Officer was justified in frisking defendant for weapons after the car he was in was stopped and a drug dog gave a positive alert. Stokeling v. State, 189 Md. App. 653, 985 A.2d 175 (2009).

In response to defendant’s claim that his search incident was invalid under Gant, the government instead relies on reasonable suspicion for the stop, which was found, and probable cause for a search based on the smell of marijuana, which was found. United States v. Awolowo, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121798 (E.D. Tenn. December 14, 2009).*

Defendant was speeding. “The fact that the officers were looking for Jesus Huerta to arrest him on an outstanding federal warrant is quite beside the point; so-called pretextual traffic stops are permissible so long as the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred.” United States v. Huerta, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121778 (E.D. Tenn. December 9, 2009)* (And, if they had PC to believe that Huerta was in the vehicle, that would support the stop, too.)

A person not legitimately on the premises at the time of an alleged illegal search has no “standing” to sue either. McPheters v. City of Boise, 361 Fed. Appx. 754 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Officers were assured that defendant was in the place where the officers went with an arrest warrant, so the entry was with knowledge he would be found there. United States v. Collins, 359 Fed. Appx. 639, 2010 FED App. 0001N (6th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant showed up at a house being searched under a search warrant, and rang the doorbell. One of the officers invited him in and then searched him without any effort to determine his connection to the premises. The search was unreasonable. Defendant was seized when he came into the house. People v. Chestnut, 398 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 336 Ill. Dec. 955, 921 N.E.2d 811 (2010).

The officer was told that the defendants were hauling cash hidden in the dashboard before the stop was made for a traffic offense. The defendant’s conduct after the stop was reasonable suspicion to continue questioning about drugs and cash. A dog was called, and it arrived within 15 minutes so the stop was not unreasonably extended. United States v. Guzman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123232 (D. Minn. November 25, 2009).*

The evidence supports the District Court’s finding that the defendant consented during a knock-and-talk of the hotel room where he lived. United States v. Phillips, 361 Fed. Appx. 679, 2010 FED App. 0028N (6th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Plaintiff’s complaint that an officer induced her to have her husband arrested for a domestic dispute after she did not want to and then had her ride with him and touched her hand saying that he wanted to date her stated a Fourth Amendment claim without qualified immunity. Wilson v. Wilkins, 362 Fed. Appx. 440, 2010 FED App. 0030N (6th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

The search of defendant’s car for a weapon was permissible under Michigan v. Long, so Gant did not apply. State v. Butler, 296 Conn. 62, 993 A.2d 970 (2010).

Typo in address (174 v. 184) could be overlooked where it was the only house that otherwise matched the description: mobile home perpendicular to the road, dog pen in backyard, only house in proximity. Price v. State, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 377, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 1395 (April 7, 2010).

Defendant’s wife who had equal access to his computer, although she had her own, had the apparent authority to consent to search and seizure of defendant’s computer by the police after she saw child pornography on it. She feared violence by the defendant so she called the police. United States v. Harper, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43616 (E.D. Mo. April 23, 2010).*

While the search of defendant’s car might have been invalid under the later decided Gant, it would have inevitably been searched under a search warrant, so the motion to suppress is denied. United States v. Norwood, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43432 (E.D. Ark. April 1, 2010).*

Defendant had no special expectation of privacy in the common areas of his condominium that were secured by security codes. The police came to the building to do a knock-and-talk and got access by entering after another tenant came out. His girlfriend admitted them, and drugs and drug paraphernalia were in plain view. State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723 (Tenn. 2010), aff’g State v. Talley, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 506 (July 1, 2009):

