OR: Guest standing is functional to the relationship to the residence and here didn’t cover under the back steps

Guest standing has a functional element. Defendant was a guest in the home of another and their relationship was founded on drugs. While defendant would have standing in the home, he didn’t under the back steps, where, incidentally, he’d been sitting earlier. State v. Gonzalez, 292 Ore. App. 342 (June 13, 2018):

Defendant appeals, reprising the arguments that he made below. We begin with whether, for purposes of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, defendant had a privacy interest in the area of Eichengreen’s home in which the police found the methamphetamine. Among other things, Article I, section 9, protects the people’s right to privacy against intrusion by the state. Privacy rights that are protected by Article I, section 9, can extend to invited guests in the home. See, e.g., City of Eugene v. Silva, 198 Ore. App. 101, 106-07, 108 P3d 23 (2005) (concluding that overnight guest who had unlimited access to a backyard had the same privacy rights in the backyard as the resident). The scope of the Article I, section 9, privacy right depends on the reason that the person is on the property. Cf. Tanner, 304 Ore. at 321 (distinguishing privacy rights of a dinner guest from those of a trespasser). Similarly, the scope of the privacy right is affected by the scope of the invitation to be on the property. Cf. id. (suggesting that a dinner guest might not have a privacy right in the basement of a home). The scope of an invitation to be on or to use property is inherently a fact-based inquiry that is affected by property-law principles, see State v. Howard/Dawson, 342 Ore. 635, 642, 157 P3d 1189 (2007) (recognizing that property law bears on Article I, section 9, privacy interests), and societal norms, see State v. Mast, 250 Ore. App. 605, 613, 282 P3d 916 (2012) (relying on societal norms to determine a person’s privacy interests for purposes of Article I, section 9).

Here, the trial court found that the scope of Eichengreen’s invitation to defendant to be on Eichengreen’s property did not extend to the area under the back steps. The trial court relied on contextual facts for its finding. First, it noted that defendant was in the home as a guest, not as a resident. Additionally, defendant did not have a close relationship with a resident there, because the person whom he had been dating no longer lived in the home. The court also noted that the invitation was extended by passive rather than active means. Finally, it noted that the purpose of the visit was to exchange money to pay to have a cat spayed. It found, based on those facts, that the scope of Eichengreen’s invitation was limited and did not extend to the area under the back steps in which the police found the methamphetamine. Thus, because the scope of Eichengreen’s invitation did not include that area, defendant lacked a protected privacy interest in it.

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