CA5: “The mere failure of the officers to give an encyclopedic catalogue of everything they might be interested in does not alone render the consent to search involuntary.”

Defendant’s consent was voluntary even though she did not know she could refuse or what the officers were looking for. United States v. Avila-Hernandez, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21721 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 2016):

Avila does not argue that Laura did not know she could refuse to consent to the search, a factor “highly relevant” to voluntariness. See Jenkins, 46 F.3d at 451. He instead argues, without citing to or explaining any relevant precedent, that Laura’s consent was involuntary because of “deceit and trickery.” The district court did not address this argument when it denied Avila’s suppression motion. But the district court made some relevant factual findings during the suppression hearing. The district court found that the officers knew it was “likely” that Avila was at Laura’s house and that they “didn’t tell [Laura] that they were looking for him also.” Avila argues that this knowledge was enough to render Laura’s consent involuntary through “deceit and trickery.”

“The mere failure of the officers to give an encyclopedic catalogue of everything they might be interested in does not alone render the consent to search involuntary.” Davis, 749 F.2d at 295. The dispositive question is whether “the government agent was found to have intentionally deceived the defendant by making false representations in order to induce consent.” Id. at 297.

Laura’s consent was not involuntary because of deceit. As in Davis, “all of the statements the officers made and the impressions they gave were true.” Id. The district court found at the suppression hearing that the officers were looking for Castillo, that the officers believed that Castillo was at Laura’s house, and that the officers “had information [Castillo] had been there prior to that.” There is no evidence that Trooper Arevalo or any other officer told Laura that they were only looking for Castillo or that they intended to deceive her. Unlike in Davis, there is no evidence that Laura would have refused to consent to the search if the officers told her they were also looking for Avila or any other person involved in the kidnapping. See id. at 294. This court holds that the officers’ “unrevealed knowledge” did not render Laura’s consent involuntary.