State’s argument that defendant had constructive possession of drugs in his girlfriend’s purse came really close to a virtual concession that he, then, would have standing to challenge the search of her purse because of his alleged control over it. The issue was purely possession based on his having possession of the drugs “just prior” to the search, but the court found it to be speculative. State v. Daniels, No. S057832 (Ore. July 9, 2010):

In the alternative, the state contends that defendant had constructive possession of the methamphetamine in Perdune’s bag. The concept of constructive possession broadens the scope of the crime of possession beyond physical control. State v. Casey, 346 Or 54, 60, 203 P3d 202 (2009). In accordance with that concept, under ORS 161.015(9), “possess” means not only physical possession, but “otherwise exercis[ing] dominion or control over property.”

The state contends that the jury could have found that defendant exercised dominion or control of the methamphetamine on September 21, 2006, because he shared control of it with Perdune. The state relies on the same circumstances outlined above: defendant was a drug dealer and user; defendant and Perdune were in a romantic relationship; and Perdune’s bag was located in defendant’s bedroom. Accordingly, the state contends that “it is likely that the drugs were available for defendant’s use, and that he, therefore, constructively possessed them.” (Emphasis added.)

We reject the state’s argument for two reasons. First, proximity to property owned by a social guest does not establish that the host exercises dominion or control over that property. Second, the facts did not permit a reasonable inference that Perdune was more than defendant’s social guest.

Again, standing was not the issue here, but defense lawyers generally should watch for state arguments trying to show possession that can amount to virtual admissions of standing. (Few prosecutors read this website, so don’t worry about that.)

The use of a private software company to retrieve deleted images did not violate the Fourth Amendment. A law enforcement officer was not necessary at the time of the search, and their expertise made this reasonable. Also, defendant was permitted to file his motion to suppress after the motions deadline where the motion to dismiss was first denied and the defendant’s indictment was superseded. CI’s detailed description of images of apparent child pornography that he saw in defendant’s home supported issuance of the search warrant. United States v. Heggebo, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67527 (N.D. Iowa July 7, 2010).*

Defendant’s email activities, while the last was 13 months before the search warrant, showed that the warrant was not stale and there was still probable cause to believe that child pornography was present. There is no requirement that the judge issuing the search warrant actually see the pictures unlike adult porn. The warrant for the entire premises was not overbroad, although others lived there. United States v. Rubinstein, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67896 (S.D. Fla. June 23, 2010).*

Defendant was in a barbershop, and officers wanted him to come outside voluntarily if possible. The court concludes that the defendant was not arrested until he was handcuffed outside despite the officer being armed. The officer, of course, wanted to “control the situation” for safety reasons in case defendant panicked or attempted to struggle with the officers, but that intent was known to defendant. United States v. Wiggan, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67717 (D. Conn. July 8, 2010).*

School search under Oregon Constitution requires only reasonable suspicion and not probable cause. The court of appeals erred in requiring PC. State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. M. A. D., 348 Ore. 381 (June 10, 2010), revg State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. M. A. D., 226 Ore. App. 21, 202 P.3d 249 (2009):

We conclude that the school context is sufficiently different from the setting in which ordinary police-citizen interactions occur to justify an exception to the warrant requirement in certain circumstances, and we turn to the scope and application of the state’s proposed exception. First, we describe what we view as the closest analogy to that exception, the long-standing and well-defined “officer-safety exception” to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 9. Under the officer-safety exception, a police officer may take “reasonable steps” — including a limited search — to protect the officer or others if, “during the course of a lawful encounter with a citizen, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that the citizen might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer or to others then present.” State v. Foster, 347 Ore. 1, 8, 217 P3d 168 (2009) (quoting State v. Bates, 304 Ore. 519, 524, 747 P2d 991 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The officer-safety exception is necessary because of the unique circumstances to which it applies:

“‘A police officer in the field frequently must make life-or-death decisions in a matter of seconds. There may be little or no time in which to weigh the magnitude of a potential safety risk against the intrusiveness of protective measures. An officer must be allowed considerable latitude to take safety precautions in such situations. Our inquiry therefore is limited to whether the precautions taken were reasonable under the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time that the decision was made.'”

