Joshua Gruenspecht, “Reasonable” Grand Jury Subpoenas: Asking for Information in the Age of Big Data, 24 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 543 (2011):

Grand juries use the subpoena duces tecum to request and collect evidence held by a party or witness. In so doing, they serve as an investigative arm of the prosecution. Though subpoenas, unlike warrants, can be issued with less than probable cause, they receive less attention from commentators because subpoenas do not result in the state’s exercise of its powers to search a suspect’s property without his consent. Instead, they are used to request documents and information that the prosecution suspects will be material in the case. The advent of mass digital storage, however, has significantly increased the chances that records of any given document exist and is increasingly unifying the locations in which those records can be found. Both in the case of digital data stores held by users themselves and in the case of data stored by users with third parties, the extent of the subpoena power increasingly rests on the question of how specific a prosecutorial request for documents must be.

Faced with increasing amounts of stored digital information, courts and commentators have attempted to apply old rules in a new context. The knotty Fourth Amendment questions that arise from the production of electronically stored information through warrants have received particular scrutiny. Civil liberties groups have argued that the Constitution demands a probable cause standard for various kinds of digital searches by law enforcement, while public interest and industry coalitions have pushed for legislation to address the issue. While standards for the use of warrants for the collection of evidence have been the subject of judicial conflict, scholarly debate, and public outcry, standards for the use of the grand jury subpoena have slipped by relatively unnoticed. Given the potential scope of digital subpoenas, this is surprising. As one commentator has noted, “[w]hereas the subpoena power is fairly narrow in traditional cases, in computer crime cases it is incredibly broad.”

While the CI was fully tested or corroborated, the search warrant was based on the CI’s controlled buy, and that was good enough. State v. Payne, 59 So. 3d 1287 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2011).*

The place where defendant was stopped was a high crime area, and, when talking to the defendant, the officer told him to remove his hands from his pockets (for officer safety). Instead, defendant shoved his hand deeper into his pocket, and the officer forcibly removed it and 10 bags of dope came out, too. This was reasonable. State v. Huntley, 60 So. 3d 644 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2011).*

The officer’s suspicions were reasonably aroused by defendant’s conduct to call for a drug dog. Whether the drug dog alerted is credited despite the defendant’s claim the dog never alerted. State v. Birgans, 57 So. 3d 478 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2011).*

Defendant was free to leave the police station when he gave his statement, so the Fourth Amendment was not violated. State v. Edwards, 299 Conn. 419, 11 A.3d 116 (2011).*

While people can lawfully carry weapons with a carry permit in Massachusetts, that does not mean that there is no reasonable suspicion when officers see a person apparently grasping a gun. Here, the officers said “drop it” and defendant fled. Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Mass. 572, 946 N.E.2d 114 (2011):

While “the mere fact of carrying a weapon does not give rise to reasonable suspicion that the person is carrying it unlawfully (because many people register their weapons and carry them lawfully) … the fact of concealment of the weapon … gives rise to such reasonable suspicion.” Commonwealth v. Franklin, supra at 823 n.3, and cases cited. Thus, at the time Officer Blas commanded the defendant to drop his weapon, Officer Blas, as the police in Commonwealth v. Franklin, supra at 823, had reasonable suspicion (and also probable cause) that the crime of illegally carrying a firearm had been committed. See Commonwealth v. Sykes, 449 Mass. 308, 314-315, 867 N.E.2d 733 (2007) (stop of defendant based on reasonable suspicion when, in high crime area where large group had congregated, defendant attempted to avoid contact with police and clenched waistband while he ran). There was no error in denying the motion to suppress.

Defendant had been judicially evicted from the premises, and the owner had a writ of possession. Therefore, he lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises and the landlord could seize what he wanted and turn it over to the police. The issue of the police exceeding the private search is irrelevant. United States v. Jones, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49609 (W.D. Tenn. May 9, 2011), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49899 (W.D. Tenn. March 12, 2011).

