Cal.4: Dispatch told officer that def was on probation for one crime, but it actually had expired; he was, however, on probation for something else; GFE applied

The officer here responded to a suspicious activity report and found a stolen trailer in defendant’s yard with a piece of pipe on it. He inquired of dispatch and was told defendant was on probation for brandishing a weapon. He did not inquire whether there was a search term, and he assumed there was because he never encountered a suspect on probation for a weapons offense that did not have a search term. “Later, Deputy Yamaguchi learned that, at the time of the search, defendant was no longer on probation for the brandishing a weapon conviction. Defendant’s probation for that offense had ended on March 1, 2012, about one month prior to the search of his residence. Defendant, however, was on probation at the time of the search for a felony case, case No. INF028639, which contained search terms. Deputy Yamaguchi acknowledged that at the time he entered defendant’s home to conduct the probation search, he did not know any specific terms and conditions of defendant’s probation and that law enforcement officers do not directly contact the court to find an individual’s specific terms and conditions.” The exclusionary rule would not be applied because the officer was acting in good faith reliance on the probation report and his experience, despite the fact that specific probation expired because there still was a probation search term on defendant. People v. Wolfgang, 2015 Cal. App. LEXIS 877 (4th Dist. October 5, 2015):

We think the Hill court’s approach to the problem of applying Sanders to a mix-up situation is relevant here. Application of the exclusionary rule to the facts here would not serve a deterrent purpose, nor would upholding the search impugn judicial integrity. Here, the dispatcher advised the deputy that defendant was on probation for brandishing a weapon. The deputy, based on his training and experience, was aware that individuals placed on probation for weapons violations are subject to search conditions. The dispatcher’s information with the deputy’s awareness was sufficient to convey to the deputy in the field that defendant was searchable. And, in fact, defendant was on probation for a felony case, and searchable. The mistake here was the dispatcher’s misspoken word. Under the totality of these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the dispatcher and the deputy were collectively at fault for an inaccurate record that resulted in an unconstitutional search or that the deputy’s actions constituted misconduct.