The passenger in a vehicle subjected to GPS monitoring even for a few days and on public roads has standing to contest the monitoring. Here, however, the GPS device was placed in February 2010, more than two years prior to Jones, so the state gets the benefit of the good faith exception. State v. Jean, 2018 Ariz. LEXIS 1 (Jan. 3, 2018):
¶32 We conclude that passengers traveling with the owner in a private vehicle generally have a reasonable expectation of privacy that is invaded by the government’s continually tracking the vehicle through a surreptitious GPS tracking device. In addition to the reasons noted above, we note that since Jones, at least one other state supreme court has found the government’s warrantless electronic monitoring of an individual’s movements to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment under the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. See Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014) (“[W]e conclude that such a subjective expectation of privacy of location as signaled by one’s cell phone―even on public roads―is an expectation of privacy that society is now prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable under the Katz ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test.”). And other courts have found that warrantless GPS tracking violates an individual’s right to privacy based on their own state constitutions. See State v. Holden, 54 A.3d 1123, 1132-33 (Del. Super. Ct. 2010) (finding warrantless GPS tracking violated state constitution on privacy grounds and noting GPS “represents more than a mere alternative to conventional physical surveillance” by enabling “24/7” surveillance); Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 990 N.E.2d 543, 553 (Mass. 2013) (finding thirty-day GPS tracking of passenger in vehicle violated state constitution because “a person may reasonably expect not to be subjected to extended GPS electronic surveillance by the government”); Jackson, 76 P.3d at 224 (holding, prior to Jones, that warrantless GPS tracking of vehicles violates state constitutional privacy provision).
. . .
¶38 GPS tracking is qualitatively different from visual surveillance, even on public roadways, because it can monitor “[t]he whole of a person’s progress through the world.” Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199. For the reasons noted, we conclude that Rakas and Knotts are not controlling and that Jean’s expectation of privacy from the warrantless GPS monitoring of his movements is one that “society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 n.7 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).