CA6: SW with wrong address and color of building was still particular enough in location

The search warrant was wrong on the address and colors of the place to be searched. Following the description in the warrant, however, led to only one building: The place searched. The officer involved was there to ensure it was the right place. Thus, there was no reasonable probability that the wrong place was searched, and the motion to suppress was properly denied. United States v. Wagoner, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 37345 (6th Cir. Nov. 25, 2020):

Here, many descriptors in the warrant did not point to the searched mobile home. Not only did the warrant list the incorrect address, it also stated that the target was Wagoner’s residence and described the target as beige with blue shutters. In fact, the mobile home was gray, did not have blue shutters, and was not Wagoner’s residence.

But some specific descriptors in the warrant did point to the searched premises. The warrant provided accurate and detailed instructions that indisputably applied only to the searched premises, not the other structures on the property: “Follow the one lane gravel drive to the end, approximately 1/10 mile to … mobile … home with an attached covered front porch and an attached back porch sitting to the right of a white metal building.” (DE15-1, Search Warrant, Page ID 51.) None of the other residential structures were at the end of the lane to the right of a metal building – only the mobile home was. So this specific descriptor only applied to the double-wide mobile home. See United States v. Crumpton, 824 F.3d 593, 612-13 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that technical “error does not invalidate a search warrant if the warrant includes other specific descriptors that remove the probability that the wrong location could be searched, especially when the warrant affiant participates in the execution of the search” and citing cases relying on location information to support that assertion). An officer who followed these directions would arrive at the correct residence. Further, the warrant’s recitation of the wrong house number did not appreciably increase the chance of an incorrect search in the context of this case because the houses were not numbered. So this was not a case in which location information was of “limited usefulness.” Knott v. Sullivan, 418 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2005).

Additionally, the information in the warrant taken together did not accurately describe any other building on the property, minimizing the chances of searching the wrong place given the detailed location information. The other mobile home did not have blue shutters and was not located at the end of the lane. And there is no evidence that the other mobile home was beige. Although it is true that the parents’ house and Wagoner’s apartment were beige, neither had blue shutters. Neither were mobile homes. And neither were even close to the end of the lane; the house (located about fifty feet from the apartment) was “probably a couple football fields away.” (DE67, Suppression Hr’g Tr., at Page ID 428, 423.)

Substantially decreasing the probability of a search of the wrong place, the executing officer, Agent Dalrymple, was at the mobile home immediately before he went to obtain the warrant. And officers remained at the mobile home until he returned to execute the warrant. Where, as here, there are some accurate identifiers (mobile home, location information) and the executing officer is the affiant and just came from the home in question, this court and the Eighth Circuit have upheld a search warrant. Durk, 149 F.3d at 466; see also United States v. Hassell, 427 F.2d 348, 349 (6th Cir. 1970) (upholding a warrant in part because “three officers were left at the [premise] while one went to procure the search warrant”); United States v. Clement, 747 F.2d 460, 461 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding no probability that an incorrect location could be searched when the officers personally knew the location to be searched); United States v. Gitcho, 601 F.2d 369, 372 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979) (“Of even greater importance is the fact that the agents executing the warrant personally knew which premises were intended to be searched, and those premises were under constant surveillance while the warrant was obtained”).

The question is whether there was a “reasonable probability” that another premise might be searched under the warrant. Durk, 149 F.3d at 456-66. Because Dalrymple returned directly to the same mobile home he had just left, the other officers waited there for the entire time, the directions in the warrant would correctly lead an officer to the mobile home in question, and the inaccurate information taken together did not clearly point to any other structure, there is no such reasonable probability. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Wagoner’s motion to suppress.