The record supports the district court’s conclusion that, during a knock and talk, defendant consented to a search of his laptop computer for narcotics related evidence. The court notes that consent in one’s own home is less coercive than the case he relies on which involved a suspect in an airport claiming he was trying to avoid a “scene.” (United States v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 1999)). United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 2011 FED App. 0119P (6th Cir. 2011).*

Defendant fails to show that there were any false statements underlying a search warrant from defendant’s camp counselor’s room or that there was a warrantless search. Securing the premises while the warrant was sought was not unreasonable. United States v. O’Dell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49977 (W.D. Mo. May 10, 2011), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49956 (W.D. Mo. April 12, 2011).*

Officers saw a vehicle parked on the side of the four lane road. It was not illegally parked, and the officers claimed information that maybe they were stopped to dump trash, but there was no trash. There was no reasonable suspicion for a stop. Defendant’s consent was tainted by this illegal stop. United States v. Corona-Torres, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47998 (N.D. Iowa April 20, 2011).*

Defendants were stopped and not free to go, but there was reasonable suspicion. Defendants refused consent, so the use of a drug dog was not unreasonable, and that developed probable cause. United States v. Benedict, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47970 (D. Neb. February 18, 2011)*:

An unusual nervousness on the part of Benedict, a failure of memory as to his wife’s name, the divergence of travel plans expressed by Benedict and Robyn, and the divergence of family history expressed by Benedict and Robyn, all contributed to Trooper Hayes’ suspicion of criminal activity. The court finds such suspicions to be reasonable as would justify a further detention. At first, Benedict’s detention was voluntary as Benedict agreed to talk with Trooper Hayes about contraband matters. While initially indicating he might permit a search, Benedict was clear when asked to sign a consent to search that he did not consent to the Cadillac being searched. When Benedict refused consent to search, Trooper Hayes detained Benedict and the Cadillac for a canine sniff. It is clear that Benedict and Robyn were both detained on the side of the Interstate along with the Cadillac. It would be absurd to say that Benedict and Robyn were “free to go” when there was no practical way to leave the scene of the stop.

The search warrant in this case was issued with probable cause, and defendant did not show that Leon’s exceptions would make the search invalid. Because the search was with a warrant, the question of whether defendant was on the curtilage at the time of arrest was moot. United States v. Norris, 640 F.3d 295 (7th Cir. 2011).*

Only 60 hours of GPS surveillance was not as intensive as Maynard’s 28 days, so Maynard is distinguished. United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2011):

We are called on to decide whether the factually straightforward case before us implicates the concerns articulated in Maynard, or whether it is subject to the residual principle derived from Knotts and Garcia, that GPS tracking does not constitute a search. We believe that the present case is not like Maynard, and accordingly, we believe that the analysis of that case does not apply here.

The aspects of the search in Maynard that affected the court’s decision are absent here. The 28-day surveillance in Maynard was much lengthier than the 60-hour surveillance in the case before us. Moreover, the Maynard court repeatedly distinguished the surveillance at issue there from surveillance during a single journey. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558, 560, 562, 565. For instance, the court stated, “[s]urveillance that reveals only what is already exposed to the public—such as a person’s movements during a single journey—is not a search.” Id. at 565 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285). The case before us, so far as the record reveals, involves such a “single-trip” duration of surveillance. Unlike in Maynard, the surveillance here was not lengthy and did not expose, or risk exposing, the twists and turns of Cuevas-Perez’s life, including possible criminal activities, for a long period. As the Maynard court noted, the chances that the whole of Cuevas-Perez’s movements for a month would actually be observed is effectively nil—but that is not necessarily true of movements for a much shorter period.

As to the objection that the actual course of the GPS use is not known until long after the need for a warrant might arise, that may be true, but it is beside the point: the need vel non for a warrant depends on the purpose of the GPS use. And the purpose of the GPS attachment would generally be known ex ante, even though the actual facts of its use would only be known ex post. No different from any other case, the police here were obliged to decide ex ante whether their contemplated surveillance activities would require a warrant. Here, the purpose of the GPS was apparently only to record Cuevas-Perez’s trip across the country from Arizona. Therefore, assuming no significant deviation from the indicated purpose, no warrant would be required even if the Maynard analysis were applied. In that regard, it may be that the present state of precedent provides only piecemeal guidance, but this is unexceptional in the case of Fourth Amendment issues, and is only a reason that law enforcement may wish to obtain a warrant in close cases.

