CA9: Anti-hunting checkpoint at entrance to national park was valid

A checkpoint at the entrance to a national park to guard against unlawful hunting in the park was minimally intrusive and not unconstitutional. Its purpose was prevention and deterrence, not arrests. Defendant was arrested for DUI. United States v. Fraire, 575 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2009):

Park rangers set up a vehicle checkpoint at the entrance to the Kings Canyon National Park to “mitigate the illegal taking of animals in the park” due to hunting, which is prohibited in the park. All vehicles were stopped for about 15 to 25 seconds, and their drivers asked about hunting. When Appellant Ricardo Fraire’s vehicle was stopped at the checkpoint, a ranger noted a strong odor of alcohol on Fraire’s breath. He subsequently was charged with driving under the influence and related offenses. In a motion to suppress, Fraire argued that the suspicionless stop of his vehicle was unconstitutional. We agree with the district court that it was not. We hold today that a momentary checkpoint stop of all vehicles at the entrance of a national park, aimed at preventing illegal hunting—which is minimally intrusive, justified by a legitimate concern for the preservation of park wildlife and the prevention of irreparable harm, directly related to the operation of the park, and confined to the park gate where visitors would expect to briefly stop—is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

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The checkpoint in this case is analogous to the [DUI] checkpoint upheld in Sitz and is distinguishable from the checkpoint in Edmond. A critical factor in Sitz was the close connection between the checkpoint and the harm it was seeking to prevent. Id. at 39 (describing the “obvious connection between the imperative of highway safety and the law enforcement practice at issue” in Sitz); id. at 43 (emphasizing the “close connection to roadway safety”). Likewise, here, the checkpoint was situated at an entrance to the park and sought to counter illegal hunting within that park. Unlike the drug crimes addressed by the Edmond checkpoint, which occur throughout the nation, the wildlife offenses here are specific to national parks. Further, just as the Sitz checkpoint prevented an immediate harm to motorists, the checkpoint here prevents hunters from destroying a precious natural resource. It does so by catching poachers before they can kill additional animals, by deterring would-be poachers, and by educating the park-going public about the hunting prohibition. The goal was prevention, not arrests.

Because the primary purpose of the checkpoint is distinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoint is not per se unconstitutional under Edmond. We must therefore determine its “reasonableness, hence, its constitutionality, on the basis of the individual circumstances.” Lidster, 540 U.S. at 426. Our first consideration is “the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure[.]” Id. at 427 (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 51). In Faulkner, we described the gravity of the public concerns served by an informational checkpoint in a national park (preventing litter, promoting fire safety, reducing incidents of driving under the influence, eliminating property destruction and gang activity, and protecting the environment) as high. 450 F.3d at 472. Here, the public concerns, including the protection of wildlife and ensuring the safety of park visitors, are equally pressing.

The second consideration is “the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest[.]” Lidster, 540 U.S. at 426 (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 51). Fraire contends that the checkpoint cannot be upheld without some empirical data demonstrating its effectiveness.
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