OH10: While Carpenter is a “new rule,” it’s not been applied in post-conviction proceedings

While Carpenter is a “new rule,” courts on post-conviction haven’t been applying it, and this court does not either. State v. Neil, 2019-Ohio-3793, 2019 Ohio App. LEXIS 3843 (10th Sept. 19, 2019):

[*P21] Courts addressing the holding in Carpenter have held that the Supreme Court’s decision “states a new rule.” United States v. Davis, D.C.M.D.Pa., No. 1:13-cr-28, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63314 (Apr. 12, 2019) (holding that “[t]he Carpenter decision clearly carves out a new understanding of the Fourth Amendment, as it applies to wireless data,” and that the Supreme Court “did not merely apply prior case law to the facts before it,” but rather “stated a new principle on the type of conduct that constitutes a search”); United States v. Williams, D.C.E.D.Mich. No. 2:17-cr-20758-VAR-DRG, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129639 (Aug. 2, 2018) (holding that the Supreme Court in Carpenter “announced a new rule that the Government obtaining CSLI constituted a search and can only be legally obtained with a search warrant,” and therefore “[g]oing forward, law enforcement * * * will need to demonstrate probable cause”).

[*P22] Courts have further held that “[a]lthough Carpenter announced a new rule of law, the Supreme Court did not make the case retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” United States v. Marquez, D.C.W.D.Ok., No. CR-12-233-R, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136209 (Aug. 13, 2018). See also Davis (new rule stated in Carpenter does not apply retroactively on collateral review; exceptions in Teague do not apply as “the new rule is plainly procedural” and “simply does not rise” to the level of a watershed rule of criminal procedure); In re Symonette, 11th Cir. No. 19-12232-F, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 20428 (July 9, 2019) (“The Supreme Court * * * has not held that Carpenter is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, nor does any combination of cases necessarily dictate its retroactivity.”); People v. Cutts, 62 Misc.3d 411, 414, 88 N.Y.S.3d 332 (N.Y.2018) (analyzing Carpenter under retroactivity principles of Teague and holding that “defendants whose convictions became final prior to Carpenter cannot benefit from its holding”).