IL: Def consented to home inspections as a condition of pretrial electronic monitoring

Defendant was placed on electronic monitoring for his pretrial release in a gun case. The conditions he agreed to included home inspections necessary to determine his adherence to conditions. When the device signaled it had been tampered with, pretrial officers could enter to inspect. People v. Garcia, 2021 IL App (1st) 190026, 2021 Ill. App. LEXIS 705 (Dec. 28, 2021):

On November 16, 2017, Anson helped defendant enroll in the EM program. Anson explained the conditions stated on the participation agreement and equipment responsibility agreement. He identified those agreements in court. As a condition of participation, Garcia agreed “to admit representatives of this program into [his] residence twenty-four hours a day to ensure compliance with the conditions of the program.” Garcia initialed the conditions and signed both agreements.

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Critically, the language used in Garcia’s EM participation agreement is distinguishable from that in Lampitok when considered in the context of the record before us. Garcia was arrested and charged with gun-related offenses. He then signed an EM participation agreement stating he agreed “to admit representatives of this program into [his] residence twenty-four hours per day to ensure compliance with the conditions of this program.” At that time, Garcia gave prospective consent to search his residence at any time to ensure his compliance with the program. In exchange for his agreement, Garcia was released from jail and allowed to stay home on electronic monitoring pending his trial. The language of Garcia’s search condition cannot be construed to require officers to ask for consent when it is presumed that Garcia would be home to admit officers inside to verify his compliance with the program.

In this case, investigators received an alarm that the home monitoring device worn by defendant as a condition of pretrial release had been tampered with. This provided a reasonable suspicion to investigate. Although under the terms of the program defendant was required to be at home when officers went to his home to investigate, he did not answer the door. Armed with this information, there was certainly probable cause to search defendant’s residence. Defendant’s brother-in-law opened the door for officers, who then confirmed defendant was in violation of the terms of the program. Based on Garcia’s prospective consent, which he voluntarily gave in exchange for his release on home detention and electronic monitoring, a motion to suppress would have been meritless. “A court will not find that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a meritless motion to suppress.” People v. McIntosh, 2020 IL App (5th) 170068, 54. Because Garcia failed to establish trial counsel’s deficient performance, his claim of ineffective assistance fails. People v. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d 302, 317-18 (2010). Because we have found that defendant gave his prospective consent to the search in this case, we need not consider whether authority existed for defendant’s brother-in-law to consent to search his apartment.

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