing whether the Constitution’s warrant requirements apply to Americans’ e-mail.

The legal dust-up, unsealed late Tuesday, concerns a 1986 law that already allows the government to obtain a suspect’s e-mail from an ISP or webmail provider without a probable-cause warrant, once it’s been stored for 180 days or more. The government now contends it can get e-mail under 180-days old if that e-mail has been read by the owner, and the Constitution’s Fourth Amendment protections don’t apply.

Yahoo is challenging the government’s position and defying a court order to turn over some customer e-mail to the feds. Google, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Center for Democracy & Technology and other groups late Tuesday told the federal judge presiding over the case that accessing e-mail under 180 days old requires a valid warrant under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether it has been read.

“The government says the Fourth Amendment does not protect these e-mails,” Kevin Bankston, an EFF lawyer, said in a telephone interview Wednesday. “What we’re talking about is archives of our personal correspondence that they would need a warrant to get from your computer but not from the server.”

On eff.org: EFF Backs Yahoo! to Protect User from Warrantless Email Search. eff.org has the unsealed documents in In Re Application of the United States of America for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2703(d).

Plaintiff’s jail strip search in the presence of other inmates was not unreasonable, citing five cases. Miller v. Bailey, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99245 (E.D. N.Y. December 20, 2007).*

Defendant was found to have consented to a search of his hotel room, not just a weapon as he complained. United States v. Anderson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35650 (D. Minn. March 26, 2010),* R&R adopted, United States v. Anderson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35823 (D. Minn. April 12, 2010).*

Defendant’s Franks challenge fails. Considering the interview, it seems apparent that the right person was identified as the offender, and the search warrant is sustained. United States v. Jones, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35622 (W.D. Mo. March 22, 2010).*

Defendant was stopped for having a taillight out, something observable from the video of the stop. The officer was credible when he said that the defendant’s car smelled of marijuana. United States v. Lynch, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35890 (W.D. N.C. March 18, 2010).*

Defendant’s leaving his thumb drive in a common computer at work was a waiver of his expectation of privacy in it. His boss looked at the thumb drive and reviewed some folders finding child pornography. The boss’s search was not a law enforcement search. United States v. Durdley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35422 (N.D. Fla. March 11, 2010):

Additionally, the subsequent reviews of the thumb drive by police detectives did not exceed the scope of the private review conducted by Mr. Johnson. In United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984), and its predecessor, Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980), the Supreme Court affirmed that an individual can retain a legitimate expectation of privacy after a private individual conducts a search, but in Jacobsen the Court clarified that “additional invasions of [an individual’s] privacy by the Government agent must be tested by the degree to which they exceeded the scope of the private search.” Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115, 104 S.Ct. 1652. Here, since the police reviews of the thumb drive did not exceed Mr. Johnson’s, there can be no “additional invasions” to consider.

The mere fact that he was also employed by a government agency does not turn him into a part of the “law enforcement arm of the state.” Johnson’s testimony at the hearing established that he was using the computer for work purposes and not in a law enforcement capacity.

. . .

In sum, the Court finds that Mr. Durdley had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the thumb drive once he attached it to a common-use computer and forgot to remove it. Second, even if he did, the search by Mr. Johnson would be considered a private, rather than law enforcement search under Ortega and Reyes. Third, the subsequent police search did not exceed the scope of the private search. Thus, nothing about the search of the thumb drive justifies excluding the evidence found thereon.

On SCOTUSBlog: Where is the Fourth Amendment docket? by Orin Kerr re Monday’s oral argument in City of Ontario v. Quon, the text message search case.

It violates due process to transport a presumed innocent arrestee in the K-9 dog cage of the back of the police car with dog hair and dried urine and feces. Defendant’s claim of legitimate penological interest is rejected on the totality of the circumstances, and qualified immunity denied. Morris v. Zefferi, 08-3141 (8th Cir. April 13, 2010)*:

Because Morris was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged violation of his constitutional rights, we analyze Morris’s claim against Zefferi under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Owens v. Scott County Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979)). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee’s constitutional rights are violated if the detainee’s conditions of confinement amount to punishment. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 (“[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” (citation omitted)). “[P]retrial detainees are entitled to ‘at least as great’ protection [under the Fourteenth Amendment] as that afforded convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment,” …. The Eighth Amendment prohibits penalties “that transgress today’s ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.’” Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). “Punishment that ‘deprive[s] inmates of the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities’ is unconstitutional.” Owens, 328 F.3d at 1027 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).

