N.D.N.Y.: Confrontation clause doesn’t apply in suppression hearings

Hearsay may be relied upon in a suppression hearing, and the confrontation clause doesn’t apply. United States v. Albert, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168169 (N.D.N.Y. July 29, 2026):

In considering a motion to suppress, “the court may rely on hearsay and other evidence, even though that evidence would not be admissible at trial.” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 (1980) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-74 [1974]; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-74 [1949]; Fed. R. Evid. 104[a], 1101[d][1]). Similarly, “the Confrontation Clause does not attach to pretrial suppression hearings.” United States v. Shaw, 16-CR-0642, 2017 WL 1380598, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2017). Finally, the standard of proof at such a hearing is a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Miller, 382 F. Supp.2d 350, 361 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (Sharpe, J.) (“In Fourth and Fifth Amendment litigation … the standard of proof is … proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 [1974]).

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