ICE was monitoring credit card purchases from a child pornography website. Defendant purchased using an e-mail address and a credit card. The IP address of the e-mail was traced to defendant’s house. That provided probable cause for a search warrant for the house and its computers. United States v. Skjonsby, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16546 (D. Minn. January 14, 2011).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not calling witnesses at a Franks hearing since he could not even make a threshold showing to get a Franks hearing anyway. The falsities he was relying on were insufficient to undermine probable cause. Smith v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16366 (E.D. Mo. February 18, 2011).*

Officers called out to the defendant to attempt to get him to stop as he approached a drug house late at night. There was no reasonable suspicion, but defendant ignored them and tossed a gun and drugs against the fence as he went into the house. That was an abandonment and created justification for his stop. United States v. Fowler, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16526 (D. Neb. February 18, 2011).*

Crediting their testimony, officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and probable cause to search his Escalade. United States v. Cummings, 764 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. N.Y. 2011).*

Defendant was stopped because he was a suspect in a bank robbery with probable cause, so the search of the car was not limited by the search incident doctrine. United States v. Miller, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16751 (S.D. Ind. February 19, 2011).*

Defendant was arrested on a federal charge of failing to pay child support, and a search warrant was issued for his e-mail account. The use of a “filter agent” to screen for potential privileged information was not inherently unreasonable. United States v. Taylor, 764 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D. Me. 2011)* (footnotes citing cases have been omitted):

The parties have not referred me to any First Circuit decision dealing with the use of a filter agent. Case law from the rest of the country does not yield clear answers, but some themes emerge. A number of cases have permitted its use. At the same time, there is a healthy skepticism about the reliability of a filter agent or Chinese or ethical wall within a prosecutor’s office, a skepticism perhaps prompted by the famous failures of such a procedure in United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1991). Courts exhibit particular concern over use of filter agents or taint teams in searches of lawyers’ offices, where privileged materials of many clients could be compromised. There, judges have sometimes required alternatives such as appointment of a special master, a wholly independent third party. Courts seem to recognize a distinction between circumstances where the government has not yet obtained the records on the one hand (allowing defense counsel’s preliminary review), and, on the other hand, what the government should do when it has already seized the records, then realizes that it may have privileged materials (allowing use of filter agent there). Finally, some of the cases and some of the commentators suggest a role for judicial review.

In the circumstances of this search and this e-mail account, I have no reason to find that it was inherently negligent for the government to fail to foresee that its seizure of the defendant’s e-mails would produce privileged documents simply because he had a lawyer, and I do not conclude that every warrant for an e-mail search must have at the outset a built-in privilege protection procedure, any more than there is such a requirement for every paper document search. Instead, I conclude that the government behaved reasonably here by immediately seeking judicial instructions once its agent noticed that e-mail headers reflected communications between lawyer and client. It is true that some cases could be read to suggest that at that point the defendant and his lawyer should have been allowed a first look at the e-mails, so as to create a privilege log and then let the government challenge it in court, rather than vice versa as here. But the defendant did not propose that procedure to the magistrate judge, and instead simply opposed the government’s proposal in toto. The government sought judicial instructions, the magistrate judge modified its proposal, and then issued an order on how to proceed. I reject the argument that somehow that was per se an inappropriate way of proceeding.

Government’s failure to include computer in the search warrant precluded it from seizing and then searching it. United States v. Abdellatif, 758 F. Supp. 2d 183 (W.D. N.Y. 2010)*:

By failing to respond to defendant’s argument that the computer was outside the scope of the warrant, the government “ha[s] essentially conceded the point”. Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69173, 2010 WL 2794231, *5 (D.Conn. 2010).

“There is no question that computers are capable of storing immense amounts of information and often contain a great deal of private information. Searches of computers therefore often involve a degree of intrusiveness much greater in quantity, if not different in kind, from searches of other containers. Such considerations commonly support the need specifically to authorize the search of computers in a search warrant.” United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 861-62 (9th Cir. 2009). See, e.g., ¶7(a-e) of the schedule attached to the search warrant in United States v. Tigano, 08-CR-281S, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63114 (Dkt. #52 in that case), specifically authorizing the search of computers.

