CA5: Rooker/Feldman abstention doesn’t bar action by SVP against how state handled a court order

Rooker/Feldman abstention didn’t bar plaintiff’s action against state officials enforcing a court order allegedly unconstitutionally, here against SVP. Brown v. Taylor, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1742 (5th Cir. Jan. 31, 2017) (see Treatise § 64.02):

The Order does not authorize Defendants to conduct the alleged searches and seizures that Brown argues violate the Fourth Amendment (Claim 12). In allegedly imposing these conditions, Defendants exercised discretion in implementing the Order. Rooker-Feldman does not prevent review of such discretionary executive action taken in enforcing state court judgments. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002); Mosley v. Bowie Cty. Tex., 275 F. App’x 327, 329 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that although a court could not hear a collateral attack on a state court judgment requiring payment of child support, it could consider claims that defendants violated constitutional rights “in the effort to enforce the state child support judgment”); Land & Bay Gauging, L.L.C. v. Shor, 623 F. App’x 674, 680 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he … claims do not attack the state-court judgment; they complain about the [defendants’] violations of their independent legal obligations.”).

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