Having considered our 2001 holding in Ross and the developments in the federal courts of appeal since the Sixth Circuit decision in Carriger, we reject any bright-line rule and maintain our view that the totality of the circumstances test is best-suited for determining the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy. Application of these factors to the circumstances existing at Hedrick Place favors the State. Although the Defendant had a 1/21st ownership interest in the common areas of the building and the front entrance was locked at all times, each of the residents, according to Reasor, had the right to permit entry without restrictions. Neither the Defendant nor any other resident could unilaterally exclude others rightfully within the hallway. While the Defendant was entitled to privacy in his condominium unit, there is no evidence that he exhibited a subjective expectation that the common areas, and particularly the hallways, would be free from intermittent access by the police. To the contrary, the record establishes that the condominium residents had collectively provided not only the police department but also several others with the entry code for use in the ordinary course of their duties. Police access was “discretionary” and not always limited to emergencies. Moreover, there is no evidence that the Defendant had taken any precautions to maintain his privacy in the common areas of the building. The totality of these circumstances establish that the Defendant could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior hallway between the condominium entrance and the door to his particular unit.

Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense, and the paperwork was completed in 12 minutes. When defendant would not consent to a search, a drug dog was called, and its task extended the whole stop to 29 minutes. There was no reasonable suspicion, and the de minimus rule of $404,905 is rejected, not that this was de minimus. Whitfield v. State, 33 So. 3d 787 (Fla. App. 5th DCA 2010).

Defendant got out of her car with purse in hand. When she was arrested, her purse was searched incident to her arrest. It was not unreasonable under Gant because the car was not entered. State v. Johnson, 155 Wn. App. 270, 229 P.3d 824 (2010), ordered published by, Modified by State v. Johnson, 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 867 (Wash. Ct. App., Apr. 22, 2010)
.*

Excessive nervousness, air freshener in the back, and a suspicious answer to travel plans was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Castelan-Benitez, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 8803 (11th Cir. April 28, 2010) (unpublished).*

While the affidavit for the search warrant did not show probable cause, the officer’s reliance on it was not unreasonable because it was not so lacking in probable cause as to render reliance on it unreasonable. United States v. Wiley, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116899 (D. Minn. December 15, 2009)*, affg United States v. Wiley, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116901 (D. Minn. October 15, 2009) (USMJ R&R)*:

Even an affidavit that has an obvious facial flaw may not be “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” that it renders an official’s belief in the existence of probable cause “entirely unreasonable.” In Leon, for example, one of the defendants argued that “no reasonably well trained police officer could have believed that there existed probable cause to search his house,” because “the affidavit included no facts indicating the basis for the informants’ statements concerning [the defendant’s] criminal activities and was devoid of information establishing the informants’ reliability.” 468 U.S. at 905, 926. The Court disagreed, stating that the “application for a warrant clearly was supported by much more than a ‘bare bones’ affidavit. The affidavit related the results of an extensive investigation and … provided evidence sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause.” Id. at 926. The Eighth Circuit has “found Leon applicable even when a facially obvious error exists on a warrant.” Hessman, 369 F.3d at 1021. In United States v. Hessman, the Eighth Circuit concluded that an officer’s good faith reliance on a warrant was objectively reasonable, even though the officer had failed to sign his affidavit and the magistrate had failed to administer an oath, noting that “(1) the state magistrate had made a probable cause determination, (2) the affidavit provided specific information about the objects of the search, (3) the affiant . . . helped execute the warrant, and (4) the warrant could have been made valid by the addition of [the affiant’s] signature and administration of an oath.” Id. at 1023.

The Court concludes that even though Officer Babekuhl’s affidavit fails to establish probable cause, it was not “entirely unreasonable” for Officer Babekuhl to believe that it contained sufficient indicia of probable cause. Officer Babekuhl’s affidavit contained specific information establishing his reasons for believing that the residents of the house were selling narcotics. It made reference to citizen complaints, Officer Babekuhl’s personal observations consistent with those complaints, information from a CRI confirming that the residents are dealing narcotics, and a description of a controlled buy that the CRI conducted with a specific individual in the house.

