PA: Seatbelt checkpoints are governed by the same standards as DUI checkpoints

Seatbelt checkpoints are governed by the same standards as DUI checkpoints. Commonwealth v. Garibay, 2014 PA Super 272, 2014 Pa. Super. LEXIS 4548 (December 9, 2014):

Like DUI checkpoints, checkpoints established to inspect vehicle safety and seatbelt usage are lawful in Pennsylvania, provided that the checkpoint complies with the procedural requirements outlined by the Tarbert/Blouse guidelines. In re J.A.K., 2006 PA Super 256, 908 A.2d 322, 325-26 (Pa.Super.2006). In In re J.A.K., a seatbelt safety checkpoint case, this Court specifically stated:

[W]e are convinced, by the plain language of 75 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. § 6308(b), that so long as a “systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers” is followed, then an investigative roadblock may be conducted to enforce any provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code. Indeed, the plain language of 75 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. § 6308(b) clearly does not limit the situations under which such a roadblock may be conducted, other than to specify that such a stop must be “necessary to enforce the provisions of [the Motor Vehicle Code].” Therefore, we find that while 75 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. § 4581(a)(2) may prohibit a police officer from making routine traffic stops for a seatbelt violation, nothing in that provision prohibits an investigative roadblock that checks for general motor vehicle safety compliance, provided that a proper systematic program is implemented. Such roadblocks afford minimal personal interference, while furthering an important highway safety interest.

In re J.A.K., 908 A.2d at 325-26 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis supplied).

Regarding the evidence the Commonwealth must put forth at a suppression hearing to justify the selection of a DUI checkpoint, this Court has explained that “[t]o ensure that the intrusion upon the travelling public remains minimal, we cannot accept [] general testimony elicited at [a suppression] hearing as proof of ‘substantial compliance’ with the [Tarbert/Blouse guidelines].” Blee, 695 A.2d at 806. Rather, “[a]t the very least, the Commonwealth [must] present information sufficient to specify the number of DUI-related arrests and/or accidents [at] … the specific location of the sobriety checkpoint.” Id. If the Commonwealth fails to introduce evidence concerning the number of DUI-related arrests and/or accidents in explaining the choice of a checkpoint’s location, then the checkpoint will be deemed unconstitutional. Compare Blee, supra (checkpoint unconstitutional where testimony at suppression hearing related to DUI arrests and DUI-related accidents county-wide and in certain municipalities rather than at the specific location of the sobriety checkpoint) and Commonwealth v. Trivitt, 437 Pa. Super. 432, 650 A.2d 104 (Pa.Super.1994) (same) with Commonwealth v. Ziegelmeir, 454 Pa. Super. 330, 685 A.2d 559 (Pa.Super.1996) (roadblock constitutional where testimony established the number of DUI-related accidents and arrests in the particular area of the checkpoint), Commonwealth v. Myrtetus, 397 Pa. Super. 299, 580 A.2d 42 (Pa.Super.1990) (same), and Yastrop, supra (sobriety checkpoint constitutional where officer who set up checkpoint testified that he reviewed PennDOT records and information that led him to conclude the checkpoint location was a route likely to be travelled by intoxicated drivers). The Commonwealth must fulfill these same specified procedural requirements for both DUI and non-DUI checkpoints. See In re J.A.K., supra.