CA7: No Fourth Amendment Heck bar in false statements case

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment civil claim not barred by Heck v. Humphrey because it says nothing about, and doesn’t undermine, his false statement conviction. Hill v. Murphy, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 7351 (7th Cir. May 4, 2015) (concurrence):

The Fourth Amendment claims that we have listed are not barred by the principle of Heck v. Humphrey (such claims rarely are, see Wallace v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 421, 426-28 (7th Cir. 2006), affirmed under the name Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 166 L. Ed. 2d 973 (2007); VanGilder v. Baker, 435 F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 2006); Covey v. Assessor of Ohio County, 777 F.3d 186, 197 (4th Cir. 2015); Hooper v. County of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1127, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2011); Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160-61 (11th Cir. 2003)). If the police roughed up Hill, seized his gun without justification, waved a loaded gun in his face, and so on, these outrages, constituting violations of his Fourth Amendment right not to be subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure, would entitle him to damages for physical and psychological injury resulting from the search and seizure and for the expropriation of his gun. That would be true even if he’d never been prosecuted. But such violations of his rights would not exonerate him from the false statement and attempted-extortion charges that were the only grounds of his convictions.