Taking DNA from a convict is not unconstitutional. Here, it linked defendant to another crime. Sanchez v. State, 2009 OK CR 31, 223 P.3d 980 (2009).*

A shaving kit was searched incident to arrest pre-Gant (and certainly appeared invalid under Gant), but the defendant did not make a proper objection, so it was waived for appeal. Bishop v. State, 308 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. App. — San Antonio 2009).*

Inevitable discovery supports the search here because the officer would have been able to arrest the defendant, and it would have been found by an inventory. United States v. Garcia-Covarrubias, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117136 (N.D. Tex. December 16, 2009).*

Nexus was shown for the search warrant of defendant’s car for ecstasy pills. Investigation showed that 9,500 pills were being trafficked in defendant’s car, and it was common for drug traffickers to keep stuff in their house. United States v. Khami, 362 Fed. Appx. 501, 2010 FED App. 0050N (6th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

A witness saw defendant get into a fight and heard gunshots, and she called the police. This was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop. United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 2010).*

While the search of defendant’s car “was not justified as a search incident to arrest under Gant,” it was valid as an automobile search. United States v. Cooper, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123984 (W.D. La. October 15, 2009).*

Whether defendant’s registration of his vehicle was valid was a question of fact about which the officer was likely mistaken, such that good faith would not apply. However, he was speeding, and that justified the stop. United States v. Reyes, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123989 (W.D. La. February 25, 2009).*

Court considers good faith exception first, probable cause second in evaluating the validity of a search warrant. The court finds that an open barnlike structure that was before the living area was not a part of the curtilage. Defendant’s argument that the doors were left open for weeks because of hurricane damage supports the lack of curtilage. United States v. Cooke, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6287 (S.D. Tex. January 27, 2010).*

The Illinois Court of Appeals follows Hudson in not applying the exclusionary rule to a no-knock violation under its state constitution, finding that the state Supreme Court would probably follow Hudson. People v. Glorioso, 398 Ill. App. 3d 975, 338 Ill. Dec. 627, 924 N.E.2d 1153 (2010)*:

We turn to the second prong–long-standing state constitutional law. Here, we find little to suggest that the supreme court would conclude (or that we ought to conclude) that adopting Hudson would violate established precedent. Although the supreme court applied the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations in Ouellette and Condon, the court in each case assumed, without any discussion, that the exclusionary rule applied under both the federal and the state constitutions. See Condon, 148 Ill. 2d at 108; Ouellette, 78 Ill. 2d at 521-22. While such an unspoken assumption was entirely reasonable under the circumstances, it is hardly the stuff of which “state tradition and values” (Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d at 314) are made. Moreover, because the Condon and Ouellete courts did not have to decide whether to deviate from fourth amendment precedent in construing article I, section 6, their opinions say nothing about what they would have done had the Supreme Court previously decided that the federal exclusionary rule did not apply to knock-and-announce violations. Thus, to decide whether anything in our case law now requires excluding evidence seized in violation of the knock-and-announce rule, we must look elsewhere. But when we do, we find little.

Apparently, the only time that the supreme court has deviated from lockstep in its construction of the state exclusionary rule is Krueger. As we have noted, although that case did involve an unconstitutional no-knock search, the type of the search was not pertinent to the court’s decision. Rather, that decision was based on the distinction between the actions of a magistrate issuing a warrant in an individual case and a statute that has the potential to violate the constitutional rights of many people without any redress. This distinction militates against departing from lockstep for knock-and-announce violations. Although these infringements of constitutional rights are committed by police officers rather than magistrates, either type “‘affects one person at a time,'” in contrast to legislation authorizing unconstitutional searches, which “‘may affect thousands or millions and will almost always affect more than one.'” Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d at 73, quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 365, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 385, 107 S. Ct. at 1175 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.). Moreover, whatever one makes of the debate in Hudson over the effectiveness of civil suits as relief against violations of the knock-and-announce rule, there is no doubt that such relief is available. By contrast, as Krueger stressed, no relief is available against a legislature that has authorized unconstitutional searches and seizures. See Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d at 75.

