CA5: There is no “contemporaneity between the evidence supporting probable cause and the arrest.”

There is no “contemporaneity between the evidence supporting probable cause and the arrest.” It’s up to police discretion when to arrest. Essentially: Staleness doesn’t apply to PC for arrest. United States v. Clark, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 7959 (5th Cir. May 2, 2016):

The district court’s conclusion that there must be contemporaneity between the evidence supporting probable cause and the arrest is unsupported by precedent. Neither of the cases cited by the district court—Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003), or Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 1994)—requires such contemporaneity; rather, both cases explain that probable cause exists if the facts prior to arrest provide an officer with a reasonable belief that a suspect had committed an offense. See Pringle, 540 U.S. at 369-74; Blackwell, 34 F.3d at 303. Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he necessary inquiry … [is] not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether there was probable cause for the arrest.” United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976). After discussing the permissibility of warrantless arrests based on probable cause, the Watson Court upheld the warrantless arrest of the defendant, even though the arrest took place approximately six days after probable cause for the arrest was first obtained and the Government never sought an arrest warrant. Id. at 412-13, 423-424.

Furthermore, we have previously recognized that “when probable cause exists, the timing of an arrest is a matter that the Constitution almost invariably leaves to police discretion.” United States v. Willis, 304 F. App’x 256, 258 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished) (quoting United States v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 554 (1st Cir. 1999)). Thus, probable cause existed to arrest Clark because the earlier tip from the confidential informant and the controlled purchase provided BRPD with facts that “would support a reasonable person’s belief that an offense ha[d] been … committed and that the individual arrested [was] the guilty party.” Hearn, 563 F.3d at 103 (quoting Hart, 127 F.3d at 444).