Id. (quoting Bates, 304 Ore. at 524-25). …

A dance club in Omaha had contract security to pat down customers to keep drugs and weapons out of the club, and it used off-duty police officers to assist them. Defendant was subjected to a pat down but resisted the going into his pockets, and the off-duty police officer told him to keep his hands in the air. This was a joint endeavor between the police and the club, and the search violated the Fourth Amendment. State v. Smith, 279 Neb. 918, 782 N.W.2d 913 (2010):

[8-10] The question whether a search is a private search or a government search is one that must be answered taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances. On the record before us, it is clear that the search of Smith was a joint endeavor involving a private person and a state or governmental official. First, we conclude that Harper, although off duty at the time, was acting as a governmental official in his capacity as a police officer. A police officer on “off-duty” status is obligated to preserve the public peace and to protect the lives and property of the public in general. Police officers are considered to be under a duty to respond as police officers 24 hours a day. It has been widely held, based both on common law and statute, that a police officer is not relieved of his or her obligation to preserve the peace while off duty. In Nebraska, it has long been the case that a police officer may provide security to a commercial establishment while off duty and make arrests or take other authoritative action in connection therewith. At the time of the search, Harper was in full police uniform and was carrying a firearm. Although Harper was off duty and employed by the Club, he was acting in his official capacity as a police officer, not as a private citizen. (footnotes omitted)

I found this insidious practice in Oakland today from New American, Oakland Officials Get SMART to Circumvent the Constitution from East Bay Express’s Oakland Police Search Without Warrants by Alex Weber, summarized as follows:

In a little-known city program that critics say may be unconstitutional, cops join fire and building inspectors as they enter homes without a warrant and then arrest residents if they find anything illegal.

The first two paragraphs:

On a gloomy recent morning in West Oakland, tenants at the David Gray Building — or, Off-Ramp Studios, as everyone who lives there calls it — stood in the hallways outside their lofts. They gathered around their doors in nervous clusters and spoke in hushed tones, wondering aloud whether they should head to work or stay and observe while two Oakland police officers, two building services code enforcers, a fire inspector, and three property management representatives entered all of their units one by one.

Traditionally the entire procedure would have required a search warrant. But on this day, the group of cops and city officials were operating under a little-known Oakland city program, called “SMART” — Specialized Multi-Agency Response Team — that some legal experts say may be unconstitutional. That’s because they enter people’s homes without consent or a warrant.

This isn’t even close to constitutional nor in good faith. King George’s messengers* would be proud of what they wrought.

__________

* So referred to in Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765), and Leach v. Three of the King’s Messengers, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. 1001, 97 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1765) (sometimes called Leach v. Money but not by SCOTUS, see United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972)).

The use of deadly force was objectively reasonable here as a matter of law under the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff’s decedent was shot by an officer in an attempt to arrest after a PIT maneuver when one officer thought that another had been run over and decedent was still driving recklessly at them. The dissent believed there were still issues for trial. Wilkinson v. Torres, 09-35098 (9th Cir. July 6, 2010) (2-1):

Here, Torres did not violate a constitutional right [in shooting plaintiff’s decedent]. Even construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a reasonable officer in Torres’ position had probable cause to believe that Wilkinson posed an immediate threat to the safety of Key and himself. When he fired the shots, Torres was standing in a slippery yard with a minivan accelerating around him. The driver of the minivan had failed to yield to police sirens as well as to direct commands to put his hands up and to stop the vehicle. Cf. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 200 (finding that “shoot[ing] a disturbed felon, set on avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate area are at risk from that flight” was not a clearly established Fourth Amendment violation). The minivan was accelerating, its tires were spinning, mud was flying up, and a fellow officer was nearby either lying fallen on the ground or standing but disoriented. The situation had quickly turned from one involving a crashed vehicle to one in which the driver of a moving vehicle, ignoring police commands, attempted to accelerate within close quarters of two officers on foot. In this “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” situation, a reasonable officer had probable cause to believe that the threat to safety justified the use of deadly force.

DNA Sample Bill Passes Despite 4th Amendment Concerns from Civitas Review Online:

The United States Constitution was discussed on the floor of the House of Representatives yesterday with regards to HB1403, which passed 92-23. Previously, I posted a debate between another intern and myself about the bill on the Civitas website. HB1403, entitled “Collect DNA Sample on Arrest,” was objected to on Fourth Amendment grounds as numerous legislators claimed that using a cheek swab to obtain DNA from individuals arrested for certain serious crimes was an “unreasonable search” that compromised the personal privacy of innocent people. The objection to the bill is a reasonable one, but bill supporters claim to have sufficient safeguards in the bill to ensure against privacy concerns.