Defendant juvenile effectively consented to a search of his house for psychedelic mushrooms. The officer called him on his cell after having been given the number by another juvenile who consumed them. He got the defendant to meet him at defendant’s house, and he promised not to take him in if he turned over the drugs. “Officer Hansen told R.A. that he needed the drugs to complete his report and that he would ‘not take [R.A.] to juvenile detention’ if R.A. came home and gave the drugs to Officer Hansen. After R.A. agreed to leave work and come home, Officer Hansen asked R.A. to clarify whether he was going to turn over the items or if Officer Hansen should ‘try for a warrant.’ R.A. responded that ‘he didn’t want [Officer Hansen] to try for a warrant.’” State ex rel. R.A. v. State, 2010 UT App 71, 231 P.3d 808 (2010).*

Another success for the Columbo gambit (see here, too), although the court does not call it that. See LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1843, 1898 (2004) (argues officers can “obviate any and all time and scope limitations” by performing “the well-known Lt. Columbo gambit [‘one more thing …’]”; State v. Thompson, 284 Kan. 763, 166 P. 3d 1015, 1027 (2007); Brown v. State, 182 P.3d 624, 632 (Alaska App. 2008). Beware of police officers saying “I just need to complete my report” or “The boys downtown require it.”

Defendant’s nervousness, an unusual number of air fresheners, and inability to name any passenger was reasonable suspicion. A drug dog was called, and the stop was not unreasonably long. State v. Sherrod, 2010 Ohio 1273, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 1085 (11th Dist. March 26, 2010).*

The police conducted an illegal search of defendant’s house even with a signed consent form, and they exploited the prior illegality. Essentially, this search was clearly and objectively illegal. State v. Gorup, 279 Neb. 841, 782 N.W.2d 16 (2010):

We conclude that the district court incorrectly relied on the fact that Gorup did not see, and the police did not confront him with, the evidence Simones discovered during his illegal search before Gorup gave his consent to search again. This was not an intervening circumstance. Accepting this reasoning would permit officers to validate illegal searches and seizures by simply never confronting suspects with evidence they have illegally discovered or seized before obtaining their consent to search again. Our conclusion is not altered because Simones advised Gorup that he could refuse consent to search.

Both the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have rejected the argument that a signed consent form, which advises suspects of their right to refuse consent, is a sufficient intervening circumstance to purge the taint of an illegal action when it is obtained shortly after the illegal action: “This would effectively eviscerate the exclusionary rule’s goal of deterring police misconduct because it would give officers who recently violated a suspect’s constitutional rights a chance to grant themselves a free pass by uttering a few magic words and encourage–rather than discourage–investigatory shortcuts.” And the Ninth Circuit further recognized that permitting such advisements to purge the taint of the prior illegal search would be contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of an analogous argument in Brown v. Illinois.

. . .

The State argues that the detectives, while mistaken in their belief that their conduct was legal, did not engage in flagrant misconduct. But the State fails to recognize that flagrant misconduct includes investigatory conduct that results in an obvious Fourth Amendment violation.

[17] We agree with federal courts that have stated the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct is the most important attenuation factor because it is directly tied to the exclusionary rule’s purpose–deterring police misconduct. …

. . .

[19] In this case, the court’s reliance on whether the detectives knew their conduct was illegal missed the mark because it applied a subjective standard. Obviously, if the detectives had admitted that they knew the search was illegal, their misconduct would have been flagrant. But, here, the detectives were never asked whether they subjectively believed the search was legal. And even if law enforcement officers do not subjectively know that their conduct is illegal, they are also chargeable with knowing when their conduct is an obvious violation of the Fourth Amendment under an objective standard of reasonableness.

. . .

Our adherence to solid legal moorings requires that we reverse the trial court’s ruling. For 40 years, U.S. Supreme Court case law has prohibited this type of search. In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Chimel v. California that a search incident to arrest is limited to the arrestee’s person and the area within his or her immediate control. The following year, the Court specifically held that a warrantless search of a house was invalid as a search incident to an arrest when the defendant was arrested on the front steps of his house. We applied both of these decisions in a 1982 case to conclude that a warrantless search of a house was illegal. Many courts have long held that an arrest must take place within a suspect’s residence to justify the search of the residence as an incident to the arrest, even in cases preceding Chimel.

