Possible gun is not grounds for protective sweep; a sweep is aimed at locating people

Defendant was a police officer, so he “cannot reasonably argue that he was vulnerable in any way or did not understand the rights he was giving up. He was fully aware that he could force the officers to obtain a warrant before they searched his home, but he chose not to.” The mere fact of a gun on the premises is not cause for a protective sweep because it is limited to looking for people. State v. Evans, 2008 Ohio 2032, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 1735 (8th Dist. May 1, 2008).

“[A] method of drug delivery described by the confidential informant” was sufficient to show a nexus to defendant’s property to support a search warrant. Commonwealth v. Pina, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 653, 885 N.E.2d 157 (2008).*

Miranda violation under Oregon law compels suppression of everything that results from it. State v. Vondehn, 219 Ore. App. 492, 184 P.3d 567 (2008):

The issue in this case is whether the analysis that the Supreme Court described in Hall applies when the police obtain voluntary consent to a search by exploiting a previous interrogation that violated Article I, section 12, because of a failure to give Miranda warnings. We conclude that it does.

The foundation of the analysis in Hall is that Article I, section 9, creates a constitutional right to be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures and that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to vindicate that right. In the same way, Article I, section 12, creates a constitutional right not to be compelled to provide testimony or furnish evidence against oneself, a right that applies in any kind of judicial or nonjudicial procedure, including police interrogation. State v. Fish, 321 Ore. 48, 53, 893 P.2d 1023 (1995). The right by its express terms constitutes an exclusionary rule that prohibits the use of testimonial evidence acquired as a result of its violation, but it also protects a person from being compelled in the first instance to furnish evidence. State v. Soriano, 68 Ore. App. 642, 646 n 4, 684 P.2d 1220, aff’d and opinion adopted, 298 Ore. 392, 693 P.2d 26. Again, under the Oregon Constitution, the right is based not on deterring police misconduct but on preserving a person’s freedom to decide whether to speak. The Miranda warnings are an essential part of protecting that freedom of decision and thus of protecting the constitutional right. Excluding testimony that violates the Miranda rule, thus, is necessary to vindicate the constitutional right.