CA5: City DPW worker driving pickup in accident he caused could be drug tested

City Public Works Department supervisor was subject to drug testing under city employment manual for an on the job vehicle accident where his pickup truck grazed a tree stump and he was admittedly at fault. The test was about three days later and followed up with another one, and he tested positive for marijuana. Drug testing on this condition was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Bryant v. City of Monroe, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22127 (5th Cir. November 19, 2014):

Applying this “special needs” framework, the Supreme Court has upheld rules or regulations authorizing suspicionless drug tests of Customs employees applying for positions requiring them to carry firearms or directly engage in drug interdiction, see Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679, and student athletes, see Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65, but rejected testing of political candidates, Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321-22. This Court has applied the same analytical framework to uphold a test of a custodian pursuant to a rule requiring random drug testing of designated safety-sensitive school employees. See Aubrey v. School Board of Lafayette Parish, 148 F.3d 559, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1998). Finally, in a decision particularly relevant to these facts, the Sixth Circuit upheld the application of a policy requiring public transportation drivers to undergo a drug test after “an accident involving a fixed object.” See Tanks v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 930 F.2d 475, 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1991).

Guided by these cases, the U.S. Magistrate Judge concluded that the test administered to Bryant was a constitutionally reasonable application of both the departmental Accident/Incident Policy and Category II of the City Policy. See Bryant, 2013 WL 5924731, at *10-11. On appeal, the parties likewise frame the issues in terms of the “special needs” analysis.

We begin by clarifying the issues presented in this appeal. First, we find no genuine dispute of fact on this record that the “Simple Fault” testing provision of the Accident/Incident Policy was triggered because Bryant’s City-owned vehicle hit the bush as a result of his inadvertence. Second, although Bryant suggests that the Policy is vague or overbroad, we do not treat this as a facial constitutional challenge. A suspicionless drug-testing policy may be constitutional as applied to some employees but unconstitutional as applied to others. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 678-79. Accordingly, we address whether the Accident/Incident Policy was constitutional as it was applied to Bryant on these facts. Third, because we conclude that the drug test was a constitutionally reasonable application of the Accident/Incident Policy, we decline to decide whether the U.S. Magistrate Judge also correctly granted summary judgment based on Category II of the City Policy.