CA8: Lack of nexus saved by GFE

Even without an adequate showing of nexus, search warrants have been sustained under the good faith exception. This is one of those cases where the inference is close enough. United States v. Mayweather, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 10208 (8th Cir. Apr. 8, 2021):

Mayweather argues that the affidavit lacked sufficient indicia of probable cause because it provided no connection between Mayweather’s drug distribution activities and his home. Thus, he asserts that McLouden’s belief that the search was legal, was “entirely unreasonable.” See id. (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted).

Contrary to Mayweather’s assertions, we have applied the good-faith exception in controlled-substance cases even when an affidavit did not establish a nexus between the search location and the suspected contraband. In those cases, we concluded that the facts enabled an officer and the issuing judge to logically infer that a drug dealer would store contraband at his residence. See id. at 671-72 (stating it was not “entirely unreasonable” for an officer to rely on the warrant because, “[a]s a matter of common sense, it is logical to infer that someone in possession of valuable contraband would store that contraband in a safe, accessible location such as his or her residence”); see also Moya, 690 F.3d at 948-49 (holding that the good-faith exception applied because it was not unreasonable for the issuing judge to infer evidence would be at a suspect’s house when the affidavit indicated the suspect was distributing methamphetamine in the area, making the officer’s reliance objectively reasonable).

Here, the good-faith exception similarly applies because the issuing judge could have logically inferred that Mayweather stored contraband at his residence. As in Moya, law enforcement possessed information that Mayweather was distributing cocaine. The issuing judge could reasonably infer that evidence of cocaine distribution would be at Mayweather’s residence. Therefore, McLouden’s “[r]eliance on the search warrant was objectively reasonable, and there is no evidence [he] acted in bad faith.” See Moya, 690 F.3d at 949; see also United States v. Ross, 487 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (8th Cir. 2007) (emphasizing that the issuing state judge, federal magistrate judge, and federal district court judge all found sufficient indicia of probable cause); cf. United States v. Herron, 215 F.3d 812, 814-15 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that the good-faith exception could not apply, even when a state judge issued the warrant, because the only evidence connecting the suspect or his house to a farm containing marijuana plants was the suspect’s prior marijuana convictions and his familial relationship to the farm owners).

In Ross, the good-faith exception applied because (1) we previously held that probable cause to arrest a drug dealer supported an inference that evidence exists at his residence when officers stated that in their experience such an inference is appropriate; (2) the issuing judge, reviewing magistrate judge, and reviewing district court judge all found sufficient indicia of probable cause within the affidavit; and (3) the affidavit actually connected the drug transaction to the suspect’s home by way of his truck. Ross, 487 F.3d at 1123-24; see also United States v. Luloff, 15 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing a district court’s grant of a motion to suppress when an affidavit supporting a search warrant showed that the defendant “had engaged in a continuous course of drug trafficking” and the affiant “aver[red] based upon his experience that drug traffickers often keep in their residences records of their illicit activity”).