Conflict of laws: “The New Mexico exclusionary rule is grounded in effectuating the constitutional rights of individuals and is therefore applicable where out-of-state evidence is introduced in a New Mexico court.” Here, it was a search in Texas that resulted in a murder charge in New Mexico. State v. Causey, 2026 N.M. LEXIS 124 (July 8, 2026):
P21 The State contends Snyder and Cardenas-Alvarez are distinguishable because the searches and seizures in both cases occurred within the physical borders of New Mexico, albeit at federal border patrol checkpoints. We find the reasoning of both cases applicable to the circumstances before us. We cannot say the text of Article II, Section 10 or our relevant jurisprudence limits the application of that constitutional provision to unwarranted governmental intrusions committed within the state itself. Nor do we find a meaningful distinction pursuant to Article II, Section 10 between the actions of federal agents operating under and effectuating distinct federal standards in their discrete jurisdictional sphere, regardless of occurring within New Mexico’s geographical borders, and the actions of other states’ agents operating under and effectuating those states’ distinct standards in their discrete jurisdictional sphere occurring outside of New Mexico’s borders.
P22 Article II, Section 10’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures—whether applied to the actions of federal agents, Texas agents, or any other non-New Mexico agent—remains a fundamental constitutional right entitling individuals freedom from unwarranted governmental intrusion and is effectuated by the exclusion of evidence that results from such intrusion when proffered in New Mexico courts. Snyder, 1998-NMCA-166, ¶ 15; Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 18. “‘Denying the government the fruits of unconstitutional conduct at trial best effectuates the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures by preserving the rights of the accused to the same extent as if the government’s officers had stayed within the law.'” Snyder, 1998-NMCA-166, ¶ 16 (quoting State v. Gutierrez, 1993-NMSC-062, ¶ 55, 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052).
P23 While it is certainly true the laws of our state generally do not govern the conduct of out-of-state agents, as they also do not govern the conduct of federal agents, the evidence at issue has still been proffered by the State in its prosecution of Defendant in a New Mexico state court for violating New Mexico’s criminal statutes. As was the case in Cardenas-Alvarez, our application of state constitutional standards to determine the admissibility of evidence in a New Mexico state court of evidence which was seized by a non-New Mexico agent will not affect any prosecution that might be brought against Defendant in another jurisdiction, nor does it circumscribe the activities of those agents. Moreover, we do not claim the authority to constrain the activities of agents of other sovereigns, here Texas law enforcement; however, “we do possess the authority—and indeed the duty—to insulate our courts from evidence seized in contravention of our state’s constitution.” Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 19 (emphasis added).
. . .
C. The Application of Article II, Section 10 in New Mexico Courts Does Not Lead to Impracticable Results
P33 Finally, we address the State’s assertion that our holding operates as a blanket refusal to admit lawfully obtained evidence leading to impracticable results. To be clear, our holding today should not be interpreted as a bar on the admission of all evidence obtained outside of New Mexico by non-New Mexico agents. To the contrary, the State can proffer evidence gathered outside of New Mexico by another jurisdiction’s law enforcement agency so long as that evidence is lawfully obtained under Article II, Section 10.
P34 Moreover, we fail to see the impracticable results the State cautions against. The State offers several hypothetical situations to elucidate the impracticability of applying Article II, Section 10 in New Mexico courts where evidence is gathered elsewhere by various non-New Mexico entities or people. As none of those circumstances are relevant to the narrow question before us—whether the district court erred in applying New Mexico law, rather than Texas law, in its order granting Defendant’s motion to suppress—we find it unnecessary to address them.
P35 As for the impracticable results in similar circumstances—in other words where evidence is gathered in another state by that state’s law enforcement in violation of Article II, Section 10—the State alleges criminal defendants could escape meaningful prosecution, thereby rewarding criminals. We find this argument problematic for two reasons: (1) suppression of evidence seized in violation of Article II, Section 10 does not foreclose prosecution of criminal defendants, and (2) Article II, Section 10 is intended to protect individuals from unreasonable search and seizure, including defendants who have yet to be proven guilty.
P36 In relation to the alleged impracticable results in Defendant’s case, the State correctly asserts in its briefing that the purpose of the New Mexico exclusionary rule is to protect citizens from unreasonable government interference. Despite this, the State seemingly argues that the purpose of the rule is not effectuated by suppressing the firearm because no New Mexico official engaged in the unreasonable search and seizure. The State goes on to imply the result of the district court’s order is impracticable because the practical effect “rewards” Defendant. Again, we disagree.
P37 As discussed above, and observed by the State, Article II, Section 10 protects against unreasonable government interference. We do not interpret this constitutional protection to apply narrowly against our state government given the provision’s plain language, our relevant jurisprudence applying Article II, Section 10 to evidence introduced in a New Mexico court stemming from a federal border patrol search, and our extensive jurisprudence concerning our state’s desire to effectuate the constitutional rights of individuals. Finally, we hardly think enforcing Defendant’s constitutional right could be hailed as a “reward[].” The New Mexico Constitution, including Article II, Section 10, provides fundamental rights for New Mexicans. To consider the district court’s grant of Defendant’s motion to suppress a “reward[]” is misguided because Defendant merely sought to enforce a right he already had, and we cannot say such enforcement of a constitutional right is impracticable.
