M.D.Pa.: Carpenter does not qualify for retroactive effect to obtaining CSLI in 2013

Carpenter does not qualify for retroactive effect to obtaining CSLI in 2013. United States v. Davis, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63314 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2019):

As to whether the rule in Carpenter is new, we must determine whether the decision states a rule that “was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final,” in opposition to “merely an application of the principle that governed” a prior matter. Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 347-48 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 307) (emphasis in the original). The Carpenter decision clearly carves out a new understanding of the Fourth Amendment, as it applies to wireless data. The Court did not merely apply prior case law to the facts before it; the Court stated a new principle on the type of conduct that constitutes a search. Thus, we find that Carpenter states a new rule. We further find that the exceptions in Teague do not apply. First, the new rule is plainly procedural; that is, the rule does not concern the range of an individual’s conduct that the government may punish, but specifically addresses the procedural mechanism required for the police to obtain certain information. Second, the new rule does not appear to be a watershed rule of criminal procedure. A “watershed” rule goes to “the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction,” such as a right to counsel at trial. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693-94, 91 S. Ct. 1160, 28 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1970)) (emphasis in the original). The new rule stated in Carpenter simply does not rise to that level. Thus, under the guidance of Teague, the rule in Carpenter is not effective retroactively, and Defendant here cannot rely on it to collaterally challenge his conviction.

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