Update: Orin Kerr on Volokh Conspiracy.

The officer had reasonable suspicion to get defendant out of her car and talk to her because of an obstructed windshield. She fumbled for her DL and was nervous. The officer fished around for consent for 13 minutes and didn’t get it. Only then did she call for the drug dog, and it didn’t arrive for 25 minutes. That delay made the stop unreasonable. People v. McQuown, 407 Ill. App. 3d 1138, 348 Ill. Dec. 332, 943 N.E.2d 1242 (2011).*

Defendant was stopped in a high crime area after an apparent drug deal happened in the vehicle. The officer saw cocaine in the vehicle, so the car was validly searched under the automobile exception or a protective sweep. State v. Popp, 2011 Ohio 791, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 675 (12th Dist. February 22, 2011).*

Officers observed an apparent drug deal from a car, and approached, and the defendant tossed a baggy away, which was thus abandoned. State v. Soto, 2011 Ohio 785, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 670 (8th Dist. February 17, 2011).*

Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense and he was apparently under the influence. When he couldn’t find his DL, the officer noticed pills in his wallet as he fumbled with it. He admitted he had no prescription. The arrest was with probable cause. Wilson v. State, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 115 (February 22, 2011).*

A judge’s scrivener’s error of writing “p.m.” instead of “a.m.” voided the warrant. The requirements of state Rule 41 serve a high and important function in protecting against abuse of search warrants. State v. Hayes, 337 S.W.3d 235 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010):

With respect to Rule 41(c), in State v. Coffee, 54 S.W.3d 231, 233-34 (Tenn. 2001), the Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed the applicable law:

These procedural safeguards are intended “to secure the citizen against carelessness and abuse in the issuance and execution of search warrants.” Talley v. State, 208 Tenn. 275, 345 S.W.2d 867, 869 (1961).

“There is no writ more calculated to be abused in its use than the search warrant, for with it any home may be entered and the inmates disturbed, humiliated, and degraded. To prevent such a possibility from false informants made to officers inspired by overzeal, or acting from expediency, or obeying the command uttered by a mob impulse, the provisions of the Constitution and statutes found force and command observance.”

Id. (quoting Hampton v. State, 148 Tenn. 155, 252 S.W. 1007, 1008 (1923)).

An “anonymous” CI called the police that defendant had drugs in his car. When defendant pulled into his driveway, a police car stopped behind him with lights on and told the defendant to “come here.” That was a stop implicating the Fourth Amendment, and the officer had no reasonable suspicion for the stop because there was nothing at all to corroborate the CI’s information. State v. Wilson, 337 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011).*

The officer had reasonable suspicion and likely probable cause where he pulled up next to defendant’s car on a freeway to see that was following too close. Defendant was then found under the influence. State v. Ward, 2011 Ohio 1261, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 1087 (4th Dist. March 14, 2011).*

Defendant was involved in an accident where a pedestrian was hit by his car. While the officer misrepresented his basis for taking a blood or urine sample, defendant’s talking with a lawyer dissipated the taint. Anderson v. State, 246 P.3d 930 (Alaska App. 2011).*

Habeas appellant’s uncertified (non-COAed) Fourth Amendment claim was not reached. Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2011)*:

We decline to certify Stanley’s uncertified claim that he was denied a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims during the pretrial phase of his trial. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Stanley has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right in that claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

Not raising a Franks challenge until the post-suppression hearing brief was a waiver of the issue. United States v. Vazquez, 406 Fed. Appx. 430 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

While executing an animal welfare warrant, officers saw a list or URLs indicating possible child pornography, so another search warrant was sought for that. [The legality of the warrant was not an issue in this opinion.] United States v. Clark, 762 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.Me. 2011).*

Report of a person on fire in a house is an exigent circumstance for a police entry. State v. Langley, 128 Conn. App. 213, 16 A.3d 799 (2011).