. . .

Zefferi’s piecemeal analysis of the conditions of Morris’s confinement misses the point. In considering whether the conditions of pretrial detention are unconstitutionally punitive, we review the totality of the circumstances of a pretrial detainee’s confinement. See Owens, 328 F.3d at 1027 (citing Smith, 87 F.3d at 268) (“[A]ny analysis of confinement conditions must be based on the totality of the circumstances.” (citation omitted)). When considered separately and in isolation, Morris’s allegations of the unsanitary conditions of the cage, the degree of discomfort experienced by Morris, or the humiliation and degradation suffered by Morris may not appear to state a constitutional violation. But Morris did not experience these conditions in isolation. Morris was a presumed innocent pretrial detainee. According to Morris, he was forced to crawl into a small cage littered with dog hair, excrement, and dried urine. He was then required to lie in an uncomfortable position while restrained by a waist belly chain, handcuffs and ankle restraints, for a ninety-minute car ride. Exigent circumstances did not exist, and other transportation options apparently did exist. Based on the totality of the circumstances and accepting Morris’s allegations as true, as we must, we conclude Zefferi’s decision to transport Morris in this manner “transgress[ed] today’s broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685 (internal marks omitted).

Defendant argued that his consent did not permit the officer to remove the door and rocker panel. The officer had probable cause, so the scope of consent issue is moot. United States v. Calvo-Saucedo, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35222 (S.D. Ill. April 9, 2010).*

Defendant’s 2255 fails because his allegations against counsel were conclusory and belied by the record. There was one search, not three, and it was litigated in the suppression hearing. United States v. Torres, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35330 (S.D. Tex. April 9, 2010).*

When the statute of limitations started to run in this case is problematic, but moot because it ran no matter which view applies. Kuan v. United States Customs Serv., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126574 (C.D. Cal. December 16, 2009).*

Defendant was stopped when he pulled into a driveway. He was arrested for not having a DL, and the passenger didn’t have one either. He was allowed to call somebody to pick up his dog. Defendant claimed to know the people where he stopped, but nobody came to the door when the officer knocked. So, he decided to have the vehicle towed. The inventory was objectively valid, even if there was a mixed motive for it. State v. Dank, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 280 (April 8, 2010):

“The legality of an inventory search depends on two overlapping inquiries: the validity of the impoundment and the scope of the inventory.” Huisman, 544 N.W.2d at 436. If either is unreasonable, the search violates the Fourth Amendment and any evidence discovered in the search must be suppressed. Jackson, 542 N.W.2d at 845. Dank did not challenge the scope of the inventory. Rather, she challenged the validity of the decision to impound her truck. We look for the existence of reasonable standardized procedures and a purpose other than the investigation of criminal activity when examining the officer’s decision to impound. Huisman, 544 N.W.2d at 437. This analysis is intended to prevent courts from second-guessing professional judgments of busy police officers who are faced with the practical realities of limited time and expertise to make such judgments. Id. We utilize an objective test–“whether, when viewed objectively, an administrative reason for impoundment existed.” Id. at 439-40.

The Polk County Sheriff’s Department has a written inventory procedure. This procedure required impoundment when a deputy makes an arrest and the person arrested is the driver of the vehicle. The policy has a number of exceptions. One provides impoundment is not necessary if the owner of the vehicle is present and has a valid driver’s license. Another states impoundment is not necessary if the arrest is made on private property, the legal owner of the vehicle is present, and the vehicle can be left with the approval of the property owner. Neither Dicks, the driver, nor Dank, the vehicle owner, had a valid driver’s license. No one was present to consent to leaving the vehicle on the property.

“[A]n impoundment is unconstitutional if it is done to investigate suspected criminal activity.” Id. at 439. Where an administrative purpose exists to impound the vehicle, the impound is proper even if the officers are partially motivated by a belief the vehicle may contain contraband. Id. Dank alleges the impoundment of her vehicle was a mere pretext for an investigatory search for drugs. Our review finds otherwise. Although Funaro said he saw Dank crawl into the back seat and found this suspicious, this was after he had initiated the traffic stop. Funaro started the inventory search and discovered drug paraphernalia. He then called for assistance. The fact the inventory search took place at the scene rather than after towing the vehicle is not significant. … The Polk County policy called for an impound inventory at the scene and Huisman recognizes the validity of such a search unless the policy states otherwise. See id. at 439-40 (noting “[i]f the officers could have had a caretaking reason to impound the car, then we assume they did not act solely to investigate criminal activity”). Polk County’s policy states: “Impound inventories should be made at the place of arrest” and further instructs the officer to call a supervisor if illegal substances are found during an inventory search. We conclude the deputy complied with the department policy and the search was not motivated solely by an investigatory purpose.