What was most interesting yesterday was the discussion of the Constitution. It was nice to hear legislators discuss the constitutional limits on government power. If our legislators discussed the constitutionality of all legislation – both in Raleigh and in Washington, D.C. – it’s possible We The People would think more highly of them. …

HB1403 does not apply to all crimes–just more serious ones, and then after a showing of probable cause:

This section shall apply to a person arrested for violating any one of the following offenses in Chapter 14 of the General Statutes:
(1) G.S. 14-17. First and Second Degree Murder.
(2) G.S. 14-18. Manslaughter.
(3) Any offense in Article 7A, Rape and Other Sex Offenses.
(4) Any offense in Article 10, Kidnapping and Abduction, or Article 10A, Human Trafficking.
(5) Any offense in Article 14, Burglary.
(6) Any offense which would require the person to register under the provisions of Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes, Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Programs.
(7) G.S. 14-196.3, Cyberstalking.
(8) G.S. 14-277.3A, Stalking

On SSRN: Police, Vehicles & the Fourth Amendment–-Part Two: Maryland Cases by Byron L. Warnken of the University of Baltimore School of Law, published in Trooper Magazine 2006.

In looking for drugs after a tag light was out, a 45 minute detention became unreasonable and was not connected to any articulable facts. United States v. Valle-Tellez, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122995 (N.D. Miss. December 18, 2009).*

Defendant was arrested when he showed up as an internet traveler for arranging sex with a minor over the Internet. There was probable cause to search his car. United States v. Deal, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122874 (M.D. Fla. July 29, 2009)* [In my experience with these cases, there is evidence in the car at least 75% of the time.]

The district court’s findings of consent are supported by the record. United States v. Ray, 361 Fed. Appx. 674, 2010 FED App. 0026N (6th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Leaving a copy of a search warrant at the premises when the defendant is arrested is [substantial] compliance with the requirement that the target of the search be served a copy of a search warrant. The knock-and-announce requirement was satisfied here, so whether the state should follow Hudson is moot. State v. Davis, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 30 (January 12, 2010).*

Indiana’s seatbelt enforcement statute limits the authority of officers to search after a stop for violation of the statute. “Indiana Code section 9-19-10-3.1, also known as the Seatbelt Enforcement Act (‘Act’), provides that ‘a vehicle may be stopped to determine compliance with this chapter. However, a vehicle, the contents of a vehicle, the driver of a vehicle, or a passenger in a vehicle may not be inspected, searched, or detained solely because of a violation of this chapter.’” The officer noticed a “suspicious bulge” in defendant’s pocket and asked about it. This exceeded the statute, and the constitutional question did not have to be decided. State v. Richardson, 927 N.E.2d 379 (Ind. 2010):

Here, Officer Eastwood initiated a traffic stop solely under the Act after she observed Richardson driving without wearing a seat belt. When Officer Eastwood approached Richardson’s car, she recognized him from a prior traffic stop, during which she had encountered no problems with violence or resistance. Additionally, Richardson was immediately cooperative with Officer Eastwood and admitted that he was not wearing his seat belt. While Officer Eastwood did observe an “unusual bulge,” this fact standing alone did not provide the independent basis of reasonable suspicion that Baldwin requires, especially in light of Richardson’s immediate compliance and Officer Eastwood’s prior peaceful exchanges with Richardson. Cf. Morris , 732 N.E.2d at 228 (finding an independent basis for further inquiry above and beyond the seat belt violation, where the defendant failed to produce a valid license, and a computer check later revealed his license was suspended). On these facts, we agree with the trial court that Officer Eastwood’s questioning about the “unusual bulge” contravened the Act.

There will, of course, be circumstances where something more than an “unusual bulge” will be visible, or other conditions that provide a police officer with the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct further inquiry. This is not one of them. And even if the facts were such that Officer Eastwood’s questioning about the bulge was proper, the fact remains that Richardson’s production of a valid gun permit should have resulted in the termination of any further questioning.