Probable cause was evidence from a named CI as a source of information that defendant was involved in child pornography on his computer. She saw a notebook near the computer with URL’s suggestive of child porn websites. When he was confronted about the websites, he just threw the notebook away, but she saw an extra hard drive hidden in the house. State v. DiMeco, 2011 Conn. App. 198, 15 A.3d 1204 (2011).*

The police entered through an unlocked gate of a six foot high chain link fence to conduct a knock and talk. This did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Nieminski v. State, 60 So. 3d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).*

A report of neighbors that there was a burglary in progress in a house that was previously unoccupied for two weeks and seeing defendants running away from the house was exigency for an entry into the house to investigate additional suspects or victims. Drying marijuana was found. State v. Goodwin, 2010 Ohio 6480, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 5387 (2d Dist. December 29, 2010).*

Leaving stuff in an abandoned house was a waiver of any expectation of privacy. State v. Wilson, 56 So. 3d 375 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2010).*

Defendant validly consented to a BAC test. He was on probation, and he would have been revoked for refusing consent. State v. Hiner, 240 Ore. App. 175, 246 P.3d 35 (2010).*

Detailed report from identified CI was sufficient in itself to provide probable cause once corroborated. State v. Mitchele, 240 Ore. App. 86, 251 P.3d 760 (2010).*

Defendant’s girlfriend’s mother who was a co-lessee and paid the rent had sufficient common authority to consent to a search of their bedroom. People v Holmes, 2010 NY Slip Op 9683, 79 A.D.3d 1681, 913 N.Y.S.2d 480 (4th Dept. 2010).*

The 18 minute stop here for a window tinting citation was not unreasonably prolonged so the drug dog could get there 15 minutes after being called. [Right!] State v. Dewitt, 2010 Ohio 6476, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 5388 (2d Dist. December 29, 2010).*

The knock and talk here was a ruse to get the defendant to open his house for the police to look for an alleged bomb, and they found a gun inside. The district court suppressed the search because it was rife with coercion. The government appealed contending that the defendant did not feel coerced because he didn’t leave the apartment while officers, not the bomb squad, looked for the alleged bomb. The district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous, and the government failed in its burden of showing voluntariness. United States v. Harrison, 639 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2011):

Notwithstanding the legality of searches conducted by undercover agents, the “Fourth Amendment can certainly be violated by guileful as well as by forcible intrusions into a constitutionally protected area.” Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301, 87 S. Ct. 408, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1966). We have repeatedly held that deception and trickery are among the factors that can render consent involuntary. See, e.g., Sawyer, 441 F.3d at 895; United States v. McCurdy, 40 F.3d 1111, 1119 (10th Cir. 1994). When government agents seek an individual’s cooperation with a government investigation by misrepresenting the nature of that investigation, this deception is appropriately considered as part of the totality of circumstances in determining whether consent was gained by coercion or duress. We should be especially cautious when this deception creates the impression that the defendant will be in physical danger if he or she refuses to consent to the search.

In a fascinating opinion from Alaska, the U.S. District Court concludes that the defendant satisfied his burden of proof in a Franks challenge that an Alaska State Trooper could not have smelled a marijuana grow operation from at least 450′ away from the house in the Mat-Su valley at night in winter as alleged in the affidavit for a search warrant for defendant’s house. Without that information, the motion to suppress is granted, and Leon does not apply to Franks challenges. The USMJ’s R&R is rejected. [The defense called a human smell expert, and, reading between the lines, the government’s cross-examination of the smell expert likely inadvertently demolished the credibility of the Alaska State Trooper.] United States v. Thoms, 3:10-cr-00069 JWS (D. Alaska April 22, 2011) (order from Anchorage Daily News website, all thanks to a reader from Alaska):

Thoms also offered the testimony of Dr. David Doty (“Doty”). Doty is the director of the Smell and Taste Center at the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine. He has published over 170 peer-reviewed articles in various fields. He edited, contributed to, and is “best known” for The Handbook of Olfaction and Gustation, a highly regarded work in the “chemical sense field.” Doty helped develop the University of Pennsylvania Smell Identification Test, which is “sort of the gold standard for smell testing.” He was qualified as an expert on smell and taste detection and smell detection capabilities. Doty ultimately opined that there was a “zero” probability that Young smelled marijuana as he claimed.

