NM: The “new crime” exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply to identity-related offenses; it would to violent crimes

Defendant was a passenger in a car stopped without reasonable suspicion, and he had no seatbelt on. He gave a false name and signed the ticket with the false name. That was forgery. The new crime is suppressed because it furthers the purpose of the exclusionary rule. It is also not attenuated. State v. Tapia, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 20 (February 16, 2015):

{17} The authorities cited by Defendant are the most persuasive. Specifically, the policy reasons for recognizing a new crime exception to the exclusionary rule simply do not exist when a non-violent, identity-related offense is committed in response to unconstitutional police conduct. On the other hand, applying the exclusionary rule in such circumstances advances its purpose of deterring unlawful police conduct. See State v. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 24, 147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032 (“[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter unlawful police conduct[.]”); see also Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217 (“The [exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.”). In this case, the identity crime was directly connected to the seat belt infraction, and the seat belt infraction was only unearthed because of the unconstitutional police conduct. Under these facts, applying the exclusionary rule serves to deter the initial unconstitutional conduct. See Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]o arrest for concealing identity, there must be reasonable suspicion of some predicate, underlying crime.”). Furthermore, the societal cost for excluding evidence that a non-violent offense was committed to avoid a seat belt infraction appears to be minor. Because the deterrent effect outweighs the societal costs, suppression of the evidence of Defendant’s new crimes is appropriate. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 141 (suppression is an appropriate remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation when the benefits of deterrence outweigh the costs). We hold that the commission of a non-violent, identity-related offense in response to unconstitutional police conduct does not automatically purge the taint of the unlawful police conduct under federal law.

This entry was posted in Exclusionary rule. Bookmark the permalink.

Comments are closed.