Nothing the police did, other than being there, caused the defendant to flee. They had reasonable suspicion. Commonwealth v. Franklin, 456 Mass. 818, 926 N.E.2d 199 (2010):

The line we have attempted to draw is fact specific. Here, the defendant’s flight was not prompted by anything the police did, and, indeed, began before the officers got out of their vehicle. There was no evidence that the police exercised any show of authority or commanded the defendant to stop. See Commonwealth v. Grandison, supra at 138. Nor did they block or impede his path. See Commonwealth v. Sykes, 449 Mass. 308, 313, 867 N.E.2d 733 (2007). Accordingly, the judge’s conclusion that the defendant was seized when the police left their vehicle and began to run after him was incorrect. See Commonwealth v. Battle, supra at 474-475 (no seizure where police stopped cruiser, got out, and pursued defendants into outer hallway of building).

Thereafter, a seizure did take place when the police grabbed the defendant as he was climbing the fence. By that time, “suspicious conduct [gave] the officer[s] reason to suspect that [he had] committed, [was] committing, or [was] about to commit a crime.” Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 405, 318 N.E.2d 895 (1974).

Police showed up at an apartment complex (“a high crime area”) to execute a search warrant. Defendant saw the police coming and fled, and that was reasonable suspicion. State v. Cowling, 34 So. 3d 717 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009), Released for Publication April 30, 2010.* [How about fleeing so as not to get shot by a stray bullet? Wouldn’t that be prudent and not reasonable suspicion?]

Certification of a drug dog satisfies the Caballes “well-trained dog” requirement. “‘Reliability is generally present if the dog is “well-trained.”’ United States v. Nelson, 309 F. App’x 373, 375 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409).” United States v. Mack, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11831 (M.D. Ala. February 11, 2010).*

The officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant had drugs in the car at the time he used the drug dog, which, the court concludes, alerted based on its view of the video of the stop. United States v. Williams, 690 F. Supp. 2d 829 (D. Minn. 2010).*

Officers approached a parked car to talk to the occupants and there was no seizure. When one of them ducked to hide, that was reasonable suspicion to fear for safety. United States v. Derrick, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12030 (C.D. Ill. February 11, 2010).*

Defendant was in a national park in an area he rented and he was arrested for disorderly conduct and being intoxicated in public. He was not in a public area when he was arrested. There can be private areas within a national park. United States v. Schaffer, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11940 (E.D. Cal. January 29, 2010)*:

Although “a national park is the quintessential public place,” United States v. Maher, 902 F.Supp. 560, 565 (E.D. Penn. 1995), the public does not have unfettered access to a person’s private, reserved area inside of the public park. Having considered the evidence and the case law, this Court finds since Mr. Schaffer’s behavior lacked a public character. Because Mr. Schaffer’s statement was made in a private place, “then [his] offense isn’t committed.” Taylor, 258 F.3d at 1066-67. C.f. United States v. Albers, 226 F.3d 989 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 859, 531 U.S. 1114 (2000) (defendants who engaged in BASE jumps from peaks in national park recklessly created a risk of public alarm, nuisance, jeopardy, or violence, through creation or maintenance of a hazardous condition, as required to support convictions for disorderly conduct under administrative regulation governing conduct in national parks; activity occurred in a public place, and, while primary safety threat implicated in BASE jumping was to jumper, BASE jumping also posed risks to public at large); Coutchavlis, 260 F.3d 1149 (risk of public harm where defendant is traveling on public highway and behaved in a way that could have resulted in a crash on the public highway); and United States v. Lanen, 716 F.Supp. 208 (1986) (defendant’s exposure was public, and thus constituted disorderly conduct, where it occurred in an open stall in a public restroom), with Taylor, supra (public requirement not satisfied when defendant makes statements to ranger while in the sleeping area of his cabin).

City ordinance says it permits entry for trash cleanup and enforcement. It is not unconstitutional on its face. “If action taken pursuant to that authority violates Fourth Amendment warrant requirements, the resulting criminal prosecution may be tainted, but that does not render the authorizing statute unconstitutional. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967).” The entry to his property over the driveway was reasonable under United States v. Dunn. The garage was 30′-45′ from the house, so that made it not curtilage. Nikolas v. City of Omaha, 605 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 2010):

Applying the multi-factor test in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 94 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1987), the district court concluded that Benson did not need a warrant to approach the garage and peer in its windows because the garage was not part of the curtilage of the residence some thirty to forty-five feet away. We agree with this conclusion, which is consistent with our decisions that have applied Dunn to other garages and barns. … [¶] Moreover, even if Nikolas had an expectation of privacy in the garage warranting protection comparable to that afforded the curtilage of a residence, we conclude that Benson’s minimally intrusive exterior search and look through the windows was constitutionally reasonable.

