D.Md.: A waived motion to suppress by a guilty plea, no matter the likelihood of success, is not actual innocence

The potential of a successful motion to suppress that was waived by a guilty plea is not “actual innocence” for post-conviction tolling. “Regardless, Yansane’s claim that he now has evidence of legal innocence fails because a potentially successful motion to suppress is not equivalent to an assertion of legal innocence. See United States v. Wintons, 468 F. App’x 231, 233 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that ‘suppression of evidence does not amount to legal innocence’); United States v. Neal, 230 F.3d 1355 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (holding that a belated desire to file a motion to suppress does not constitute a credible assertion of legal innocence warranting withdrawal of a guilty plea); Vasquez v. United States, 279 F.2d 34, 35-37 (9th Cir. 1960) (affirming the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea when the defendant argued that he had discovered after the plea that he might have a meritorious legal defense through a suppression motion).” United States v. Yansane, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30717 (D. Md. Feb. 27, 2019).

A generalized post-conviction claim of a waived search and seizure claim without discussing it is denied. Miller v. United States, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30719 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2019).*

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