CA4: Def in rental car preserved standing issue; remanded for application of Byrd

Defendant was in a rental car, and he moved to suppress. He was denied standing under existing case law, but that was abrogated in Byrd. SCOTUS GVR’ed. Remanded for application of Byrd and whatever else. United States v. Houston, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20832 (4th Cir. July 26, 2018)*:

In Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018), however, the Supreme Court held that “the mere fact that a driver in lawful possession or control of a rental car is not listed on the rental agreement will not defeat his or her otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 1531. Because the Supreme Court’s decision in Byrd abrogated our decision in Wellons, the Court vacated our decision in this case and remanded for reconsideration in light of Byrd. Having considered the Supreme Court’s decision, we hereby vacate the decision of the district court and remand for further proceedings. The district court should consider the matter de novo in light of Byrd, and the parties are free to raise any newly relevant issues.

The court means Davis good faith. Hint, hint. Wait: Not so fast. Why should “standing” be treated the same as the merits of whether the search is valid, as in Davis? If standing is the ability to challenge a search, how does that affect the officers conducting the search allegedly in good faith? You mean the officers actually think about “standing” when they are conducting a search? Where does Leon good faith apply to standing questions? Moreover, standing is the defendant’s burden while the legality of a search without a warrant is the government’s burden, and the government carries the burden on good faith. Conflating the burdens on opposite parties, one of standing, one of the merits, doesn’t work for the good faith exception.

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