Defendant was under investigation for trafficking in child pornography when he traveled to Colombia. On his return, he was selected for secondary screening, and officers looked at his laptop computer, finding child pornography. This border search was reasonable, even without reasonable suspicion, which the court finds there was. United States v. Verma, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34559 (S.D. Tex. April 8, 2010):

Here, Verma argues that the search of his computer and CD-ROMs at the airport was non-routine, in part because the agents brought in a forensic expert with “accompanying electronic equipment” to conduct a thorough search of the computer. At the outset, the court notes that the testimony does not support this characterization of the search. The forensic agent examining the computer–ICE Agent David Harrison–testified that the search he performed at the airport was a surface review of the files on the computer, and not, as Verma argues, a thorough forensic search of the computer. Moreover, the court finds that reviewing the files of a computer does not rise to the level of “invasion of the privacy and dignity of the individual” to make the search non-routine. See Kelly, 302 F.3d at 294.

Even had the search of the computer been as exhaustive as Verma claims, the court is not convinced it would be considered non-routine. The search of an object carried by the traveler threatens the dignity interest of the traveler far less than searches of the body of the traveler himself. Additionally, there is precedent to suggest that the thoroughness of the search is not dispositive. The Supreme Court, as recently as 2004, held that the search of a vehicle’s gas tank was routine when the customs agents called in a mechanic who “raised the car on a hydraulic lift, loosened the straps and unscrewed the bolts holding the gas tank to the undercarriage of the vehicle, and then disconnected some hoses and electrical connections. After the gas tank was removed, the inspector hammered off bondo (a putty-like hardening substance that is used to seal openings) from the top of the gas tank.” Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 151. The forensic examination of a computer would be achieved far more easily with less lasting damage than suffered by the car in Flores-Montano. Accord United States v. McAuley, 563 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (drawing parallels to the search of a car’s gas tank when finding the search of a computer’s hard drive to be routine). The search did not invade Verma’s body or damage his computer. Therefore, the search at issue in the instant case is routine.

However, even if it were non-routine, the search would still be constitutional. A warrantless non-routine border search requires a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing to be constitutional. Rivas, 157 F.3d at 367. Here, the agents had the requisite particularized and objective basis for suspecting Verma of transporting child pornography. First, they had already traced downloaded files containing child pornography to Verma’s IP address at his home. And, second, they knew that persons who deal in child pornography tend to carry at least some of it with them when they travel.

Defendant was stopped in Wyoming and consented to a drug dog search of his car. The dog alerted and the car was searched but nothing was found, so he was released. The Wyoming officer called ahead to South Dakota and warned them defendant was coming. Defendant was stopped in South Dakota for speeding, and “during the stop” a drug dog was “deployed,” alerting to a different area of the car. The officer noticed signs of changes in the vehicle and found a hidden compartment. Aside from the prior stop, this use of the drug dog was promptly into the stop, and probable cause developed. The Wyoming probable cause continued into South Dakota. Citing “The French Connection,” it is well known that vehicles have sophisticated methods of hiding drugs. United States v. Hernandez-Mendoza, 08-3898 (8th Cir. April 6, 2010):

… Even if we accept that Swets acted based in part on pre-existing probable cause developed in Wyoming, the search was not unreasonable. [¶] The stop by Trooper Swets was based on a traffic violation, so we need not be concerned with whether the probable cause from Wyoming would justify a second seizure. Cf. United States v. Garcia, 23 F.3d 1331, 1334-35 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Peters, 10 F.3d 1517, 1522-23 (10th Cir. 1993). The seizure here was reasonable, and we must consider whether Swets had probable cause to search despite the previous investigation. That a law enforcement supervisor in Wyoming determined to cease searching and to release the vehicle is not dispositive, for whether probable cause exists is a question of law to be determined objectively. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996). The Wyoming lieutenant decided that the vehicle did not contain drugs; Captain Hodge disagreed. The lieutenant outranked Hodge, but law enforcement’s pecking order does not make the supervisor’s subjective opinion controlling under the Fourth Amendment. In South Dakota, Trooper Swets observed the hidden compartment and food storage containers after about ten minutes of searching the vehicle. If there had been probable cause to search for another ten minutes in Wyoming before the vehicle was released, then there was probable cause for Swets to search for ten minutes in South Dakota based on the same pre-existing probable cause.

