WA: Even if CP warrant was overbroad (it’s not), severability makes seizure valid

One month old information received from Microsoft to NCMEC was not stale. (That is settled everywhere.) The search warrant was not too vague, and, even it if was, the court’s ability to sever invalid parts makes this search valid. State v. Friedrich, 2018 Wash. App. LEXIS 1996 (Aug. 23, 2018):

The severability doctrine spares us the task of drawing lines about over-seizing electronic information in this case, because the evidence that was seized and used to convict Mr. Friedrich was seized pursuant to provisions of the warrant that were particularized and supported by probable cause.5Link to the text of the note Under the severability doctrine, which “has been applied [even] where First Amendment considerations exist,” “‘infirmity of part of a warrant requires the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to that part of the warrant’ but does not require suppression of anything seized pursuant to valid parts of the warrant.” Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 556 (quoting United States v. Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d 633, warrant.” Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 556 (quoting United States v. Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d 633, 637 (8th Cir. 1983)). Although the doctrine does not apply to unconstitutional general warrants or where the valid portion of the warrant is “a relatively insignificant part of an otherwise invalid search,” id. at 556-57 (internal quotation marks omitted), neither of those exceptions to the doctrine apply here.

The warrant was not too vague and did not authorize the seizure of items protected by the First Amendment. Its extension to nine unrelated IP addresses and any other debatable overbreadth did not taint its valid and severable authorization to seize the three computers and one smartphone relied on as evidence against Mr. Friedrich.