In a rare occurrence, the Western District of Texas at El Paso believed the motorist and passenger over the officer about the reasonable suspicion for the stop. The defendant had been stopped four times in a short period of time, and the officer’s testimony was just too suspicious. And, even if the reasonable suspicion doesn’t survive appeal, the stop was too long under Rodriguez and is suppressed. United States v. Waller, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63145 (W.D. Tex. May 14, 2015):
Because the Court received conflicting testimony on whether Adrienna was operating the vehicle in compliance with Texas law, the Court’s resolution of the first step of the Terry analysis necessarily requires a credibility determination. See Turner, 628 F.2d at 465. In this vein, the Court finds Adrienna’s and Defendant’s testimony to be more credible than that of Officer Granados’s for several reasons. As an initial matter, the uncontradicted evidence at the hearing establishes that the September 25, 2014, traffic stop was the fourth occasion in a span of a week that a team of TAC officers stopped Adrienna’s vehicle. See Tr. 87-90, 103-04. Indeed, Officer Granados admitted that he personally stopped Adrienna “maybe two or three nights before” September 25, 2014, see id. at 30-33, 55, and Officer St. Lewis testified without elaboration that he recognized Adrienna from “traffic stops.” Id. at 79. Given that Adrienna had already been stopped three times by EPPD that week, the Court doubts that she was operating the SUV on September 25, 2014, in blatant violation of several Texas traffic ordinances. Instead, the Court finds it more likely that Officer Granados and Officer Ibarra stopped the SUV on September 25, 2014, solely based on their desire to further their ongoing narcotics investigation.7 This conclusion is consistent with the fact that on all four occasions that the TAC officers detained Adrienna under the guise of a traffic stop, they never once issued her a single citation. See id. at 100, 108.
In addition to the suspicious circumstances surrounding the September 25, 2014, stop, the Court also notes that it found Officer Granados’s testimony to be evasive on several material issues. For example, while Officer Granados claimed that he and Officer Ibarra were merely conducting routine traffic enforcement on September 25, 2014, id. at 8, 58, the TAC unit to which he and Officer Ibarra belong is responsible for investigating major crimes in the El Paso area, id. at 29, 56, not “cruising around, checking to see if everybody [was obeying] the traffic laws.” Id. at 8. Moreover, while Officer Granados initially represented that he did not know who Defendant was until he saw the Texarkana Home listed on her insurance information, see id. at 13-14, he later testified on cross examination that narcotics detectives told him several days prior to the traffic stop that Defendant “was a target of a narcotics investigation.” Id. at 37. Thus, at bottom, Officer Granados’s testimony is that two TAC officers who were conducting routine “traffic enforcement” because they “didn’t have any cases that particular week,” id. at 58, randomly stopped a vehicle whose passenger happened to be the primary target of an EPPD narcotics investigation, and whose driver they were already familiar with because they had stopped her two or three times previously that same week, including “maybe two or three nights before” September 25, 2014. Id. at 30-33. In short, the Court is of the opinion that this testimony is disingenuous at best. And, although it is not illegal to conduct a pretextual traffic stop, see Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, Officer Granados’s lack of candor undermines the veracity of his testimony as a whole, including his representations that Adrienna was speeding and using her cell phone at the time of the stop.8 See Turner, 628 F.2d at 465.
Finally, the fact that Adrienna had outstanding traffic warrants does not automatically render the traffic stop constitutional. While police officers may undoubtedly stop a vehicle based on their reasonable suspicion that the driver has outstanding traffic warrants, see, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 145 F. App’x 894, 895 (5th Cir. 2005), here, Officer Granados himself testified that the only justifications for the stop were speeding and the driver’s illegal use of a cell phone. See Tr. 8-9, 29-30, 53. Indeed, according to Officer Granados, he and his partner did not recognize Adrienna as the driver of the SUV until after they had already initiated the traffic stop and exited their police cruiser. See id. at 30. As a result, Adrienna’s outstanding traffic warrants could not serve as an independent justification for the September 25, 2014, stop.
In sum, because the Court credits Adrienna’s testimony that she was neither speeding nor talking on her cell phone at the time of the stop, see Turner, 628 F.2d at 465, and because the officers claim not to have recognized Adrienna as the driver of the SUV until after they stopped the vehicle, the Court finds that the officers lacked an objectively reasonable basis to stop the SUV on September 25, 2014. See Cole, 444 F.3d at 689. Without an objectively reasonable basis to initiate the traffic stop, Defendant’s detention was unlawful. See id.
In every other case I see, the officer always gets credited on basis for the stop. I’ve listened to incredible pattern testimony, knowing full well the judge knows it’s pattern testimony too, and, still, the stop is always valid. Usually, there’s a snide comment about “who has an interest in the outcome? The defendant.” Yes, but so does the officer who’s making a career on the stops he or she makes and the convictions obtained, and the quantity of drugs and money seized.
