Defendant had her blood drawn by search warrant, and the officer failed to leave a copy of the warrant with her. The trial court granted her motion to suppress, and the court of criminal appeals affirmed. Reversed: The mere nonprejudicial technical failure of state Rule 41 requirements does not lead to suppression, although Tennessee normally strictly construes the technical requires of Rule 41. Also, the court cabins it partly in the [new found] good faith exception. The court suggests this is limited to blood. State v. Daniel, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 383 (July 21, 2018):
As we did in Lowe, ___ S.W.3d at ___, we take this opportunity to provide guidance to trial courts considering motions to suppress arising from technical violations of Rule 41. When a defendant has demonstrated that a search warrant or its supporting affidavit is noncompliant with the technical requirements of Rule 41 or other relevant statute(s), the burden shifts to the State to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the technical noncompliance was the result of a good-faith error and (2) the error did not result in any prejudice to the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Diehl, 276 F.3d 32, 41-42 (1st Cir. 2002) (recognizing that, where the state is defending a motion to suppress on the basis of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, it is the state’s burden to demonstrate that the conduct at issue meets the standards of good faith). Although the term “good faith” is not subject to precise definition, a good faith error is one that is characterized by simple, isolated oversight or inadvertence. A good faith mistake does not include conduct that is deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent, nor does it include multiple careless errors. Furthermore, where a finding of good faith depends on the credibility of one or more witnesses, the trial court should set forth its assessment of that factor to facilitate appellate review. If the State carries its burden of proving both prongs, the trial court then may consider, in the trial court’s sound discretion, whether the technical noncompliance was sufficiently inadvertent and inconsequential to qualify for the narrow good-faith exception to Rule 41’s exclusionary rule that we have adopted.
In sum, given the specific facts of this case in which the Defendant was aware of the blood draw and the fact that no property of the Defendant was seized as a result of the warrant which could later be returned, we hold that a good-faith exception to Rule 41’s technical requirement that the officer executing a search warrant leave a copy of the warrant with the person searched should apply in this case. Cf. Crumpton, 824 F.3d at 617 (holding that officer’s failure to leave a copy of warrant at residence in contravention of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(f)(1)(C) would not entitle defendant to suppression when defendant was shown a copy of the warrant at scene of search, rendering it “difficult to imagine what prejudice he could have suffered if the agents did not leave a copy of the warrant at the house as well”).
Nevertheless, we remind law enforcement officers that their utmost attention to detail is required when seeking and executing search warrants. Rule 41’s procedural safeguards “are intended ‘to secure the citizen against carelessness and abuse in the issuance and execution of search warrants.'” Coffee, 54 S.W.3d at 233 (quoting Talley v. State, 345 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tenn. 1961)). A police officer’s duty to protect the citizens within her jurisdiction includes the duty to act with due care in the seeking and execution of search warrants, including the requirements set forth in Rule 41 and any applicable statutes.