M.D.Fla.: After defendants were arrested in Sri Lanka and shipped back to U.S., criminal investigatory border search was valid

Defendants were arrested in Sri Lanka for fraud, and their belongings and computers were searched. A U.S. crime was potentially involved, and the FBI viewed the evidence seized in Sri Lanka. A criminal complaint was lodged in the U.S. and defendants were returned at government expense with their luggage, computers, and cell phones, being put in airport jail in Frankfurt between flights. When they entered the U.S. at Dulles near D.C., all that stuff was seized as a criminal investigatory seizure, but apparently not searched. The computers and other evidence were transported to Tampa for the prosecution, but one defendant with apparent authority consented to a search at her detention hearing in Tampa. The seizure at Dulles customs was valid as a border search despite is investigatory nature. United States v. Morgan, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83081 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2011):

Against this legal backdrop, there can be no dispute that Customs performed a valid border search at the Dulles airport upon the Morgans’ arrival into the United States. As in Gurr, the fact that the FBI was present and advised Customs agents of the nature of the charges against the Morgans and requested they be on the lookout for particular matters of evidentiary value does not alter that conclusion. As for the Customs official’s segregation of such evidentiary items found within the Defendants’ property into plastic bags, Gurr suggests such seizure was justifiable as within the scope of the routine border search and thus raises no Fourth Amendment concerns. In sum, I agree with the parties that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment in the Customs search of the Defendants’ property. Insofar as the Customs officials seized certain items believed to be of evidentiary value from the luggage, such too was justified under the border search exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, to the extent of the items seized and segregated into separate plastic bags – the so-called 1B11 items – the seizure too was consistent with Fourth Amendment considerations. Given that the items in 1B11 were properly seized, I find no Fourth Amendment issue arising from the agents’ subsequent warrantless review of these same matters upon their arrival in Tampa, Florida. Cf. United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (“The Fourth Amendment is implicated only if authorities use information with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated.”).

Update: On review, the District Court adopts the part denying suppressing the search, but orders and additional hearing on some additional items seized. United States v. Morgan, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86729 (M.D. Fla. August 5, 2011).*

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