D.C.Cir.: Officer saying he had “warrants” required remand for whether consent was mere acquiescence

The district court erred in not considering whether defendant acquiesced in consenting to a search. The officer said he had “warrants,” but there was no clarification whether it was an arrest warrant or search warrant. Reversed. United States v. Glover, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 18091 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 2025):

The district court found that when Officer Creamer stated he had “warrants,” he “was telling Brewer that there were outstanding arrest warrants for the brothers and that he was not asking to search the apartment.” J.A. 175. Critically, however, the district court did not determine whether Officer Creamer’s references to a warrant-even if understood to be for an arrest and not a search warrant-rendered Brewer’s assent to a search mere acquiescence. In other words, the district court did not consider whether Officer Creamer’s “invocation of a warrant was tantamount to a pronouncement that [Brewer] had no right to resist the search.” United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quotations and citation omitted).

Nor did the district court consider whether Officer Creamer’s statement that he “need[ed]” to search the apartment for Brewer’s brothers in conjunction with his reference to warrants rendered Brewer’s assent to the search mere acquiescence. J.A. 174. The district court observed that Officer Creamer’s statement that he “need[ed]” to search for Brewer’s brothers, “did not appear in context to be an assertion of authority he lacked, but rather a plea.” J.A. 174-75. But it did not consider the compounded effect of Officer Creamer’s statements that he had warrants and that he needed to search the apartment for Brewer’s brothers on Brewer’s ability to voluntarily consent to the search.