Since the seizure of the computer was not authorized by the warrant, the government bears the burden of proving the legality of that seizure. See United States v. Poulos, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6185, 2008 WL 222272, *12 (D.Me. 2008), adopted, 2008 WL 619406 (D.Me. 2008) (“The government concedes that seizure of these items was not authorized by the Warrant but asserts that officers validly seized them inasmuch as they were in plain view …. The government meets its burden of proving the validity of their seizure”). The government has offered no justification for the seizure of the computer, nor has it argued that the seizure does not warrant suppression. Therefore, I recommend that any evidence derived from the seizure of the computer be suppressed.

In a § 2255 case, the court concludes that defendant had abandoned his rented office by not having paid rent for 16 days, returning no calls to the landlord about his intentions, and the landlord changed the locks after 10 days. The fact the landlord had taken no steps to legally evict him wasn’t even relevant because the landlord didn’t have to. The officer’s reliance on the landlord’s consent was clearly in good faith. Therefore, defense counsel was not ineffective. Mugweni v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13671 (N.D. Tex. February 10, 2011).

Defendant’s stop would have been invalid because, while his license plate was dirty, it was not unreadable. However, defendant fled and that made the stop valid. The consent obtained after that was after intervening events. United States v. Mathews, 764 F. Supp. 2d 926 (S.D. Ohio 2010).*

Under the Washington Constitution, defendant was handcuffed and placed in a police car after the officer smelled marijuana on his breath and clothing. A baggie of marijuana was in plain view in the car. This was not a proper search incident; since defendant was alone there was no issue of tampering with the car, and a warrant should have been obtained. State v. Swetz, 160 Wn. App. 122, 247 P.3d 802 (2011).*

In the third appeal of this case, the affidavit did not show a substantial basis for showing probable cause to believe that weapons would be found in defendant’s house. The affidavit was bottomed on mere conclusions of the officers, and the motion to suppress should be granted. Kennedy v. State, 338 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011), on remand from Kennedy v. State, 297 S.W.3d 338, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (appellate issues were preserved) which reversed Kennedy v. State, 262 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008):

For the reasons that follow, we believe that the affidavit did not provide a substantial basis for determining whether there was probable cause to believe that there were illegal weapons on Kennedy’s property. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.02(4) (West 2005) (listing “weapons prohibited by the Penal Code” as one type of property that search warrant may be issued for). First, although the affidavit described the weapons and ammunition that were recovered from Kennedy’s car on the night of the shooting, nothing in the affidavit indicated that any of the weapons were legally prohibited. In other words, nothing in the affidavit suggested that Kennedy’s possession of the recovered items was, on its own, illegal. Similarly, although the affidavit mentioned that Kennedy had asked the New Braunfels police department to return a handgun that had been taken from him, the affidavit did not explain why the handgun was taken or allege that it was seized because it was a legally prohibited weapon. Consequently, these portions of the affidavit provided no basis to conclude that there was a fair probability that prohibited weapons would be found on Kennedy’s property.

. . .

These statements were too conclusory to properly serve as support for a probable cause-determination. … They did not provide enough information to allow the reviewing magistrate to make an independent evaluation and provided no basis for the officers’ beliefs. On the contrary, the statements provided nothing more than a summary of Goll’s and others’ bare and unsubstantiated beliefs and suspicions that people who “possess and utilize” some legal weapons were more likely to possess and use illegal weapons. …

In addition, we note our strong concern regarding the use of these types of statements as support in a search-warrant affidavit. The statements postulated that individuals who possess and utilize legal weapons were likely to possess and utilize illegal weapons, and this type of rationalization is akin to the idea that individuals who legally use and possess over-the-counter or legally prescribed medications are more likely to use and possess illegal controlled substances. Regardless of whatever statistical significance statements of this sort might in fact possess, these types of overly generalized and unsubstantiated statements that seek to imply illegal conduct based on legal conduct cannot serve as a legitimate basis for a probable-cause determination.

[Remember, Texas has no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.]