A peak into the garage window to see if defendant’s SUV was parked there in looking for the defendant shortly after a murder was not an unreasonable search. State v. Herring, 387
S.C. 201, 692 S.E.2d 490 (2009):

Under the circumstances presented, we find the exigencies of the situation justified Officer Linfert’s look into Herring’s garage at 2:00 a.m. It is undisputed that police had knowledge of Herring’s identity, his residence, the make and model of his vehicle, and his license tag number. Officer Linfert testified that upon arriving at the home, he saw a light on in the garage and therefore looked through the window to see if the suspect was inside. Police officers were looking for a suspected murderer whom they knew was likely to be armed with a deadly weapon.

We find it was objectively reasonable for Officer Linfert to take precautions to protect his own safety, and the safety of the officers around him, by looking into the garage to see if the suspect was there. When nobody was in the garage, police followed proper procedure by knocking on the door and ringing the doorbell. Receiving no answer, they stationed men at the house and went to obtain a warrant. Given the exigent circumstances then and there presenting, we find Officer Linfert’s minimal intrusion was objectively reasonable and did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. Cf. Chimel v. California.

Moreover, Officer Linfert’s peek into the garage yielded no evidence against Herring. Police already had knowledge of the make, model and license plate number of the vehicle the suspect drove; they knew the automobile was registered to Herring, and they knew his residential address was 406 Alexander Circle. Officer Linfert’s observation of the vehicle in the garage yielded no evidence which further inculpated Herring. We find the trial court erred in holding this initial “search” violated Herring’s Fourth Amendment rights; the de minimis intrusion to secure the officers’ safety did not necessitate suppression.

Search incident may precede actual arrest if there is probable cause. [The case law has supported this for at least 40 years.] United States v. McCauley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17162 (W.D. Wis. February 2, 2010).

CI’s controlled buy was probable cause for search warrant. State v. Dee, 34 So. 3d 892 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2010).*

Defendant was not being pursued when he ran and tossed a gun. The officer walked into an area where defendant was, and apparently was not even focused on defendant when he took off and dropped the gun. State v. Loeb, 34 So. 3d 917 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2010).*

While this was a really close case, the court finds reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop and eventual patdown. Commonwealth v. Cabrera, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 341, 921 N.E.2d 1026 (2010).*

Defendant’s window tint stop led to finding an arrest warrant on him and that led to a valid search. People v. Carter, 182 Cal. App. 4th 522, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805 (2d Dist. 2010).*

A police safety checkpoint set up for no apparent reason was unreasonable. State v. Sigler, 224 W. Va. 608, 687 S.E.2d 391 (2009):

We hold that a stop of a motor vehicle at a police checkpoint such as the stoppage here is intrusive to private citizens. Such an intrusion is by its constitutional nature a seizure. As in Brown, in evaluating the lawfulness of a suspicionless seizure such as here, we believe that a balancing of interests should be considered to determine if such a seizure is permissible under the United States Constitution and the Constitution of West Virginia and these factors should be considered: (1) the gravity of the public concern that is being addressed or served by the checkpoint; (2) the degree to which the checkpoint is likely to succeed in serving this public interest; and (3) the severity with which the checkpoint interferes with individual liberty. When evaluating the degree of severity of interference with individual liberty, West Virginia courts must consider not only the subjective intrusion determined by the potential of the checkpoint to generate fear and surprise in motorists, but also the objective intrusion into individual freedom as measured by the duration of the detention at the checkpoint and the intensity of the inspection. The court’s obligation in weighing these factors is to assure that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.

