DC: Flight even in a high crime area isn’t RS

Relying on the en banc opinion in Mayo v. United States, 315 A.3d 606 (D.C. 2024), flight in a high-crime area is not reasonable suspicion. People flee to avoid unnecessary confrontation with the police, who just might be potentially too aggressive. D.W. v. United States, 2025 D.C. App. LEXIS 198 (July 17, 2025):

That leaves D.W.’s flight. That flight was in one important respect more suspicious than Mr. Mayo’s flight, because D.W. fled before officers had singled him out in any way. On the other hand, there was evidence in this case relating to the concerns expressed in Mayo about flight as an innocent response to reasonable fear of aggressive police conduct. We need not delve further into these complexities, however, given our holding in Posey v. United States, 201 A.3d 1198 (D.C. 2019), that “a nondescript individual distinguishing himself from an equally nondescript crowd by running away from officers unprovoked does not, without more, provide a reasonable basis for suspecting that individual of being involved in criminal activity and subjecting him or her to an intrusive stop and police search.” Id. at 1204.

We conclude that our decisions in Mayo and Posey, taken together, require reversal of the trial court’s order denying the motion to suppress evidence in this case. Mayo leads to the conclusion that the general locational crime evidence in this case added little if anything to reasonable, articulable suspicion. Posey holds that even unprovoked headlong flight is not by itself sufficient to justify a stop. We acknowledge the trial court’s point that D.W.’s flight could be viewed as more suspicious because of the desperation reflected in his jumping fences. We view that point as having at least some relevance, but we do not view the point as warranting a result different from our holdings in Mayo and Posey. An innocent individual who feared “police brutality or harassment” or “over-aggressive police conduct” might well reflect that fear by taking measures such as jumping fences. Mayo, 315 A.3d at 625, 630 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The United States argues that affirmance in this case is required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Wardlow. We disagree. As the court in Mayo interpreted Wardlow, Wardlow’s holding rested in part on two factors not present in this case: Mr. Wardlow’s holding of an opaque bag that could have contained illegal drugs and information that drug activity was anticipated in the “particular location” where Mr. Wardlow was observed. Mayo, 315 A.3d at 626 & n.12, 633.

Finally, for the first time on appeal, the United States contends that suppression of evidence was not justified under the exclusionary rule even if the stop was unlawful. We decline to consider that argument. See, e.g., In re R.W., 334 A.3d 593, 605-06 (D.C. 2025) (declining to consider exclusionary-rule argument raised for first time on appeal; citing cases).