Arrest warrant with reasonable cause to believe that defendant was at home justified entry into his house under Payton. United States v. Fance, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47951 (S.D. Fla. April 13, 2010).*

Computer data particularity requirement and the Fourth Amendment does not constrain how the government must search before the computer is accessed. United States v. Bowen, 689 F. Supp. 2d 675 (S.D. N.Y. 2010):

While there may be a degree of uncertainty as to the “precise applicability of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement with respect to searches of computer data,” United States v. McDarrah, 05 Cr. 1182 (PAC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48269, 2006 WL 1997638, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2006) (quoting Hensel v. Lussier, 205 F.3d 1323, at *1 (2d Cir. 2000) (summary order)), we reject Defendants’ contention that the warrant lacked particularity because it failed to specify different or more precise computer search methods. “[I]t is generally left to the discretion of the executing officers to determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by warrant.” Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1979). Courts are ill-suited to constrain law enforcement to certain search-terms or methodologies in advance. As Judge Bianco recently noted, “in most instances, there is no way for law enforcement or the courts to know in advance how a criminal may label or code his computer files and/or documents which contain evidence of criminal activities.” United States v. Graziano, 558 F. Supp. 2d 304, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). To limit the government’s computer search methodology ex ante would “give criminals the ability to evade law enforcement scrutiny simply by utilizing coded terms in their files or documents” or other creative data concealment techniques. Id. Accordingly, we join the Graziano court and several other federal courts 4 in holding that the Fourth Amendment does not require a search warrant to specify computer search methodology. See id. at 315-16.

A drug dog going into an already open window did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Even if that was a potential problem, there already was probable cause at that point. United States v. Williams, 690 F. Supp. 2d 829 (D. Minn. 2010):

Although in the case at hand, Defendant Capers did not consent to a search of her vehicle, her consent was not necessary for the dog sniff conducted on the exterior of the Cavalier. The dog, trained and certified in narcotics detection, then alerted to the passenger door of the vehicle, which created independent probable cause to conduct a search for controlled substances.

Moreover, the fact that the passenger window of the vehicle was open, creating an opportunity for the dog to breach the interior of the vehicle, did not render the search unlawful. See United States v. Lyons, 486 F.3d 367, 373 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a canine search of a vehicle was not rendered illegal, under the Fourth Amendment, by the fact that the vehicle’s windows were open where the passenger window was opened by the passenger without any order or request from the trooper, the trooper did not order that the windows remain open, and the canine’s handler did not direct the canine to stick his head through the window). But see United States v. Winningham, 140 F.3d 1328, 1329-31 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding a search illegal where officers opened the door of a suspect’s van, given that an officer may not open a vehicle to create the opportunity for a drug dog to go where the officer himself cannot go, although a suspect may). The squad car video confirms that Trooper Schneider did not order the passenger window to remain open. (See Gov’t Ex. 1.)

Although it is unclear from the video whether the dog entered the vehicle pursuant to a non-verbal command, assuming, without deciding, that Trooper Schneider directed the dog through the open passenger widow, any such command did not invalidate the subsequent search. This Court finds that, as the open window was the strongest source of the odor, there is little doubt that the dog would have ultimately detected the narcotics, “even if he had been reined back and held outside the plane of the window track.” Lyons, 486 F.3d at 374 (upholding a district court’s finding that the dog would have inevitably smelled the odor of drugs).

Odor of marijuana was enough probable cause for a search during an otherwise valid traffic stop. United States v. Lesane, 361 Fed. Appx. 537 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

For inevitable discovery to apply in the Second Circuit, there must be a “high level of confidence” that the search warrant would have issued. United States v. Cabassa, 62 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 1995). United States v. Wilke, 689 F. Supp. 2d 455 (W.D. N.Y. 2010).*

Defendant’s consent during a traffic stop was shown by the government to be free and voluntary. The consent was rather easily achieved, shortly into the stop, and defendant did not have a right to be informed of his right to refuse. United States v. Cousin, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3688 (E.D. Tenn. January 19, 2010).*

First entry into house was by consent, and that produced a small bag of marijuana. That observation validly made it into the search warrant request which authorized a greater search. United States v. McNeil, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3747 (M.D. Pa. January 19, 2010).*

Where a person is the subject of a search warrant, that person may be searched any place where he is found unless the warrant specifies that the search be conducted at a specific location. Defendant’s argument that he could only be searched at his own house was rejected. State v. Walker, 2009 Ohio 1903, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 1624 (4th Dist. April 23, 2009).*

