M.D.Tenn.: “[D]etermining when a traffic stop has been completed, or reasonably should have been completed, can be complicated”

Reconsideration was sought under Rodriguez, and the court finds that defendant consented to the search before the stop became too long. United States v. Hendrix, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146860 (M.D.Tenn. Oct. 29, 2015):

To be sure, determining when a traffic stop has been completed, or reasonably should have been completed, can be complicated. Certainly the Court cannot “arbitrarily define the scope of the traffic stop by making a finding of fact that a [warning] ticket usually takes a certain period of time for an officer to issue.” United States v. Torres-Ramos, 536 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 2008). Nor can it be that the measure of a valid stop is demarked by when a traffic ticket or warning is actually written “[b]ecause a crafty officer, knowing this rule, may simply delay writing a ticket for the initial traffic violation until after she has satisfied herself that all of her hunches were unfounded[.]” United States v. Ellis, 497 F.3d 606, 612 (6th Cir. 2007). And, conversely, it cannot be “that by completing all traffic-related tasks expeditiously, an officer can earn bonus time to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation.” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (2015).

Rather, as with so much under the Fourth Amendment, the issue is reasonableness, with the ultimate question being “whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly[.]” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985). The answer to that question “depends on what the police in fact do” — do their actions “‘prolong[] — i.e. add[] time to — the stop[?]'” Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1616. Officer Wilson’s actions before receiving a valid consent to search from Jarman did no such thing.

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