The CI’s detailed information about guns and drugs supported the search warrant for defendant’s house just because those things would logically be found there. United States v. Colon, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38577 (E.D. Pa. April 7, 2011):

The Third Circuit has consistently held that it may readily be inferred that drug dealers conceal evidence in residences to which they have access:

… [E]vidence associated with drug dealing needs to be stored somewhere, and … a dealer will have the opportunity to conceal it in his home. After all, a dealer logically could conclude that his residence is the best, and probably the only, location to store items such as records of illicit activity, phone books, address books, large amounts of cash, assets purchased with proceeds of drug transactions, guns to protect drugs and cash, and large quantities of drugs to be sold.

Whitner, 219 F.3d at 298 (3d Cir. 2000); …

Defendant had surreptitiously recorded a minor in the nude in his bathroom a couple of years earlier, and the minor found out about it. She told others and finally the police. The defendant was known to be depressed and a potential suicide risk. Officers opted for a knock-and-talk rather than a search warrant because of the age of the information [that has never been a problem in a child pornography case]. The knock-and-talk is recounted in detail, including defendant’s hyperventilating at one point with an EMT being called, but he recovered and agreed to keep talking. He admitted to having child porn on his computer and then consented. United States v. Hughes, 640 F.3d 428 (1st Cir. 2011).*

Police received a report of a hit and run, and they had a license number and traced the car to defendant’s house. The officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment by examining the car in the driveway. When defendant came to the door, he invited the officer in. The arrest inside for DWI did not require a warrant. City of Willoughby v. Dunham, 2011 Ohio 2586, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2210 (11th Dist. May 27, 2011).*

During a traffic stop, the officer had reasonable suspicion: (1) the car had a strong odor of air freshener, (2) the couple claimed the trunk was empty even though there was luggage on the back seat and the car’s rear end was sagging, (3) defendant became increasingly nervous, (4) the couple gave only vague descriptions of how they planned to travel back to Boston, and (5) defendant failed to give full information about his criminal history, which included cocaine distribution and an open federal case for suspected marijuana distribution. United States v. Briasco, 640 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2011).*

Grits For Breakfast today: Is Fourth Amendment dead or just in a coma? Debating when to pull the plug:

These days, being a fan of the Fourth Amendment is a bit like being an aficionado of horse racing or boxing … a bit anachronistic and out of sync with the times, doomed to tilting at mostly irrelevant windmills that nobody else around you cares about. Until recently, I might have said Americans care less about the Fourth Amendment than, say, the heavyweight boxing championship. But after a recent, lackadaisical heavyweight title bout coupled with renewed Fourth Amendment interest from grass-roots conservative quarters, perhaps Grits would revise that to say Americans care more about the Fourth Amendment than boxing, though probably still less than soccer.

. . .

The Fourth Amendment may indeed be dead. Certainly its corpus appears lifeless and inert in the hands of the current US Supreme Court. But if so, the question becomes, will it become a martyr for the cause of renewing personal privacy in the digital era, or just another nameless, faceless battlefield casualty? One wonders: Will anyone mourn the Fourth Amendment’s death, or will everyone just move to their new .secure domain listing and go on their merry way?

[Note: I can open Grits for Breakfast, but pasting in the URL isn’t working. Sorry.]

Defendant’s consent to seize his computer for child pornography did not limit when the government could get around to search it. United States v. Murinko, 410 Fed. Appx. 2 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished)*:

We reject Murinko’s contention that the FBI’s delay in obtaining a search warrant and forensically searching his computer violated his Fourth Amendment possessory interest. Murinko’s reliance on United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Dass, 849 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1988) is misplaced. Mitchell and Dass both involved warrantless seizures based on probable cause, not consent.

Defendant was not seized by officers when they were just asking questions. He was not seized until he gave his real name, and it was discovered that there was a warrant for his arrest. United States v. Anthony, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112736 (N.D. Tex. October 21, 2010).*

Officers were in defendant’s house with a search warrant for child pornography traced to the residence by the IP address. The officers let defendant’s wife and child leave to take the child to school. He was free to move around the house during the questioning, and he was not in custody for Miranda purposes. United States v. Asher, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112823 (N.D. Ga. October 21, 2010).*

Reasonable suspicion stops can be based on a completed felony, not just on ongoing one. United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 2011):

Bullock contends that for officers to detain him pursuant to Terry there must be “a basis for believing that the person is engaging (present tense) in criminal activity or is about to be engaged (future tense) in criminal activity.” Reply Br. 3. However, officers can stop and detain a suspect for reasonable suspicion that the suspect has engaged in a completed felony. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985) (“[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in … a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.”); Booker, 579 F.3d at 838-39 (reasonable suspicion existed to stop and detain defendant who was suspected of having committed battery).