Defendant parked his car on his own without direction from the officer, so he was not stopped. The officer did not need reasonable suspicion to approach him, but he in fact had reasonable suspicion from defendant’s driving around the entrance to this highest crime area of the city when he did. State v. Culbertson, 2009 Ohio 1934, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 1660 (2d Dist. April 24, 2009).*

Information from a sexual abuse victim was presumed to be credible and it provided PC. State v. Paquette, 2009 Ohio 1961, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 1653 (2d Dist. April 17, 2009).*

Defendant’s denial of ownership of bags in a motel room she was visiting when the motel manager was kicking them all out because the credit card it was rented on was stolen was not an abandonment because she understood that the bags would be kept for safekeeping and not opened. State v. Brown, 228 Ore. App. 197, 206 P.3d 1180 (2009), reversed 348 Ore. 293 (2010).*

Defendant had not submitted to a buccal swab for a DNA test on his prior convictions. Police officers investigating him for something else noted that and they called him in for a DNA test, which he consented to. State v. Bradley, 33 So. 3d 931 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2010).

Reasonable suspicion developed during defendant’s traffic stop, and the officer was not constitutionally required to issue a traffic ticket immediately. A drug dog came and alerted. State v. Lawrence, 32 So. 3d 329 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2010).*

The search of defendant’s car was not justified by exigent circumstances, so the finding of a toy gun used in a robbery case should have been suppressed. However, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt on this record. Commonwealth v. Brown, 2010 PA Super 27, 2010 Pa. Super. LEXIS 53 (March 2, 2010).*

DA’s investigators had state immunity for planning for and procuring a search warrant that led to no charges being filed, even if they were acting maliciously. County of L.A. v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 4th 218 (2d Dist. 2009), Publication Status of this Document has been Changed by the Court from Unpublished to Published January 22, 2010:

More important, the immunity applies “even if the authorities later decide not to file charges.” (Gillan, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048, italics added, citing Ingram, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1293 & Amylou R., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1209-1211.) Government Code section 821.6 appears also to extend to conduct that occurred after the close of the proceeding. (Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1496.) Ingram, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th 1280 held that where the District Attorney conducted an investigation in response to a complaint filed with the District Attorney’s Office by interested citizens alleging Brown Act violations, the District Attorney was protected by the prosecutorial immunity of section 821.6 for the statements made after close of the investigation because those statements were part of the prosecution process and hence were an exercise of prosecutorial discretion even though no prosecution was brought. (Id. at p. 1293; cf. Gillan, supra, at pp. 1048-1049 [although public employee can be liable for false imprisonment, section 821.6 immunizes employee for conduct occurring after false imprisonment ends].) The test of immunity is not the timing of the offending conduct but whether there is a causal relationship between the act and the prosecution process. Thus, if the act is made as part of the process, it is protected by the immunity in section 821.6. (Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon, supra, at pp. 1498-1500.)

There was “arguable probable cause” for plaintiff’s arrest, so the arresting officer has qualified immunity from suit over the arrest. Moran v. Cameron, 362 Fed. Appx. 88 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

A state officer made a stop of defendant’s car and an inventory was going to be conducted. The feds were called to take over the investigation, and they did it instead. This did not make the process unreasonable. United States v. Taylor, 592 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 2010).*

The district court’s credibility determination was binding since “‘unless it is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no reasonable factfinder could accept it.’ United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002).” United States v. Telcy, 362 Fed. Appx. 83 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s IAC claim fails on failure to move to suppress a search because of an unsigned search warrant since it was clear that the original search warrant was signed. United States v. Askew, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4516 (W.D. Pa. January 21, 2010).*

Defendant’s IAC claim fails because, while his electronic devices were searched incident to his arrest, he plead guilty waiving the claim. [I’m a little confused by other things the court said about the IAC claim and search, but waiver was a sufficient ground to decide the issue.] Carson v. United States, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4690 (S.D. Ill. January 21, 2010).*

Defendant’s car search violated Gant, and the government argued inventory as an alternative. The record is incomplete on the inventory issue, and the court is somewhat doubtful that the SOPs of the police department were complied with, so another hearing will have to be held. The mere fact the officers did not complete a written inventory did not make it unreasonable. United States v. Westerman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123601 (N.D. Ga. October 1, 2009).*