N.D.Ala.: Police entry 22 minutes before SW issued was reasonable because of exigent circumstances

A warrant was being sought, and the officers waiting for the warrant reasonably figured that their cover had been blown and it was time to secure the premises before the warrant arrived. The seizure of the house and protective sweep 22 minutes before the warrant arrived wasn’t unreasonable. United States v. Figueroa-Cruz, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2012):

Unlike the officers entry into the apartment of Santa [United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662 (11th Cir. 2000)] agents at the Skyline Drive house had every reason to believe that the occupants of the house would soon be alerted to the presence of the agents. Stephens ordered an entry to “secure the scene.” That stated purpose alone does not alter the fact that the entry was not authorized by a warrant. ” Any warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances must, of course, be supported by a genuine exigency.” Kentucky v. King, __ U.S. __, __, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1862, __ L.Ed.2d __, __ (2011) citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). Stephens stated purpose, however is relevant to the inquiry into whether he “created” exigency as they Eleventh Circuit found was the case in Santa. “A warrantless search is allowed,[], where both probable cause and exigent circumstances exist.” United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1510 . Exigent circumstances exist “where the inevitable delay incident to obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate action.” United States v. Morales, 868 F.2d 1562, 1575 (11th Cir.1989). Here there was a warrantless entry and protective sweep of the house. Assuming without deciding that agents seized the drugs and money once they were seen on the counter the Supreme Court has clearly approved the warrantless seizure of property to maintain the status quo while a warrant is obtained where they would or did hold a warrantless search to be invalid. Rowlings [sic] v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979); United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 25 L.Ed.2d 282 (1970). In the present case Stephens did not commence the actual search until warrant had been obtained. (Tr.7/19/12 p.39)

The agents watching the Skyline Drive location had reasonable grounds to believe that whoever was in the house would soon be alerted that some form of investigation was on going. With such knowledge the individuals may have been able to flee without detection because agents had only a limited view of the scene. The Eleventh Circuit has long expressed acceptance of the fact that the possibility of destruction of evidence is acute in narcotics cases. Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1511 (This Court has held that the need to invoke the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is “particularly compelling in narcotics cases” because narcotics can be so quickly destroyed. United States v. Young, 909 F.2d 442, 446 (11th Cir.1990)). Because both probable cause and exigent circumstances existed at the time of the warrantless seizure of the evidence which was in plain view following that entry was consistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Suppression is due to be denied.