In conclusion, suspicionless checkpoint roadblocks are constitutional in West Virginia only when conducted in a random and non-discriminatory manner within predetermined written operation guidelines which minimize the State’s intrusion into the freedom of the individual and which strictly limits the discretion vested in police officers at the scene. The checkpoints utilized by law enforcement herein were improper and any evidence derived therefrom should have been suppressed.

When officers received no response to their knock-and-talk at the front door, they could go to the back door without violating cartilage. A burn barrel in the back yard was seen, and a search warrant was obtained. United States v. Rothermich, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45798 (E.D. Mo. April 30, 2010):

To the extent that the defendant claims that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering onto his property to conduct their “knock and talk” procedure, such claim has no merit. “Law enforcement officers may encroach upon the curtilage of a home for the purpose of asking questions of the occupants.” United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 866 (2001); United States v. Raines, 243 F.3d 419, 421 (8th Cir. 2001). Nor does the fact that the officers walked to the rear of the structures in order to locate occupants of the property constitute any Fourth Amendment violation. United States v. Anderson, 552 F.2d 1296, 1300 (8th Cir. 1977)(“We cannot say that the agents’ actions in proceeding to the rear after receiving no answer at the front door was so incompatible with the scope of their original purpose that any evidence inadvertently seen by them must be excluded as the fruit of an illegal search.”).

[This just smells wrong because it is too convenient to make it up.]

Habeas petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim was fully and fairly considered in the state court, so federal court has no jurisdiction to decide it. Mason v. Allen, 605 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 2010).*

Trial court’s conclusion of lack of consent was based in part on body language on the video of the stop, and it supported the finding. The owner of the car had standing in the trunk of the car, but the passenger did not, as in Rakas. Commonwealth v. Powell, 2010 PA Super 51, 994 A.2d 1096 (2010).

When the car was stopped and the occupant ordered out of the car, the officers saw the stolen property in the back seat in plain view. That gave them reasonable suspicion to question driver and passenger. State v. Zaldivar, 34 So. 3d 76 (Fla. App. 3DCA 2010).*

Defendant stop after seeing something handed over was not probable cause because the officers lacked a reasonable belief that it was a drug transaction. Hankerson v. State, 32 So. 3d 175 (Fla. App. 4DCA 2010)*:

[I]n this case Lucas did not see what defendant exchanged for money. Schmidt did not see what was in his shoe. They did not see him similarly involved in more than one occasion. These patterns on which they rely also occur in innocent public transactions and are not unique to narcotics violations. These patterns may be enough to inform a suspicion for further investigation — perhaps even enough for a Terry stop or a stop under the Florida Stop and Frisk Law.

“[O]nce Deputy Perkins smelled the odor of marijuana coming from Defendant’s car, he had probable cause to search the car, regardless of whether Defendant chose to withhold his consent to search. Although defense counsel tried to challenge the information in Deputy Perkins’s report, the fact remains that Defendant did not provide an affidavit or any other evidence to dispute that Deputy Perkins detected an odor of marijuana emanating from Defendant’s car. Not only is there nothing to contradict Deputy Perkins’s report, the fact remains that 21 grams of marijuana were discovered in Defendant’s car.” United States v. Johnson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114241 (S.D. Ga. July 30, 2008).*

The officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was driving a car with a license plate that was not properly secured in violation of Kansas law, and that supported the stop. United States v. Lopez-Estrada, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51254 (D. Kan. May 25, 2010).*

Defendant’s possession of potential burglar tools on the front seat of his car and confusing answers from the two in the car became reasonable suspicion. United States v. Kopp, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51200 (D. Mont. May 24, 2010).*

Extending the defendant’s valid stop an additional couple of minutes, 5-6 minutes for the entire stop, was reasonable questioning and was not unconstitutional. United States v. Harrison, 606 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2010).*

A car is exigent circumstances per se for dispensing with a search warrant. Here, officers had probable cause from hand-to-hand buys from the car, and that gave the basis for the search without a warrant. State v. Jones, 33 So. 3d 306 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2010).*