It is well established, and well known, that drug traffickers have developed sophisticated means to secrete contraband in vehicles. See United States v. Oliver-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505, 508, 512 (8th Cir. 2007); The French Connection (20th Century Fox 1971). …

Update: Corrected a seriously bad typo: The dog first alerted but nothing was found, and defendant was let go on his way.

U.S. Forest Service uses surveillance cameras in the woods

See US Forest Service admits putting surveillance cameras on public lands | Charleston man surprised when he found one while camping with daughter, by Tony Bartleme, about cameras in the Francis Marion National Forest in South Carolina:

How many hidden cameras are they using, and for what purposes? Is this surveillance in the forest an effective law enforcement tool? And what are our expectations of privacy when we camp on public land?

Officials with the Forest Service were hardly forthcoming with answers to these and other questions about their surveillance cameras. When contacted about the incident, Heitzman said “no comment,” and referred other questions to Forest Service’s public affairs, who he said, “won’t know anything about it.”

Heather Frebe, public affairs officer with the Forest Service in Atlanta, said the camera was part of a law enforcement investigation, but she declined to provide details.

The Colorado Senate unanimously approved House Bill 10-1201 that requires notice of a right to refuse consent when a police officer asks for consent.

See Bill strengthening rights against searches draws unanimous Senate support in the Colorado Independent.

Update: The Arkansas State Police adopted a consent form about 1990 to settle a drug profiling lawsuit with me, and the consent form includes a statement that the motorist has a right to refuse a consent. From all accounts, it did not appreciably reduce the number of automobile consents. The net result, the consent form became the strongest evidence of voluntariness of consent. You can lead a horse to water ….

Fourth Amendment, Revised T-Shirt from Irregular Apparel.

In the Palin e-mail hacking case (EFF here), the government made a showing to seize the defendant’s whole computer to copy the hard drive for an off-site search, which is usually the preferable method anyway. “The Sixth Circuit has upheld the seizure of a computer and the subsequent search of the computer off-site due to the ‘technical difficulties of conducting a computer search in a suspect’s home[.]’ Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 334-35 (6th Cir. 2001). In so holding, the appellate court observed that such a procedure necessarily involved the seizure of computer data unrelated to the offenses. Id. at 334. The Government contends that every other circuit to consider the issue has also held that the seizure of a computer (or a copy of its hard drive) and its subsequent search offsite does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” No special search protocol was required. United States v. Kernell, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32845 (E.D. Tenn. March 31, 2010):

Thus, the Court concludes that when the search warrant permits the agents to search a computer, they may search all of the files in that computer for the items to be seized:

Searching agents have the authority to look in any place where the evidence sought may be found. The methods employed in executing search warrants are left to the searching agent’s discretion as long as the methods are reasonable. Contrary to Defendant’s argument, [the executing officer] seized all of the computer equipment, not each individual file. This was proper because all of the computer equipment and storage devices were within the scope of the search warrant. [The executing officer] thus acted reasonably in executing the search warrant, and his examination of each file on Defendant’s computers and storage media was reasonable and necessary.

United States v. Ogden, No. 06-20033-STA, 2008 WL 4982756, *3 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2008) (holding that executing officer did not exceed the scope of the search warrant); see also Gilberson, 527 F.3d at 889-90 (holding that officers could search all the files on the computer for child pornography). “[S]o long as the computer search is limited to a search for evidence explicitly authorized in the warrant, it is reasonable for the executing officers to open the various types of files located in the computer’s hard drive in order to determine whether they contain such evidence.” United States v. Jack, No. S-07-0266, 2009 WL 453051, *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2009) (collecting cases).

This morning I sought to link to Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2008), for the following post. All three citations came back as “The motion of American Bar Association for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument is denied,” not the opinion on the merits. See the prior post here.

Alas, the link on Google Scholar is wrong. I reported it. Now we’ll see how fast it is fixed.

Over the last couple of years I’ve built a 17 page document with hyperlinks to free SCOTUS Fourth Amendment opinions on Findlaw and the Court’s website. I haven’t made it a part of this website yet, but will. I was thinking about converting it to Google Scholar links because Scholar is faster. Now I’ll wait a while.

Update: After 5pm CDT I ran it again by case name without the citation, and the opinion came up second. Running the citation still brings up the wrong thing.

ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), permits out of district search warrants electronic information where Rule 41 does not. United States v. Kernell, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32802 (E.D. Tenn. April 2, 2010).*

Violation of a prison directive concerning use of a flashlight during a rectal search does not translate into a § 1983 case. Perez v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32500 (N.D. N.Y. March 16, 2010).*

Detectives were involved in defendant’s stop for a “broken” taillight, and they disagreed whether it was merely a broken lens or actually burned out. If the lens were broken and the light not burned out, that is not a violation of the traffic code. The court finds the government did not prove a burned out taillight, and the stop was invalid. The one written report said “broken,” and the officer could not remember burned out. United States v. Walker, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32799 (M.D. La. March 10, 2010).*

In a report to the GAO of March 17, 2010, Statement of Steve Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues submitted TSA Is Increasing Procurement and Deployment of the Advanced Imaging Technology, but Challenges to This Effort and Other Areas of Aviation Security Remain which concedes full body scan technology might not have found the Christmas Day underwear bomb:

While officials said AITs [advanced imaging technology] performed as well as physical pat downs in operational tests, it remains unclear whether the AIT would have detected the weapon used in the December 2009 incident based on the preliminary information GAO has received.

In the following post, I went to Google Scholar to get a free public version of the cited cases to give links in the quote from the case. It worked much faster than going to Westlaw or Lexis or free sites like Findlaw or LexisOne. Bookmark Google Scholar so it will come up quickly. Copy the citation into the research block for “legal opinions and journals” and click “search.” The case comes up in about one second.

U.S. District Court decisions not in Federal Supplement likely won’t be found.

I don’t have the time to put in these links myself in the future, and I can’t afford to hire it done, but Google Scholar will make running down citations quick and free. Whether intense research will be as easy, I doubt it. Westlaw’s digest system, developed 135 years ago, powers it because word proximity searches within headnotes can find things other sources cannot.

Stop for driving with the door open and playing loud music did not justify a search incident of the car, so it was unreasonable under Gant. State v. Burke, 2010 Ohio 1433, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 1194 (8th Dist. April 1, 2010).*

Defendant’s furtive movements and his “large size thus heightened the need for Officer Waltermyer to take reasonable precautionary measures.” A patdown was thus justified. State v. Morris, 2010 Ohio 1383, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 1159 (10th Dist. March 31, 2010).*

Defendant’s stop for a traffic offense led to a finding that the vehicle license did not match it, so that led to defendant’s custodial arrest and a search incident. State v. Ewing, 2010 Ohio 1385, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 1167 (10th Dist. March 31, 2010).*

The trial court hearing and findings denying the motion to suppress an allegedly coerced consent search were not included in the record on appeal, so appellate review failed. City of Stow v. Issa, 2010 Ohio 1346, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 1129 (9th Dist. March 31, 2010).*

Officers executing search warrant gave defendant a copy of the warrant but without the particularity attachment, so he argued Groh v. Ramirez and Rule 41(f)(1)(C) were violated. The executing officers had the full warrant. The court found this not deliberate and not warranting suppression of evidence. United States v. Riesselman, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32183 (N.D. Iowa March 31, 2010):

However, numerous courts, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that this type of violation of Rule 41 does not mandate suppression unless “a defendant is prejudiced or if reckless disregard of proper procedure is evident.” United States v. Spencer, 439 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 1994)); see, e.g., United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 993, 994 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing cases from the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits). “Not all violations of this type of rule require the suppression of evidence; we have said that innocent mistakes that do not prejudice the defendant may be excused.” United States v. Zacher, 465 F.3d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Schroeder, 129 F.3d 439, 443-44 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Burgard, 551 F.2d 190, 193 (8th Cir. 1997)). Here, Jones had a complete copy of the warrant with him, including Attachment 1. Had Riesselman inquired about the absence of Attachment 1, and asked to see it, his request undoubtedly would have been granted, and Jones would have discovered his error in failing to provide Riesselman with a copy of Attachment 1.

There is no evidence that the officers’ failure to give a copy of Attachment 1 to Riesselman was deliberate. Further, Riesselman has failed to show he was prejudiced. Therefore, Riesselman’s motion to suppress the fruits of the search should be denied.

Rule 41(f)(1)(C):

(f) Executing and Returning the Warrant.
(1) Warrant to Search for and Seize a Person or Property.
(A) Noting the Time. …
(B) Inventory. …
(C) Receipt. The officer executing the warrant must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken or leave a copy of the warrant and receipt at the place where the officer took the property.