There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in DMV records. Alexander v. State, 947 N.E.2d 966 (Ind. App. 2011).

Defendant’s de facto arrest and handcuffing because he was the roommate of a suspected drug dealer was unreasonable, and the product of the search was properly suppressed. State v. Abdulrahman, 2011 Ohio 1931, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 1663 (8th Dist. April 21, 2011).*

General consent includes prying up the rocker panel to look underneath. Moreover, standing by while it is happening, assuming he was, and not objecting was consent itself. United States v. Calvo-Saucedo, 409 Fed. Appx. 21 (7th Cir. 2011) (unpublished):

Moreover, even if Calvo could not see Officer Thebeau’s search, lifting the molding was within the scope of Calvo’s initial consent. When a person is informed that an officer is looking for drugs in his car and he gives consent without explicit limitation, the consent permits law enforcement to search inside compartments and containers within the car, so long as the compartment or container can be opened without causing damage. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251-52, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1991); United States v. Siwek, 453 F.3d 1079, 1085 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Garrido-Santana, 360 F.3d 565, 576 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Torres, 32 F.3d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1994).

Defendant had no standing to challenge the product of a search of another person’s property he wasn’t even connected to or that person’s incriminating statements about him allegedly obtained by coercion. United States v. Brodtmann, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10857 (S.D. Fla. February 3, 2011).*

A handcuffing does not turn a stop into an arrest. Also, a handcuffing does not neutralize any risk from the suspected weapon, so the frisk can still proceed. State v. Welch, 59 So. 3d 441 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2011).

Defendant was a social visitor in the house of another, but the record did not show that he was there for any legitimate purpose and he had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Hiding in the bathroom did not enhance his expectation of privacy since he was not in there for its intended purpose. People v. Magee, 194 Cal. App. 4th 178, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 689 (1st Dist. 2011), modified and
rehearing denied by People v. Magee, 2011 Cal. App. LEXIS 545 (Cal. App. 1st Dist., May 5, 2011)
:

It is also appropriate to consider the implications of the bright-line rule defendant implicitly proposes: that, where a person has an ongoing social relationship with the residents of a house, the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy whenever present in the house with the permission of the residents. Defendant’s proposed rule would be problematic. There would seem to be no limit to the number of residences within which a person could claim a reasonable expectation of privacy. The proposed rule would permit drug dealers to create a network of sanctuaries in the areas where they conduct their illegal business by establishing social relationships and bathroom access privileges at homes in various strategic locations. This outcome would frustrate law enforcement and facilitate illegality, without advancing the “valuable” social customs (Olson, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 98) underlying the rationale to recognize as legitimate a social guest’s expectation of privacy. Although a social guest’s expectation of privacy is generally legitimate, even if he or she is engaging in unlawful conduct during a social visit, we conclude that defendant’s claimed expectation of privacy is not one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. (Id. at pp. 95–96.)

Defendant was accused of a murder in NJ and he fled to NY. The NJ court found no constitutional error in the NY search warrant that NY would have suppressed the evidence if the prosecution was there. If there was a violation of NY law, it was technical at best, and that is not a ground for suppression under NY law. State v. Nguyen, 419 N.J. Super. 413, 17 A.3d 256 (N.J. Super. 2011):

Although we have not located any New York case that declined to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained as a result of a search or arrest beyond the boundaries of a police officer’s statutory jurisdiction, New York courts have held in other contexts that violations of statutes that do not affect substantial rights are not grounds for suppression of evidence. … Therefore, if defendant had been prosecuted for a violation of the New York statutes relating to unregistered firearms, it is unlikely a New York court would have suppressed evidence of the handgun that Detectives Rinaldi and Braun discovered in the roof of the Honda based on the violation of section 690.25 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law.