Officers reasonably believed that the landlord had apparent authority to consent to an entry of the deceased’s house after he was found dead in the yard. The other known occupant was in jail, so it was reasonable to believe that control ceded back to the landlord. State v. Knight, 34 So. 3d 307 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2010).*

An officer working off duty at a shopping mall got a tip about the smell of marijuana in the parking garage. He followed up and encountered the smell himself and traced it to a car. That was reasonable suspicion. The anonymous tip was corroborated. State v. Tate, 33 So. 3d 292 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2010).*

In a state forfeiture action, the state must show probable cause to believe that the object is subject to forfeiture. Commonwealth v. One 2004 Audi Sedan Auto., 456 Mass. 34, 921 N.E.2d 85 (2010).*

Defendant had standing in the residence of his girlfriend even though he was married to somebody else and he was not an overnight guest; he had a key and he paid her bills. At the suppression hearing, she “testified to the intimate nature of her relationship with Defendant Watson, including the frequency of his visits and the typical duration of his stay with her.” United States v. Watson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44777 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2010).

The Court of Appeals held that the complete search of defendant’s car’s passenger compartment was valid under the search incident doctrine. After that, Gant was decided, and the search incident rationale for a complete passenger compartment search as a matter of course was invalid. Because there was probable cause, however, the court finds that the inventory exception likely applies, so the case is remanded to the trial court for a new suppression hearing. Pineda v. People, 230 P.3d 1181 (Colo. 2010):

The inventory-search exception allows officers to conduct an administrative inventory search of a vehicle after it has lawfully been taken into custody, provided the search is conducted in accordance with the policies and procedures of the police department and is not merely a pretext for an investigatory search. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987); People v. Hauseman, 900 P.2d 74, 79-80 (Colo. 1995). The undisputed evidence in this case demonstrates that the officers had ample probable cause to stop and arrest Pineda and that they followed departmental policies and procedures in taking the vehicle into custody and inventorying its contents. Therefore, we hold that the officers conducted a valid inventory search of Pineda’s vehicle. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals on different grounds. We remand this case to that court so that it may be returned to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant did not file a motion to suppress before trial, and he objected when the state offered it into evidence. He waived the motion to suppress by not pursuing it before trial. Helms v. State, 926 N.E.2d 511 (Ind. App. 2010).*

Identification is not subject to suppression. Defendant reached for his wallet as he was being arrested, and dropped it when a gun was pulled. The police were not convinced he was the guy they were looking for. State v. Winters, 2010 Ohio 2678, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 2217 (11th Dist. June 11, 2010).*

Plaintiff was validly stopped for not having a properly lighted license plate. When the officer stopped him, the officer could go right to the driver without looking first at the license plate again. Gonzales v. Dickson, 2010 Ohio 2792, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 2302 (6th Dist. June 18, 2010).*

Pro forma motion to suppress did not state any proper grounds, and it was properly denied. Commonwealth v. Dixon, 2010 PA Super 109, 2010 Pa. Super. LEXIS 423 (June 15, 2010).*

Detailed information from the CI provided probable cause to believe that the defendant was carrying heroin, so his stop and search was reasonable. United States v. Vaughn, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59849 (C.D. Ill. May 24, 2010).*

See “America was neither founded, nor freed, by the well-behaved,” posted July 4, 2008.

See Thoughts on a Declaration from the NY Times on Friday.

Due to the part time patriots who suddenly discovered the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and other founding documents only after the election of an African-American President, I must point out that I’ve been mentioning them here every July 4th since going online in 2003. “We the People” was always an important concept to this civil libertarian with the crush of civil liberties under the last President in the name of “national security,” along with the 1775 Gadsden flag they stole.

My Gadsden has been in my office window, facing the street, since 2003. Now it has a disclaimer that it was a longstanding belief, been there for seven years, and is not just a political slogan of a part time patriot.

It shows how devalued any word can get through misuse and abuse. Share my views, and you’re a patriot; don’t and you’re a Nazi, Socialist, Communist [pick one or more].