Defendant’s conduct and statements not in harmony with what the officer observed when defendant’s SUV was in the parking lot at a convenience store that was a “hot spot of criminal activity” created reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was armed. Thus, his car should be subjected to a protective search. Defendant was stopped after he left the convenience store parking lot. When stopped, he was nervous, fidgety, and wouldn’t look the officer in the eye, and his story didn’t match the officer’s observations in the parking lot. United States v. Stewart, 631 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 2011).*

Plaintiff’s feeling he was compelled to take a polygraph examination to clear his name did not mean that he was unlawfully seized under the Fourth Amendment. Natal-Rosario v. Erickson, 410 Fed. Appx. 351 (1st Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Defendant was not seized by his attempted seizure, and his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the attempted seizure. He fled, and that gave reasonable suspicion if there was none in the first place. United States v. Smith, 633 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2011).

There was no clear error in the district court’s finding that the consent was general and not just for a protective sweep. United States v. Beltran, 409 Fed. Appx. 441 (2d Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

The officers in this case had a reasonable belief that a runaway child was in plaintiff’s house, and that was the exigent circumstance for the entry into the house. Smith v. Ray, 409 Fed. Appx. 641 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

“[D]efendant’s unusual furtive movements before and during the stop” was reasonable suspicion for continuing defendant’s stop. United States v. Crawford, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10669 (D. Kan. February 3, 2011).*

Officers on the premises with a search warrant could photograph what was then in plain view, despite the argument that it was outside the search warrant. In the Interest of R. C. H., 307 Ga. App. 774 (February 9, 2011).

A drug transaction outside the house, and then the defendant returning to the house is nexus to the house for drugs. United States v. Ellison, 632 F.3d 347, 2011 FED App. 0050P (6th Cir. 2011).*

Plaintiff’s car was subjected to a drug dog sniff by a tribal police officer working on a casino parking lot, and drugs were found. He was convicted. His suit against the tribal police department was framed in such a way it was barred by Heck. Johnson v. Pottawotomie Tribal Police Dep’t, 411 Fed. Appx. 19 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished):

After careful consideration, we find all of Johnson’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because each necessarily implies the invalidity of Johnson’s sentence.

. . .

Underlying all of Johnson’s claims is the allegation that he was subject to an illegal arrest and search without probable cause because Hurla was not qualified to be a law enforcement officer under Kansas state law. Johnson argues that, since Hurla’s law enforcement certificate was retroactively revoked, “any actions he undertook [as a K-9 officer] were not only illegal, but were also unconstitutional.” Aplt’s Br. at 4. Johnson’s argument, assuming it were true, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence because it would have been based upon evidence gathered during an illegal arrest and thus would have to be suppressed. See United States v. Jarvi, 537 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2008). Johnson’s claim is precisely the type that Heck mandates should be pursued through a petition for habeas corpus and not a § 1983 complaint.

[Note: Habeas search claims, of course, are barred by Stone v. Powell. Is this a Catch-22?]

Victim of defendant’s crime was a proper CI providing first hand information for the search warrant. Just because her name was omitted does not make her anonymous. “The overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that warrants need not contain any sort of search protocol, methodology, or other strategy restricting a computer search to specific programs or terms in order to satisfy the particularity requirement.” [citing cases] State v. McCrory, 2011 Ohio 546, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 475 (6th Dist. February 8, 2011).*

An electric company investigator investigating electrical theft at defendant’s house noticed no theft, but an unusual alteration of the roof, and he told the police. That person’s entry was not state action governed by the Fourth Amendment. State v. Delrio, 56 So. 3d 848 (Fla. App. 2d DCA 2011).*

Sitting over railroad tracks when the warning lights are flashing is reasonable suspicion for a stop. Here, DUI was found. State v. Appelhans, 2011 Ohio 487, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 427 (6th Dist. February 4, 2011).*

