E.D.Va.: Officer’s mere belief def might be the shooter in an incident based on history alone isn’t RS

An officer’s alleged belief that defendant was capable of being the shooter in an incident based on his history isn’t reasonable suspicion. United States v. Neville, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186545 (E.D. Va. Sep. 22, 2025):

Defendant has the better of this argument. The officers’ purported belief that Defendant was a “shooter,” and thus armed and dangerous, appears to be based only on the relaying detective’s knowledge of Defendant’s past behavior. Under the Government’s theory, anyone with a history of criminal behavior would be suspected of engaging in criminal behavior — an approach that would plainly swallow the Terry rule and fly in the face of Fourth Circuit precedent finding such broad-based, generalized suspicion inadequate for Fourth Amendment purposes. Cf. Curry, 965 F.3d at 332 (finding “limited and vague information regarding a possible crime” insufficient to justify a seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Black, 707 F.3d at 540 (rejecting prior arrest history as a “logical basis for a reasonable, particularized suspicion”). Similarly, the Government’s heavy reliance on Defendant’s proximity to a known criminal as a basis for reasonable suspicion runs afoul of Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court law concerning guilt (or suspicion) by association. Cf. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91 (“[A] person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause [or reasonable suspicion] to search that person.”).