Product of an arrest on a recently recalled warrant suppressed under the state constitution. The police had plenty of time to check the status of the warrant during the hours of surveillance looking for defendant and waiting for him to show up. They also violated their department’s own policy on checking the validity of warrants before attempting to execute them. Commonwealth v. Maingrette, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 691, 20 N.E.3d 626 (2014):
On appeal, the Commonwealth does not dispute that had the officers checked the WMS in the minutes immediately preceding the defendant’s arrest, they would have discovered that the arrest warrant was no longer valid. Nor is there any dispute that, absent the warrant, there was no independent basis for the arrest. The Commonwealth contends, however, that the police reliance upon information obtained from the WMS about four hours before the arrest was reasonable. The Commonwealth argues that, based on the officers’ experience, there was no good reason for the officers to suspect that the defendant had cleared the warrant after 1:00 p.m. and the defendant did not inform the officer of the recall when stopped and placed under arrest. Because the “delay in obtaining the updated information was reasonable,” and art. 14 “is not violated by reasonable mistakes of fact,” Commonwealth v. Porter P., 456 Mass. 254, 270, 923 N.E.2d 36 (2010), the Commonwealth argues, probable cause existed at the time of arrest and exclusion is not an appropriate remedy.
. . .
Several Massachusetts appellate cases shed light on the appropriate analysis to be applied when reliance by a police officer on mistaken information to justify a search or seizure, as here, is the officer’s responsibility alone. First, in Commonwealth v. Hecox, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 619 N.E.2d 339 (1993), we reversed a defendant’s conviction of trafficking in cocaine where a police officer mistakenly believed that an arrest warrant for the defendant was outstanding — even though it had been rendered obsolete five days earlier — because the officer either “did not check with his communications officer or he received incorrect data until the time he arrested the defendant.” Id. at 281. Deciding the matter solely under Federal law, id. at 282, we held that, where police have “stale information or outmoded records that are demonstrably incorrect, the government has the burden of showing that it is not at fault in failing to update its records or to provide correct information.” Id. at 284. Because the Commonwealth failed to meet this burden, we concluded that the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence should have been allowed. Id. at 285. This court stated in Hecox, “‘[T]he police may not rely upon incorrect or incomplete information when they are at fault in permitting the records to remain uncorrected’ or at fault in not informing themselves.” Id. at 284, quoting from 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.5(d), at 21-22 (2d ed. 1987).
. . .
Applying this analysis to the case at bar, the result is dictated by the circumstances preceding the arrest and the Boston police department policy. Specifically, the evidence shows that at various intervals during the afternoon in question there were up to nine police officers working together to locate and arrest the defendant. The assignment did not include responding to an ongoing crime in which the defendant was engaged, but rather consisted primarily of surveillance intended to locate him. Each officer in the team had access to a computer that could be used to instantly access the WMS. Added to this was testimony that between 3:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. two detectives remained in the neighborhood solely for the purpose of “watching [the defendant’s] residence.” When they saw the defendant return at 4:15 p.m., the detectives summonsed the other officers, including Burrows, back to the area. Burrows testified that after their arrival, “[n]othing” was happening: “We were just waiting for transmissions from the detectives watching the residence” (emphasis added). About thirty minutes later, around 5:00 p.m., the detectives alerted Burrows and the other officers that the defendant was driving away from the apartment building, and he was stopped shortly thereafter. Given these facts, it is difficult to conclude that the police had neither the time nor the opportunity to check the WMS to confirm that the arrest warrant was still active.
This failure contravened the clear policy mandate of the Boston police department, set out in special order number 95-31, dated June 2, 1995, that “[i]mmediately prior to arresting a person for an outstanding warrant officers shall notify Operations so that the computerized Warrant Management System can be checked to determine if the outstanding warrant is still active .… ” As the motion judge found, “[i]f the police had properly followed this mandate, they would have learned that the defendant was no longer on default and they were not legally authorized to stop him and search his vehicle.”
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)