Defendant’s ex in an acrimonious divorce called the police as an anonymous informant to say that she was driving erratically. The officer saw nothing but stopped her anyway, and the stop was found to be valid anyway, and the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress. State v. Baughman, 2011 Ohio 162, 192 Ohio App. 3d 45 (12th Dist. 2011).*

Defendant’s vehicle was suspected of being involved in town hall burglaries in Connecticut and New Hampshire. When the vehicle was found, it was perceived to be stolen, defendant was absent, and the female passenger wasn’t talking. The officer saw a GPS device in the front and scrolled through it, finding the addresses of other burglarized town halls. The GPS information was admissible under the automobile exception or inevitable discovery. State v. Heck, 128 Conn. App. 633, 18 A.3d 673 (2011):

… The whereabouts of the truck’s driver were unknown, the passenger of the truck refused to provide any information or explanation as to what he was doing, and Roarick had seen another individual, the defendant, wearing a hooded garment, run behind a house near where the truck was located. Upon further investigation, Roarick determined that the truck was registered to Carmac, Inc. Based on the foregoing information, Roarick reasonably believed that the truck had been stolen, and the defendant eventually was captured without the use of any information provided through Roarick’s search of the truck.

Additionally, because Roarick believed that the truck was stolen, it would have been impounded and a subsequent inventory would have revealed the same GPS information at that time. The Hillsborough town hall custodian, who usually arrived for work at approximately 7 a.m., would have discovered that the building had been burglarized and notified the police. Inevitably, the police would have connected the proximity of the defendant and the impounded vehicle to the Hillsborough town hall burglary. Therefore, the defendant’s connection to the New Hampshire town hall burglaries would have eventually been discovered and that discovery would have resulted in a lawful search of the defendant’s truck and seizure of evidence found inside the truck. Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress all evidence obtained in its search of the GPS device found in the defendant’s truck.

Orin Kerr posted this on Volokh Conspiracy.

Defendant was arrested for driving without insurance, and the arrest violated state law because it was not in the “presence” of the officer. The arrest was valid under the Fourth Amendment, however, under Virginia v. Moore. The search incident of defendant’s person was valid. State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, 240 P.3d 780, 666 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (2010).*

Reasonable suspicion found for a dog sniff where defendant had an Arizona driver’s license but the vehicle bore Iowa plates, where: the truck was registered to a third party, neither defendant nor his passenger knew the owner’s name despite being in the middle of an extended journey from Arizona to an unknown location in Iowa, neither could identify their destination other than “Iowa,” defendant never provided evidence that he was authorized to drive the car, and defendant did not know the last name of his passenger. People v. Garcia, 251 P.3d 1152 (Colo. 2010).*

In this child pornography search, officers had a search warrant based on defendant’s computer coming up via IP address as sharing via Limewire. They came to the house in what appears to be a knock and talk and defendant consented to a search of his computer and essentially everything the state needed to know. They then presented him with a search warrant for it. State v. Tremaine, 315 S.W.3d 769 (Mo. App. 2010).*

Defendant’s encounter on the street became a seizure essentially by a police show of force. In re J.F., 19 A.3d 304 (D.C. App. 2011)*:

Nevertheless, “an initially consensual encounter can be transformed into a seizure and detention within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave.” Hawkins v. United States, 663 A.2d 1221, 1225 (D.C. 1995) (citation omitted). Indeed, there is much more here than mere questioning or a pre-seizure, consensual encounter. J.F. was confronted with the authority of the police on a deserted street, as evidenced not only by the visibility of the officers’ weapons, police vests and badges, but also by multiple questions by Officer Starliper as well as a direct order to remove his hands from his pockets, and he could see that the police continued to hold Mr. Hughes (for a warrant check) after they found no contraband on his person. Our case law identifies circumstances similar or identical to those in this case which can result in a seizure. …

Defendant was arrested for identity fraud, and officers looked in his cell phone, and that information ended up in the search warrant. The cell phone search was not unreasonable [, without much explanation, and the court conceivably could have just said it was struck from the affidavit and the SW’s still good]. United States v. Arellano, 410 Fed. Appx. 603 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished):

Given the presence of business cards related to producing photographs for false identification cards and containing a printed phone number, in close proximity to the cell phone which appeared to be Appellant’s, and 14 suspected false identification cards, law enforcement agents reasonably looked to the cell phone for evidence of Arellano’s unlawful activity. See United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that “the nexus between the place to be searched and the items to be seized may be established by the nature of the item and the normal inferences of where one would likely keep such evidence.”).

