The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a wildlife case, holds that its state constitution does not create greater protection in open fields than the federal constitution, after a sensitive analysis of whether it should. State v. Russo, 594 Pa. 119, 934 A.2d 1199 (2007) (a case under submission for a year and a half):
The citizens of this Commonwealth throughout our history have shown a keen interest in protecting and preserving as an asset the diverse wildlife that find refuge in the fields and forests within our borders. This interest is so strong that it is enshrined by a separate provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27. The legislative and executive branches, in turn, have enacted and executed a plethora of statutes and regulations designed to enforce the people’s right to the preservation of our wildlife. Thus, our Constitution and enacted statutes–as well as the agencies created to enforce them–all confirm that, in Pennsylvania, any subjective expectation of privacy against governmental intrusion in open fields is not an expectation that our society has ever been willing to recognize as reasonable. In short, the baseline protections of the Fourth Amendment, in this particular area, are compatible with Pennsylvania policy considerations insofar as they may be identified. More importantly, there is nothing in the unique Pennsylvania experience to suggest that we should innovate a departure from common law and from federal law and reject the open fields doctrine.
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the guarantees of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution do not extend to open fields; federal and state law, in this area, are coextensive. Therefore, we affirm the Commonwealth Court’s determination that Officers Wasserman and Pierce did not violate appellant’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
“The officer testified appellant’s vehicle did not come to a full stop until the front wheels crossed the [stop] line. This observation provided the officer with an objectively reasonable ground for a stop.” There was a basis for the stop, so pretext was not an issue under Whren. People v. Binkowski, 157 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 741 (2007).*
Police arrived at a domestic disturbance which had defendant arguing with his girlfriend about a videotape she had in her hand. He was trying to “snatch it back” from her. Finally, he consented to the police viewing the tape because “there was nothing on it.” The police saw him masturbating in front of two minor females, and he was arrested. The viewing of the videotape was consensual. Mitchell v. State, 289 Ga. App. 55, 656 S.E.2d 145 (2007).*
Handwritten consent form was valid, and it broadly granted permission to search. “The form read in part: ‘I specifically give my consent and authorize these persons to inspect and remove any items of evidence which maybe related, directly or indirectly, to the investigations of the circumstances and/or the cause of the fire.’ (Emphasis added).” Clothing was written in, and it was valid. State v. Marshall, 2007 Ohio 6298, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 5528 (4th Dist. November 16, 2007)*:
[*P33] Appellant claims that even if his consent was voluntary the scope of the search was limited due to Fire Marshall Lawless writing “for clothing” on the bottom of the form. As previously noted, Lawless testified that he wrote those words only to ensure Appellant’s clothes were retrieved. He testified they had no bearing on the scope of the search. Both Lawless and Officer Wilson of the Ironton Police Department testified that the words “for clothing” were added after Appellant had already signed the consent form. Further, Wilson and Lawless testified that Appellant in no way asked to limit the scope of the search.
[*P34] “The standard for measuring the scope of consent under the Fourth Amendment is objective reasonableness, i.e., what a typical reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect.” Felder at 17. In the case at hand, a reasonable person would not have concluded the scope of search was to be limited to clothes only. The text of the consent to search form, which was read aloud to Appellant, stated “any items of evidence” potentially related to the fire could be removed and the evidence shows Appellant signed the form with this understanding. The hand-written words “for clothing” were not written at the request, or under the direction, of Appellant, but were written simply to ensure that his clothes were collected in addition to any other relevant evidence.