In any event, our courts are not bound, in a prosecution in New Jersey, by the remedy a court of another jurisdiction would apply for a violation of a statute governing search warrants in that state. See Evers, supra, 175 N.J. at 376-80, 815 A.2d 432.

Finally, we emphasize that any violation of section 690.25 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law was technical only. The representatives of the Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office obtained the assistance of New York City police officers in applying for warrants to search the house where defendant was residing and the car he drove away from the murder scene. A Somerset County detective supplied most of the information contained in the affidavit in support of the warrants and appeared with New York police officers when the application was made.

Defendant’s stop and frisk was unjustified by any articulable suspicion. When the officer started the frisk the defendant pushed his hands away saying “Don’t touch me.” The act of pushing the officer’s hands away was not a new crime of assault rending the exclusionary rule inapplicable. “Thus, whatever acts may have intervened, they did not influence the decision to seize the defendant, and accordingly the acts cannot have dissipated the taint of the original unlawful seizure. By the same reasoning, the renewed patfrisk was not an arrest for assault and battery on a police officer.” Commonwealth v. Martin, 457 Mass. 14, 927 N.E.2d 432 (2010), revg 73 Mass. App. Ct. 526, 529, 899 N.E.2d 869 (2009).

Defendant used a false ID and credit card to rent a hotel room. When she was ordered out of the room, she left behind bags that she denied were hers. This was an abandonment. State v. Brown, 348 Ore. 293, 232 P.3d 962 (2010), rev’g 228 Ore. App. 197, 206 P.3d 1180 (2009).* [The court concedes standing in the room based on the state constitution.]

When defendant’s car was stopped, the passenger admitted to having a gun with a carry permit. The officer looked under the passenger seat for the gun and then looked in a coat in the back seat in case there was another. That search was justified for officer safety under Chimel based on the officer’s reasonable belief that where there is one gun another might be found. State v. Williamson, 2010 Ohio 2331, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 1919 (5th Dist. May 24, 2010).*

Specific information from a known CI that defendant was selling drugs from a particular location supported defendant’s stop which resulted in a plain view of drugs on the seat. The stop and plain view was valid. A known informant was entitled to more credibility than an anonymous informant. Commonwealth v. Brown, 606 Pa. 198, 996 A.2d 473 (2010).*

Defendant was a visitor in a unit of a triplex, and he went outside and left drugs in a common trash area. Therefore, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in that common area. United States v. Maestas, 639 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 2011).

In defendant’s guilty plea, he specifically waived his right to file a suppression motion, and there was no showing that defense counsel was ineffective for not pursuing one. Also, defendant said at the plea that defense counsel did all that was asked of him. Johnson v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44212 (E.D. Mo. April 25, 2011).*

Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in AmTrak’s list of names of people riding on a train that was turned over to the DEA. United States v. McKenzie, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43969 (D. N.M. April 8, 2011).

The state adopted a seatbelt statute, as have all other states, based on evidence of savings of lives and money. It was a legislative prerogative to do so. Defendant failed to show that the purpose of the statute was to give police a basis for pretextual stops. The day of the stop, the officer was working overtime on a “click-it-or-ticket” enforcement program. Chase v. State, 243 P.3d 1014 (Alaska App. 2010):

Although Chase uses the phrase “pretext stop” to describe his claim on appeal, he is not actually talking about the “pretext” stop doctrine that this Court discussed in Morgan, Grohs, and Nease.

The officer who stopped Chase testified that he was on patrol, working overtime as part of a nationwide “click-it-or-ticket” law enforcement campaign — in other words, he was looking specifically for drivers who were not wearing their seatbelts. Thus, the officer had no ulterior motive when he stopped Chase for not wearing a seatbelt. The officer’s express motive was to look for drivers who were violating the seatbelt law, and to cite these drivers for this offense.

Defendant was properly stopped by a police officer looking across the city limits into an adjoining city seeing him commit traffic offenses. On the stop, defendant’s breath smelled of alcohol, and that justified a detention. Thomas v. State, 336 S.W.3d 703 (Tex. App. – Houston (1st Dist.) 2010).*