In this wiretapping case, the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment as to one conversation because he knew there were third parties listening to it. United States v. Brown, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12932 (M.D. La. February 8, 2011).*

Officers had reasonable suspicion defendant was involved in street sales of drugs and approached him, and he fled. They chased him to his house, and he finally came out. The conduct of the officers was not unreasonable. United States v. Lewis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13028 (S.D. Ohio February 1, 2011).*

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider denial of a motion to suppress because of (1) new documentary evidence, and (2) deciding to challenge consent. The first is granted, but the second denied. The issue of consent was expressly waived in the initial motion and can’t be asserted on a motion to reconsider. United States v. Bigi, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15374 (S.D. Ohio February 16, 2011).*

Defendant was stopped for a broken taillight, and the officer directed him out of the car because he was excessively nervous. Cocaine fell out of his lap, and a dog alerted on the car. The search was legal. United States v. Riley, 410 Fed. Appx. 963, 2011 FED App. 0109N (6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

The officer approached a car parked on a McDonald’s lot after hours that had become a drug trafficking place at night. In his encounter with the two occupants of the car slouched down and the one on the phone outside, he got a story that made no sense, and that became reasonable suspicion. United States v. Sanchez-Sosa, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15275 (D. Kan. February 14, 2011).*

Even though a drug dog may alert to the residual odor of drugs, that does not undermine probable cause for a search from a dog alert. State v. Foster, 350 Ore. 161, 252 P.3d 292 (2011); State v. Helzer, 350 Ore. 153, 252 P.3d 288 (2011).

Defendant’s guilty plea belied his claim of IAC. He also included a claim that his lawyer never moved to suppress evidence but never showed that it would be granted. Smith v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37444 (E.D. Mo. April 6, 2011).*

Defendants were stopped on I-40 in Oklahoma for impeding traffic for driving 64 in the left lane when the speed limit was 70, and they were passed by at least ten vehicles on the right. When they were stopped, the officer could smell marijuana, and they were excessively nervous and their stories were inconsistent. That was reasonable suspicion to detain them longer. United States v. McLaughlin, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37656 (W.D. Okla. April 6, 2011).*

The officer had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendants after a stop, and one defendant consented to a search of his person. United States v. Royal, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37833 (E.D. Tenn. April 6, 2011), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37655 (E.D. Tenn. March 4, 2011).*

A roadblock looking for an abducted child was valid when the person the police were looking for was stopped. This was not a general crime control roadblock like Edmond–it was specific and targeted to a serious crime, a child abduction, albeit one that happened two days earlier. Underwood v. State, 2011 OK CR 12, 252 P.3d 221 (2011):

P16 The situation here is similar to the one in Lidster — the obvious difference being that the person challenging the roadblock here was actually implicated in the crime that prompted the roadblock in the first place. That difference, however, is of no constitutional significance, since the legality of a search or seizure is not dependent on the kind of evidence it produces. At the suppression hearing, Agent Mabry sponsored the guidelines used in this case, known as the FBI’s “Child Abduction Response Plan.” Mabry testified about the procedures he had been trained to use when deploying roadblocks to canvass for witnesses and generate leads in such cases. The district court found nothing unreasonable about the roadblock and, applying the factor analysis from Brown and Lidster, we reach the same conclusion. First, the public concerns justifying the roadblock were grave – considerably more so than in Lidster. All police knew was that a little girl had been reported missing two days before. Time was of the essence; the girl’s life might be at stake. Second, the roadblock clearly advanced the public interest of informing people in the area about the girl’s disappearance, and asking them about anything suspicious they may have seen. The police set up four roadblocks surrounding the immediate vicinity of the apartment where Jamie lived. They were deployed around the same time of day that Jamie had disappeared, on the belief that many local motorists tend to travel the same routes around the same time each day. Finally, the interference with individual liberty occasioned by the roadblocks was minimal. The plan contemplated no vehicle searches, and the record offers no evidence that any motorist was seriously inconvenienced.